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“This invaluable book brings empirical rigour to a debate that is too often emo-
tive, polarised and selective in its approach to the facts. By examining how the 
Prevent duty is enacted in practice, the authors provide a sound evidence base 
for future policy development.”
—David Anderson QC, House of Lords, and former 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, UK
“In the current context of increased concern and a shifting landscape around 
terrorism, this is such an important book. As it traces how Prevent is being 
understood and rolled out across all sectors of education from early years to 
further education, it provides a nuanced yet persuasive narrative of policy imple-
mentation. The great strengths of the book are firstly its careful empirical 
research – in contrast to some of the armchair rants about the crushing weight 
and stigma of Prevent. Then it is able to reveal the agency of teachers and stu-
dents in what they do with Prevent, not portraying them as passive victims of 
some top-down securitisation strategy. Third, it confirms the problems of attach-
ing a Prevent duty to Fundamental British Values – not that teachers and stu-
dents do not agree with such values, but that they are rightly scathing about the 
claimed ‘Britishness’ of them. This book is crucial reading for at least three audi-
ences: first, policy makers who are revising counter-terror and Prevent type strat-
egies, second, those making judgements on Prevent enactment such as OFSTED, 
and third, those involved in training around extremism and radicalisation in 
schools. The book reveals what teachers and students actually want to know in 
this contested and complex area. It is an impressive read.”
—Lynn Davies, Emeritus Professor of International Education, 
Birmingham University, UK, and Director of ConnectFutures
“The involvement of educational institutions and professionals in counter-ter-
rorism processes through the Prevent Duty has been controversial. This timely 
collection provides an incisive set of essay that emphasise teachers’ and students’ 
lived experiences of both the Prevent Duty and the requirement that teachers 
promote fundamental British values in schools. Based on up-to-date research, 
the authors emphasise the varying enactments of the Prevent Duty in different 
schools and colleges, and conclude by discussing what effect practitioners can 
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have on the Duty as well as the effect it has on them. This is vital reading for 
those interested in and wanting to go beyond the headlines to learn about the 
effects of the Prevent Duty on the ground.”
—Carol Vincent, Professor of Sociology of Education, 
UCL Institute of Education, UK
“This book provides evidence-based answers to critical questions that have long 
concerned those of us in the C/PVE field, especially policymakers and research-
ers. What is the impact on teachers and students of the “Prevent Duty” policy 
enactment? Do we need to talk about extremism to our students? Has this enact-
ment had any negative effects? The UK has been a source of inspiration and 
learning for many countries working on C/PVE and this book helps answer 
many of the questions that this strategy has raised, especially about the positive 
and negative effects on the educational system.”
—Pablo Madriaza, General Chair, UNESCO Chair for the Prevention of 
Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (UNESCO-PREV), 
University of Quebec in Montreal, Canada
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Abstract The introduction in 2015 of a legal duty requiring that all pro-
viders of compulsory education in Britain pay ‘due regard to the need to 
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ prompted extensive 
policy, academic and public debate. To date however we still have a lim-
ited understanding of how this ‘Prevent Duty’ is playing out on the 
ground in schools, colleges and early years provision. This chapter sets 
out how this volume contributes towards addressing this gap in the litera-
ture. We draw attention in particular to the volume’s emphasis on detailed 
empirical analysis, introduce the concept of ‘policy enactment’ (Ball, S., 
Maguire, M., & Braun, A., How schools do policy: Policy enactments in 
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secondary schools. Routledge, Abingdon, 2012) and discuss how this con-
cept has informed the broad analytical approach adopted in this volume.
Keywords Prevent • Counter-terrorism • Education • Policy enactment  
• Policy impact • PVE
 The Prevent Duty in Education
In July 2015 the UK government introduced a legal duty requiring that 
‘specified authorities’ show ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from 
being drawn into terrorism’ (Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, 
s.26)—popularly referred to as the ‘Prevent Duty’. due to its association 
with the Prevent strand of the UK’s wider Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The 
‘specified authorities’ to which the Duty applied included all schools, regis-
tered early years childcare providers and further education providers, along-
side universities, and health and social care providers. For providers of early 
years, primary, secondary and further education, the statutory and supple-
mental guidance issued by the government sets out two areas of responsi-
bility: first, ensuring that ‘staff are able to identify children who may be 
vulnerable to radicalisation and know what to do when they are identified’ 
(Department for Education, 2015, p. 5), and second, requiring that they 
‘build pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British 
values and enabling them to challenge extremist views’ (Ibid.).
Both aspects of the Duty were presented by the government as a 
straightforward extension of existing policy and practice. The first require-
ment was presented as an extension of existing safeguarding requirements 
and practices (Home Office, 2015); the second as a continuation of non-
statutory guidance already set out in the framework for Social, Moral, 
Spiritual and Cultural (SMSC) education urging schools to promote fun-
damental British values (DfE, 2014). Nonetheless, it has been seen by 
many observers—among them policymakers, academics, civil society 
groups and educationalists—as constituting a significant change to the 
way that the country responds to and conceives of its response to the 
threat of terrorism. Indeed, with this legislation, the UK became the first 
country in the world to place specific legal responsibility on educational 
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institutions to play an important role within attempts to prevent extrem-
ism and terrorism.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Duty quickly became the focus of substan-
tial policy and public debate. Those supportive of the Duty argued that it 
was a necessary response to a very real social problem and that its conti-
nuity with existing practice meant that it would cause little if any disrup-
tion to education provision. Those critical of the Duty argued, among 
other things, that it would undermine free speech, securitise educational 
spaces, exacerbate the stigmatisation and alienation of British Muslims, 
and that the notions of ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ that underpinned the 
Duty denied student agency and potentially pathologised dissent (see 
Chap. 2 for further details). To date, however, we still have relatively 
scarce available evidence with which to evaluate such claims or with 
which we can really understand how the introduction of the Duty has 
shaped practices within these educational settings and how the enact-
ment of the Duty is evolving over time.
Official government statistics do indicate that the Duty generated a 
sharp increase in the number of referrals being made to Prevent. There 
was a steep 75% year-on-year increase in overall referrals when the Duty 
was introduced, with 7631 referrals between April 2015 and March 2016 
(Home Office, 2017). Since then the numbers have fluctuated, but have 
remained well above where they were prior to the introduction of the 
Duty (Home Office, 2018a): 6093 referrals in 2016–17 (Home Office, 
2018b), 7318  in 2017–18 (Home Office, 2018c) and then a drop to 
5738 in 2018–19 (Home Office, 2019). Throughout this time, approxi-
mately a third of those referrals have come from the education sector, 
between 56% and 58% of referrals were for people aged under 20 and 
over a quarter were aged under 15 years. As well as making up the major-
ity of referrals to Prevent, young people aged 20 and below make up the 
majority of cases actually discussed at Channel panels and the majority of 
cases which subsequently receive support through Channel, the govern-
ment’s anti-radicalisation mentoring programme (Home Office data 
cited above).
There have also emerged a number of academic studies with which we 
can begin to build a picture. These comprise smaller- and larger-scale 
studies, and encompass a range of qualitative, quantitative and mixed 
1 Introduction 
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methods (see Jerome, Elwick, & Kazim, 2019, for a summary). Yet as 
Jerome and colleagues observe, the evidence base is still in its infancy. 
This is particularly the case when it comes to capturing how the Prevent 
Duty is playing out in practice and understanding how this is being 
shaped by broader developments within policy, politics, society and the 
relevant professions.
 Our Contribution to the Debate About Prevent
This volume responds to the need for more research that documents how 
the Duty is playing out on the ground. It does this by bringing together 
research that examines the enactment, impact and implications of the 
Prevent Duty across statutory education provision—in early years, pri-
mary, secondary and further education. Chapter 2 provides an account of 
the evolving policy context and the debates that surrounded the Duty as 
it was introduced in 2015. Chapter 3 uses data collected during the first 
18 months after the introduction of the Duty to interrogate claims about 
the potential impacts of the Duty in school and further education set-
tings. Chapter 4 explores student perspectives on the educational provi-
sion around the Duty and assesses the extent to which some of the 
materials promoted in response to the Duty meet students’ requirements. 
Subsequent chapters examine the enactment of the Duty in early years 
settings (Chap. 5), primary schools (Chap. 6), secondary schools (Chap. 
7) and further education settings (Chap. 8).
The chapters employ a variety of methodological approaches, from 
medium-scale quantitative surveys to small-scale qualitative studies. They 
also vary in terms of the extent to which they focus on the perspectives of 
staff or children and young people, or a combination of the two. What 
binds them together, however, is a shared interest in asking a relatively 
simple question: what is happening in the education system as a result of 
the Prevent Duty?
To date, the literature on Prevent in education, like much of the aca-
demic literature on the effects of programmes to counter or prevent vio-
lent extremism (C/PVE) more generally, has deployed a number of 
critical theoretical perspectives in order to identify and interrogate issues 
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raised by the growing emphasis on education within C/PVE program-
ming. One prominent focus has been on concerns about the securitisa-
tion of education (Awan, Spiller, & Whiting, 2018; Gearon, 2015) and 
the way that the Prevent Duty and similar technologies of power might 
distort the relationships between staff, children and young people, and 
parents (O’Donnell, 2016). Other scholars have employed a range of 
perspectives to explore the relationship between C/PVE and secularism 
(Davies, 2008), religious education (Miller, 2018), cosmopolitanism 
(Gholami, 2018) and tolerance (Bowie, 2018). There have also been calls 
for early years practitioners and teachers to define what might constitute 
a distinctively educational approach to Prevent (as opposed to a security- 
led approach) (Panjwani, 2016), which recognises young people’s agency 
(Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks, & De Winter, 2015) and encourages the 
development of critical citizenship (Vincent, 2019).
Such approaches are important for framing questions and opening up 
new lines of enquiry, but such theoretical critiques, or proposals, also 
have their limitations. Indeed, and at worst, the inclination to theorise 
about such policy problems can encourage a tendency ‘to substitute mere 
abstract ideas for concrete, specific investigations’ (Meiklejohn cited in 
Thomas, 2007, p. 45), and we must remain alert to the risk that theory 
can sometimes provide a ‘strait-jacket’ into which the evidence is coerced 
(Wright Mills, 1959/2000).
In this volume, by contrast, the contributions have been developed 
adopting what we might call a theoretically parsimonious approach to 
the collection, analysis and reporting of data. The contributors focus pri-
marily on the detailed description and discussion of empirical data, rather 
than foregrounding whatever theoretical framework they might prefer. 
We recognise that there is a fine line to tread between foregrounding 
empirical data and slipping into a kind of naïve empiricism (Juslin, 
Winman, & Olsson, 2000), in which we somehow expect empirical 
observation to speak for itself and deliver conclusions, and in which we 
become blind to the way that empirical findings themselves are shaped by 
pre-configured values, world-views and theoretical starting points. We 
believe however that there is a very real need for the sort of empirically 
focused research presented in this volume if we are to find a way of cut-
ting through the often heavily polarised and polarising debates that 
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currently dominate public and policy discourse about Prevent, the 
Prevent Duty and C/PVE work more broadly.
There are also a number of ways in which we can mitigate against fall-
ing into a naïve empiricism. One of these is by making clear when we are 
switching from presenting data to arriving at conclusions, and in doing 
so, to clarify how those conclusions draw on values or theory (Gewirtz & 
Cribb, 2006). This is something that all the contributors to this volume 
have sought, and have been encouraged, to do at every turn.
Another way is to clarify our starting point. There are significant indi-
vidual variations between the authors in terms of how we identify as 
researchers or how we would position ourselves in relation to the Prevent 
Duty. For example, some contributors engage with the Duty as scholars 
of C/PVE more broadly, whilst others do so more as educational practi-
tioners or researchers. However, one of the key shared starting points that 
provides coherence to the book is an interest in Ball, Maguire and Braun’s 
(2012) notion of policy enactment.
As Ball and his colleagues observe, policy is not simply implemented, 
but rather it is interpreted by different actors, in different contexts and 
potentially as part of different policy ensembles. Through processes of 
interpretation, translation and reconstruction, practitioners and others 
transform policy and often develop their own ‘take’ on it as they enact it. 
Indeed, whilst policy constrains, it can also open up opportunities for 
creativity and innovation.
What Ball and his colleagues draw our attention to is the importance 
of understanding the deeply situated nature of policy enactment. They 
noted for example that the four schools where they collected data to study 
‘how schools do policy’ were concurrently enacting at least 170 separate 
policies, highlighting both how much policy work is going on and how 
many competing priorities there are. The simple fact that something 
becomes a ‘top-down’ policy tells us very little therefore about what, if 
anything, will happen as a result. In addition, individual members of staff 
may have very different relationships to any one of those policies. 
Sometimes practitioners will feel like they are rather passive recipients of 
policy, but others will be actively engaged as critics, enthusiasts or policy 
entrepreneurs, with some seizing on opportunities for new forms of spe-
cialism, responsibility, expertise and, with that, career advancement.
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Our shared focus on the enactment of the Duty has tilted all of the 
contributions to this volume away from taking up or promoting strong 
substantive positions ‘supportive’ or ‘critical’ of the Prevent Duty itself, 
and towards a focus instead on capturing how the Duty has played out in 
practice, and with that, how such practice has been shaped by the geo-
graphic, temporal, professional and policy contexts in which it has been 
enacted.
Finally, a third way to avoid slipping into a naïve and potentially mis-
leading empiricism is to be clear and realistic about the limitations of the 
data that we have been able to compile. While some of the chapters in 
this volume seek, through the use of survey instruments, to provide 
something of an overview of how teachers have responded to the Duty 
(Chaps. 3 and 6), much of the discussion in the volume seeks to use ‘low- 
hovering’ (Anderson, 2007) qualitative analysis to provide insights into 
specific aspects of practice or contexts. As such we are cautious about 
generalising from this work, and would encourage the contributions to 
be read as illuminative (Thomas, 2007, p. 110), rather than definitive.
Nevertheless, as the first collection of empirical studies into the effects 
of the Prevent Duty across the statutory education sector, we believe the 
material offers an important source of information and insight. On one 
reading, Chap. 3 provides a snapshot of the first responses to the Prevent 
Duty, as this data was collected very soon after the Duty was introduced. 
Subsequent chapters are based on data collected since then and therefore 
enable us to get some indication of whether interpretations have changed 
over time. Our observation of this longitudinal reading is that it does not 
seem to have changed much over time. On another reading, Chaps. 2, 3, 
and 4 provide an overview of the issues arising, and Chaps. 5, 6, 7, and 8 
provide a series of insights into how the Duty is translated in each of the 
age phases. This reveals some important insights into how the policy has 
been transformed as it is enacted in these rather different contexts.
 A Note of Thanks
All empirical research relies on finding willing participants, and in the 
increasingly pressurised world of education, we are grateful to all those 
who participated in the various research projects reported in the 
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following chapters. Given there are always so many other pressing priori-
ties, it is heartening that people make the time to participate in such 
activities, and this is even more impressive given the potentially contro-
versial nature of this research. Ultimately, what motivates people to give 
up their time to such endeavours is the belief that it is worthwhile mak-
ing some contribution to knowledge. In dealing with the data collected, 
the authors of this collection bring to mind Thomas’s exhortation:
What respondents say and do in interviews and what teachers say and do 
in their work are what they say and do. We have no right to impute more; 
no right to impose ‘theory’. We can certainly listen, empathize and try to 
understand. (Thomas, 2007, p. 81)
We hope that our various participants would recognise themselves from 
the accounts of practice we have produced here and that they would rec-
ognise this collection as a valuable contribution to knowledge in this 
important area.
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Abstract This chapter analyses Prevent’s development since its introduc-
tion in 2006, alongside discussion of its controversies. It considers both 
Prevent’s changing content and priorities over its distinct phases and its 
significant controversies that have endured despite such changes. Critics 
argue that Prevent disproportionately targets British Muslims as a ‘sus-
pect community’, as well as securitising society and undermining com-
munity cohesion. These critiques have persisted despite the very significant 
shift of focus from community-based engagement work in the ‘Prevent 1’ 
phase to the ‘Prevent 2’ phase and Prevent Duty concern with identifying 
individual vulnerability to radicalisation. Here, this chapter considers 
how we can understand both Prevent’s changes and the controversies 
around the 2015 introduction of the ‘Prevent Duty’, alongside their 
implications for front-line educational practitioners and institutions.
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The Prevent Duty’s introduction in 2015 represented a significant new 
development within the UK’s Prevent counter-terrorism strategy, but 
there was nothing new about the tone and content of the public contro-
versy that accompanied it. The Prevent strategy has altered and developed 
significantly over its policy lifetime, but the sharp public critiques of 
Prevent as stigmatising British Muslims, threatening free speech and 
securitising British society have remained constant. For many critics, 
Prevent always has, and always will be, really about Muslims and the per-
ceived threat to broader British society from strands of domestic Muslim 
communities. Other critics identify a shifting, but enduring, broader 
securitisation of society and an inherent threat to free speech within 
Prevent. These already-existing critiques have all been applied since 2015 
to the Prevent Duty’s introduction across the education, health and social 
welfare sections of Britain’s public services, and they raise an analytical 
dilemma. Do such critiques represent the reality of the Prevent Duty’s 
implementation, or are they really claims about what Prevent was, rather 
than what it is today?
I have argued elsewhere (Thomas, 2017) that we can identify two dis-
tinct phases of Britain’s Prevent Strategy, with a significant third phase 
emerging with the Prevent Duty’s introduction. During ‘Prevent 1’, 
2006–2011, the main focus of Prevent activity was community-based 
work with young Muslims, through Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) funding. The ‘Prevent 2’ phase was initiated 
by the new Coalition government’s 2011 Prevent Review and was very 
different in content and focus. That review removed the DCLG from 
Prevent involvement and largely ended Prevent’s community-based ele-
ment. Instead, it confirmed an enhanced Prevent focus on individuals ‘at 
risk’ of, or vulnerable to, ‘radicalisation’. The 2015 introduction of the 
Prevent Duty confirmed and significantly accelerated this ‘Prevent 2’ 
trajectory.
This chapter does two things. First, it traces the development of the 
Prevent strategy from its first implementation in 2006/7. In doing so, it 
explores both the continuities and changes within Prevent over this 
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period and shows how the Prevent Duty can be understood as an innova-
tion that, in effect, consolidated a series of prior policy developments. 
Second, it outlines key criticisms of Prevent and how these have, or have 
not, evolved in response to developments in Prevent. These three phases 
of the Prevent strategy are explored, in each case outlining both the 
phase’s key content and priorities and identifying the associated contro-
versies and criticisms.
 ‘Prevent 1’ and Its Criticisms
Britain’s Prevent strategy is part of the broader UK CONTEST national 
counter-terrorism strategy, which has gone through several iterations 
(HMG, 2018) since its inception in 2003. CONTEST is built around 
four strands, the so-called 4 P’s, of Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare, 
with Prevent undoubtedly the most controversial. This post-9/11 devel-
opment of a preventative arm within national counter-terrorism strate-
gies has been a feature internationally, with many developed and 
developing countries initiating such programmes. These national strate-
gies have variously been called ‘Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE)’ or 
‘Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)’, leading to many international 
analysts using a hybrid ‘P/CVE’ description (Rosand, Winterbotham, 
Jones, & Praxi-Tabuchi, 2018).
Britain originally utilised the PVE title for the ‘Prevent 1’ local pro-
gramme and has subsequently reduced this to ‘Prevent’. Britain was an 
early adopter of such a PVE policy approach and has resultantly been 
much-studied internationally, with this scrutiny being aided by the fact 
that Britain’s comparatively centralised government gives an apparent 
national coherence to Prevent. Whilst there is significant international 
dialogue over P/CVE policies through bodies such as the European 
Union, the United Nations and the so-called five eyes network (UK, 
USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand), Prevent is, and has been, a 
nationally determined policy. Whilst most developed nations have poli-
cies aimed at identifying and supporting individuals vulnerable to radi-
calisation in ways similar to Prevent’s Channel system, Prevent is 
internationally distinctive in enforcing this through a legal duty on 
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educational professionals, and also, in the ‘Prevent 2’ and ‘Prevent Duty’ 
phases, in its down-playing of broader, community-based resilience- 
building work.
Originally envisaged as an international-focussed programme, Prevent 
emerged as a domestic programme in the wake of the 7/7 London bomb-
ings of July 2005. Its very emergence was contested, with local govern-
ment and civil society organisations arguing for broader policy approaches 
(Thomas, 2012). This ‘Prevent 1’ phase, initiated by the Labour govern-
ment, was explicitly only about Muslim communities, with the DCLG 
PVE funding administered—at very short notice—on the basis of local 
Muslim populations. Here, the resulting activity focussed overwhelm-
ingly on young Muslims, largely through youth and community work 
and with little or no concern with formal education (Phillips, Tse, & 
Johnson, 2011). Funding was also utilised to strengthen Muslim civil 
society, such as after-school religious education bodies. In some areas, 
local government deployed the funding itself, but in other areas they 
largely passed the funding on to Muslim organisations, leading to a very 
significant inflow of funding to these groups from an explicitly counter- 
terrorism policy fund. This was mirrored by national efforts to develop 
new representative structures for Muslim women and young people, and 
even government promotion of more ‘moderate’ forms of Islamic reli-
gious interpretation. Alongside this came 300 new, dedicated Police posts 
and a significant role for Police Prevent staff in community engagement 
and in the broader development of local PVE strategies.
This approach was controversial from inception, and the critiques that 
developed during ‘Prevent 1’ continue to significantly shape current pub-
lic perceptions of Prevent (see Chaps. 5, 6, 7, and 8), despite the substan-
tially altered content and priorities of ‘Prevent 2’ and the subsequent 
Duty. The first of these was that Prevent stigmatises Muslims, seeing 
them as an undifferentiated ‘suspect community’, a term first applied to 
Irish-origin communities resident in Britain at the time of the Northern 
Ireland troubles (Hillyard, 1993). Prevent’s explicitly Muslim-only focus, 
and the sheer scale of it—government evaluation of the first year of PVE 
funding boasted of engaging with over 50,000 young Muslims (Thomas, 
2012)—made this analysis hard to refute. Essentially, ‘Prevent 1’ repre-
sented a community development intervention within Muslim 
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communities on a significant scale and on an explicitly counter-terrorism 
basis. Here, Prevent’s monocultural focus clearly contradicted the com-
munity cohesion policies, developed following the 2001 riots in northern 
England, that sought to promote cross-community dialogue and com-
mon identities (Thomas, 2011). It focussed only on Islamist terrorism at 
a time when far-right organisations were both winning local elections 
and provoking localised racial tensions. This concern of stigmatisation 
was evident in the House of Commons Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee Inquiry in to Prevent in 2009–2010, 
with their report (House of Commons, 2010) urging a re-thinking of 
Prevent and a much stronger role for cohesion-based work.
Alongside this was a concern that Prevent was securitising society 
through the role of the Police within it. The new Police ‘Prevent 
Engagement Officer’ roles facilitated a large-scale involvement with 
Muslim communities around the issue of extremism, with some officers 
working directly with young people and adult community members in 
roles normally played by youth and community workers (Thomas, 2010). 
Allegations that such Prevent Police, and staff from the Intelligence and 
Security Service (MI5), were pressurising front-line youth workers for 
information on potentially extremist young people were central to Arun 
Kundnani’s ‘Spooked’ report (2009), which received very considerable 
media coverage. Beyond dispute is that the Police gradually became more 
dominant in the local management and direction of Prevent (Bahadur 
Lamb, 2012). Central to this concern around securitisation was that even 
prior to the development of Channel and the Prevent Duty, individuals 
were being surveilled for extremist words and beliefs, so threatening free 
speech and civil liberties (Kundnani, 2009).
Some key concepts can be useful to help us describe and understand 
the Prevent strategy’s journey. One is ‘responsibilisation’ (Thomas, 2017), 
with Prevent making different sectors of society responsible for ensuring 
that terrorism is prevented over time. Within ‘Prevent 1’, it was Muslim 
communities that were responsibilised as ‘moral agents’ of terrorism pre-
vention (Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011). This approach assumed that the 
Al-Qaida-inspired attacks in London on July 7, 2005, and other foiled 
plots could be directly linked to the faith community that attackers 
claimed to speak on behalf of, and that community and religious bodies 
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could be mobilised to protect against the type of extremism that suppos-
edly led to such acts. Basia Spalek (2013) identifies this ‘Prevent 1’ 
approach of trusting and funding Muslim communities as a new depar-
ture for counter-terrorism policies. For some (see Abbas, 2018), this was 
about Prevent encouraging Muslim communities to spy on each other, 
but McGhee (2010) saw it instead as an approach that attempted to limit 
stigmatisation by the state working in partnership with communities, 
rather than ‘doing’ terrorism prevention to them. Arguably, this was also 
recognition of the state’s limited understanding of and ability to oppose 
extremism within Muslim communities.
It is certainly true that some Muslim communities refused Prevent 
funding and rejected policy engagement from the start, but other Muslim 
communities accepted the funding, using it to develop community 
organisation and resilience against extremist influences (Lowndes & 
Thorp, 2010). The devolved funding approach of ‘Prevent 1’ actively 
encouraged this, meaning that different areas had different experiences of 
and views on Prevent. O’Toole, Meer, DeHanas, Jones and Modood 
(2016) drew on empirical research amongst British Muslim communities 
to suggest that Prevent implementation was a scene of ‘contested prac-
tice’, with local Prevent involvement enabling many Muslim communi-
ties to both strengthen civil society and play a stronger role in local 
government governance. Here, many Prevent critics were Muslim, but 
many ‘Prevent 1’ advocates and actors were also Muslims.
 ‘Prevent 2’ and Its Criticisms
Whilst significantly delayed by strong disagreements about Prevent 
within the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government 
(Warsi, 2017), the 2011 Prevent Review (HMG, 2011) marked a major 
turning point for Prevent. Firstly, it officially expanded Prevent’s focus to 
all forms of terrorism (although Prevent does not cover Northern Ireland 
and its distinct terrorist threats, hence it being a British, rather than 
UK-wide, policy). Secondly, it expanded Prevent’s concern from ‘violent 
extremism’ to a broader ‘extremism’, introducing the concept (and list) of 
‘fundamental British values’ that has subsequently been foregrounded 
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within formal education. For some (see Miah, 2017), this latter expan-
sion is highly significant in that it arguably deepens and widens policy 
concern with problematic, ‘un-British’ attitudes and behaviours within 
Muslim communities. It is questionable, though, as to what tangible dif-
ference this expansion of concern has really made to Prevent’s priorities 
and operations. Here, Prevent activity is, by definition, focussed on peo-
ple and behaviours not yet linked to tangible terrorist planning; other-
wise, it would be a ‘Pursue’ policing concern. P/CVE activity could be 
seen as always being about a broader ‘extremism’ that might move towards 
violent intentions and plans, if not diverted.
The most tangible change, which marked the effective end of ‘Prevent 
1’ and the commencement of a new phase, was the removal of DCLG 
from involvement in the programme and the (virtual) ending of Prevent 
funding for community-based group resilience-building activity. This 
was justified as a response to the House of Commons (2010) Select 
Committee Inquiry report, so supposedly ensuring that there was no 
damage to (separate) community cohesion policy work:
The Prevent programme we inherited from the last government was flawed. 
It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with 
Government policy to prevent terrorism. (HMG, 2011, p. 1)
In reality, though, this shift represented a distinctly different understand-
ing of the role and purpose of Prevent, and mis-characterised the actual 
conclusions of the Select Committee Inquiry. The Select Committee 
Inquiry evidence hearings (House of Commons, 2010) saw national 
Police leaders questioning what the point of the community-based 
Prevent activity was; they described it as simply ‘community cohesion’ 
work. Of course, it wasn’t cohesion work as it had a monocultural focus. 
Underpinning this Police questioning was distrust in the efficacy of 
Prevent 1’s community-based work that aimed to build individual and 
group resilience against extremism well before individual tangible involve-
ments in extremism were developing. The Select Committee findings 
actually supported such work, but argued that it should be done on a 
(cross) community cohesion basis, partly because hostility to ‘other’ com-
munities is a key driver of extremism and terrorism. Instead, the new 
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government chose to largely end community-based Prevent work, with 
only a limited programme of local activities in ‘Prevent priority’ areas and 
those strongly controlled from London by the Home Office. This sub-
stantial downsizing of Prevent work in communities also enabled an 
austerity-focussed government to significantly reduce the overall Prevent 
budget. They also completely ended national funding for community 
cohesion work, leaving local government to continue such work with 
their own (rapidly reducing) resources (Thomas, 2014).
Instead, this new ‘Prevent 2’ phase was primarily about identifying and 
diverting individuals vulnerable to radicalisation through the Channel 
anti-radicalisation mentoring and counselling system. Channel had been 
developing on a pilot basis in the years prior to 2011 (Thornton & 
Bouhana, 2017), and it was now foregrounded as the key element of 
Prevent. Central to this approach of identifying vulnerability is the con-
cept of ‘radicalisation’, a term that has developed in the post-9/11 era of 
domestic terrorism to characterise people who move towards terrorist 
involvements (Coolsaet, 2016). Whilst the engagement of individuals in 
terrorism is a reality—as the domestic terror attacks and foiled plots in 
both the UK and across other Western countries show (Nesser, 2015)—
there is little agreement over why people make this journey. Exhaustive 
academic analysis has clearly demonstrated that there is no definable set 
of indicators or social and economic circumstances, no identifiable ‘con-
veyer belt’ process (Kundnani, 2012), that can predict who will move 
towards terrorism, when and why. This makes the concept of ‘radicalisa-
tion’ highly problematic, yet the key focus of ‘Prevent 2’ was to develop 
systems of identifying and intervening with individuals apparently at risk 
of radicalising.
This intervention was to come via the nationally designed but locally 
led ‘Channel’ system. Here, individuals identified as potentially vulnera-
ble to radicalisation are referred by organisations such as schools or health 
bodies to a multi-agency Channel panel within their local authority area, 
where their individual case is considered. Those judged to be at genuine 
risk are offered an anti-radicalisation intervention package, often mentor-
ing by a government-approved ‘Intervention Provider’ (IP). Many IPs are 
ex-extremists or people with what are considered relevant theological or 
political experience or expertise. Initially, local Channel panels were led 
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by Prevent Police staff, but there has been a move towards civilianising 
Channel under local authority leadership through the ‘Operation 
Dovetail’ pilot process (Thornton & Bouhana, 2017).
How to go about identifying individuals vulnerable to radicalisation 
and what tools and measures to use is an international challenge (Knudsen, 
2020). Various countries have devised, and shared, radicalisation assess-
ment tools, such as the Canadian-origin VERA and VERA2. Britain 
developed the ‘ERG 22+’ assessment tool, based on analysis of the path-
ways towards violence of convicted terrorists, and it has led to the 
‘Vulnerability Assessment Framework’ (VAF), which has underpinned 
the Channel system. Both these British assessment tools have come under 
significant criticism, which has focussed both on the unreliability of 
reported pathways from convicted terrorists and on the apparent policy 
stretching of such insights to use in identifying people who have not yet 
planned terrorist violence. Certainly, if the ERG 22+ indicators are taken 
at face value, items like ‘a need for identity, meaning and belonging’ seem 
to describe virtually any adolescent. However, the argument in support of 
all such assessment tools is that they are simply a framework for struc-
tured professional judgements by trained professionals.
 The Prevent Duty and Its Criticisms
‘Prevent 2’ was therefore developing Prevent in a different direction, and 
doing so both in a down-sized way and with a lower media profile in the 
period following the 2011 Prevent Review. This makes the new and very 
significant expansion phase represented by the 2015 Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act (CTSA) and its introduction of the Prevent legal duty 
both unexpected and surprising at first sight. It was, and is, internation-
ally unprecedented in its legal requirement of front-line practitioners and 
their agencies. Three key events that occurred during the period of 
2012–2014 can be identified as motivating the-then-Coalition 
government’s decision to significantly increase Prevent’s scale and reach 
through the introduction of a legal duty’.
Firstly, in 2013, Britain saw the high-profile murder of an off-duty 
soldier, Fusilier Lee Rigby, by two Islamist militants (both religious 
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converts, as a substantial proportion of domestic AQ/ISIS-inspired ter-
rorist have been) already known to the authorities. Significant public 
impact of this event in Woolwich, south London, came from the filming 
by bystanders of the attack and its aftermath, and subsequent media use 
of this footage. This public concern was re-enforced by the concurrent 
trial of six young Muslims from Birmingham who had planned violent 
attacks on an English Defence League rally held in Dewsbury, West 
Yorkshire, in 2012 (BBC News, 2013), prompting fears that Islamist and 
far-right extremist were mutually radicalising each other. At the same 
time, there was also growing evidence of a significant number of young 
Britons attempting to travel to Syria to join ISIS, which had recently 
taken by force the large geographical area of northern Syria and western 
Iraq, and declared a ‘caliphate’. These events all highlighted questions 
around the effectiveness of Prevent, and the fact that Prevent’s scale and 
activities had been significantly reduced in the wake of the 2011 review. 
Unsurprisingly, following Lee Rigby’s murder former Labour ministers 
closely connected to ‘Prevent 1’, such as Hazel Blears, criticised the with-
drawal of local Prevent funding and direction under ‘Prevent 2’ (Boffey 
& Doward, 2013).
Then-Prime Minster David Cameron’s response was a ‘Task Force on 
Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism’ (HMG, 2013). The resulting 
report suggested that some local authorities ‘are not taking the problem 
seriously’ (ibid: 4) and indicated that it would make Prevent delivery a 
legal requirement in certain priority areas. It also foregrounded the role of 
schools, stating that all schools should expect Ofsted inspections to focus 
clearly on their anti-extremism measures and particularly on their imple-
mentation of ‘fundamental British values’. Indeed, some were down-
graded by Ofsted on this basis in 2014–2015, highlighting the extent to 
which the introduction of the Prevent Duty in July 2015 was only con-
firming and deepening an already-existing reality of the need for educa-
tional institutions to comply with Prevent.
The Task Force report concluded by saying that further measures 
would be kept under review. The justification for such further measures 
was provided by the so-called Trojan Horse affair. This related to a num-
ber of state schools with mainly Muslim pupils in Birmingham (Miah, 
2017). An anonymous letter claiming ‘extremism’ in these schools 
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prompted the Education Secretary, Michael Gove, to investigate through 
an inquiry led by a former counter-terrorism Police chief, Michael Clarke. 
Whilst the resulting report found no evidence of support for violent 
extremism, this government approach framed an issue of faith’s role 
within local state schools (and their significant improvements in attain-
ment) as overtly one of extremism and implicitly also of a terrorist threat. 
This intervention was consistent with the ‘values-driven’ approach to 
Prevent that Gove had championed in the 2011 Prevent Review pro-
cess—significantly contributing to Baroness Warsi’s resignation from the 
government (Warsi, 2017)—and which reflected his suspicion of broader 
attitudes and dispositions amongst Muslim communities generally (see 
Gove, 2006). This contrasted with Prevent 1’s more ‘means-driven’ prag-
matism over community participation (Birt, 2009). This government 
interpretation of the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair also ensured that it would 
indeed toughen its approach to the role within Prevent of formal educa-
tion, which it did by placing a legal duty to implement the Prevent strat-
egy on all state education, social welfare and health professionals and 
their institutions nationally through the 2015 CTSA.
This legal duty is internationally unprecedented in relation to counter- 
terrorism, although a similar duty has been placed on Australian educa-
tors to report the sexual exploitation of students (Falkiner, Thomson, & 
Day, 2017). It is clear that educators and other state professionals have 
now been responsibilised (Thomas, 2017) for preventing radicalisation 
towards violent extremism under the CTSA’s ramping up of ‘Prevent 2’, 
supplanting the focus of responsibilisation on Muslim communities 
under ‘Prevent 1’. The scale of this Duty is obviously significant, with 
several hundred thousand educators, from early years settings to further 
education colleges, having received Prevent training, and possibly as 
many as one and a half million public servants in total, given the scale of 
the National Health Service.
Implementing this Duty also raises an issue that has dogged Prevent 
throughout its history—the partial and varied nature of the (funded) 
policy implementation structures. Here, a number of local authority 
areas have been designated as ‘Prevent priority areas’ and have received 
Home Office funding for full-time Prevent coordinators (and, in recent 
years, also for education officers to support implementation within the 
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education sector). The number of ‘priority areas’ during the ‘Prevent 1’ 
phase was very significantly reduced by the 2011 Prevent Review. It has 
subsequently grown somewhat, but it remains a reality that many local 
government areas are not priority areas and so do not have funding to 
support full-time Prevent staff, yet are legally required to ensure that all 
the schools and social service organisations within their area are correctly 
implementing Prevent. This complex contextual reality should be borne 
in mind as this chapter considers below the key critiques, contestations 
and issues which accompanied the implementation of the Prevent Duty, 
particularly in the educational sector.
The first, and certainly the most prominent criticism of the Prevent 
Duty’s implementation, was whether it had simply re-doubled the target-
ing and stigmatisation of young Muslims that was inherent to ‘Prevent 1’. 
Here, the suggestion was that while the Prevent Duty is theoretically 
about all forms of extremism, Prevent is still really still about Muslims 
(see the review of educationally focussed literature within Jerome, Elwick, 
& Kazim, 2019). Certainly, the number of Prevent referrals of young 
people to Channel grew by over 75% in the year following the Duty’s 
implementation, with those from the educational sector, particularly 
schools and colleges, more than doubling (Open Society Foundation 
Justice Initiative (OSFJI), 2016). Young Muslims were, and are, dispro-
portionately represented within these figures.
A number of high-profile, apparently deeply inappropriate, referrals of 
young Muslims were featured in the media in the months following the 
Duty’s introduction, not all of them factually accurate. These included 
the so-called terrorist house investigation in Blackburn (which was actu-
ally not a counter-terrorism case), and a case in Luton that saw a four- 
year- old girl reported to Prevent for mispronouncing ‘cucumber’ as 
‘cooker bomb’. Such early cases reinforced public perceptions, which first 
developed in the ‘Prevent 1’ phase and which did not weaken during 
‘Prevent 2’, of Prevent as being an Islamophobic policy that undermines 
the human rights and civil liberties of young Muslims (see OSFJI, 2016). 
The reality of the significant over-representation of young Muslims 
within Prevent referrals in relation to their proportion of the school and 
college population (see below) has been highlighted by greater govern-
ment transparency, post-2015, around Prevent operations, with detailed 
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annual statistic bulletins of Channel referrals and what happens to them 
(Home Office, 2019).
The meaning of this Muslim over-representation is significantly con-
tested. For some, this is prima facie evidence of the continued ‘suspect 
community’ logic of Prevent, but for others it represents the past reality 
of the domestic terrorist threat and of the very considerable travel (or 
attempted travel) to Syria by British Muslims. Certainly, the numbers of 
people now receiving actual Channel mentoring support for right-wing 
extremism are very similar to those from ISIS-inspired extremism refer-
rals, a picture which emboldened the Conservative government to accept 
an Independent Review of Prevent, initiated in 2019. However, the total 
number of Muslims referred does represent a significant over- 
representation in relation to their place both in Britain’s school and col-
lege student population, and in the general population. The higher ‘no 
further action’, attrition rate for young Muslims within Prevent referrals 
also raises the issue of whether many of these represent inappropriate 
professional referrals on the basis of a (mis-)reading of Muslim dress, 
belief or practice as an indicator of extremism. Is the operation of the 
Prevent Duty within education leading to further stigmatisation of 
Muslim students?
One of the factors driving criticism of Prevent Duty operations is the 
general high attrition rate or Channel referrals, with a very significant 
proportion leading either to no further action or to other forms of inter-
vention unconnected to issues of extremism. For some critics, this attri-
tion rate in itself demonstrates the generic ineffectiveness of the Prevent 
strategy, but it’s not clear whether such an attrition rate is inconsistent 
with attrition rates for reporting over other aspects of safeguarding within 
education. The government framing of Prevent as safeguarding is central 
to the Duty’s operation (see Chaps. 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8), but it is also con-
tested. This contestation has come particularly from the social welfare 
and health sectors. For social work theorists, Prevent has misappropriated 
the language of child protection and safeguarding work with vulnerable 
children and adults, in the cause of counter-terrorism (Coppock & 
McGovern, 2014). In particular, they argue that safeguarding has been, 
and should be, about protecting the needs and interest of these vulnera-
ble individuals, but safeguarding in the name of Prevent is actually 
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protecting wider society from these risky individuals. This emphasises the 
need for more empirical research around how the ‘Prevent-as-safeguarding’ 
frame (Busher, Choudhury, & Thomas, 2019) has been understood and 
practised within education. Research in adult mental health settings has 
suggested that professionals are resistant to Prevent reporting over-riding 
a duty of confidentiality to clients (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2019), but 
whether patient confidentiality is ever truly absolute is contested. Do 
educational professionals accept the ‘Prevent-as-safeguarding’ frame?
Closely connected to these critiques of the Prevent-as-safeguarding 
frame have been allegations that the introduction of the Prevent Duty 
represents a securitisation of education, as well as of health and welfare, 
with educational professionals asked to play policing roles. For support-
ers of the Prevent Duty, its implementation is genuinely consistent with 
the focus and operation of wider, pre-existing safeguarding approaches 
within the education sector. Critics, meanwhile, see it as representing a 
disjuncture in the systems and assumptions that educationalists utilise 
and in the way that agencies such as the Police interact with educational 
institutions. If empirical evidence from educational settings suggests the 
former interpretation, then to what extent is the Prevent Duty imple-
mentation actually a ‘securitisation’ of education?
An issue for all professionals covered by the Prevent Duty is what they 
are actually being asked to spot and report—the indicators or warning 
signs of radicalisation that professionals should be aware of and look for. 
Discussions above highlighted the problematic concept of ‘radicalisation’ 
and the international academic and policy consensus that there is not one 
clear pathway towards terrorism. However, we know that people do make 
that journey, and many of the people involved in plots of the last decade, 
and particularly those travelling to Syria, have been young people who 
were in, or had only recently left, schools and further education. Both 
that reality and the Prevent Duty to spot and report any individual at risk 
raise the issue of how clear individual educators feel they are about what 
they should look for and what level of concern justifies an external 
Channel referral. Here, there has been a need for more empirical evidence 
around who delivers Prevent training, their qualifications and credibility 
to do so, and what sort of ongoing support is available for educational 
institutions as they develop their approach to Prevent implementation. 
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What does empirical evidence tell us about the quality, clarity and help-
fulness of training for professionals in relation to the role mandated by 
the Prevent Duty?
Throughout the changing focus of Prevent, there has been a concern 
with the clarity and confidence of the front-line educational professionals 
being asked to implement Prevent. In ‘Prevent 1’, there was no policy 
focus on training or skills development for the youth and community 
workers at the forefront of Prevent (Thomas, 2012). The implication of 
this community-based approach was that youth workers would utilise 
opportunities to develop projects around citizenship and political educa-
tion that could both address youth grievances and support resilience 
against extremism, yet there was no Prevent focus on professional compe-
tence or confidence. This echoed the failings of previous anti-racism edu-
cational policy initiatives, which neglected the crucial issue of practitioners 
lacking the confidence to successfully facilitate discussion of ‘difficult 
issues’ (Thomas, 2009). Under the Prevent Duty, there are clearly two 
distinct challenges for front-line educators. One is the issue raised above, 
the safeguarding competence and confidence around spotting relevant 
signs of ‘risk of radicalisation’, and knowing what to do about it. The 
other is one of pedagogical confidence, how educators successfully imple-
ment ‘fundamental British values’ within the curriculum in a way that 
bolsters students support for common values and which scaffolds resil-
ience against extremist messages—something that may well entail ‘diffi-
cult conversations’ (Thomas, 2016)—as well as being consistent with 
wider responsibilities to promote equality and cohesion. Here, the 
‘Prevent 1’ concerns of youth and community workers about their confi-
dence and clarity to do such pedagogical work, and the availability of 
good training and resources to support it, are now challenges for formal 
educational practitioners within early years, schools and colleges in the 
Prevent Duty phase. Do educational practitioners feel confident in their 
ability to fulfil the Prevent Duty?
A final major criticism of the Prevent Duty was that it would be likely 
to have a ‘chilling effect’ on the speech and behaviour of students, and of 
Muslim students in particular, who perceive themselves to be a target of 
this measure and fear that they will be referred to Prevent. If this is true, 
it would support claims that Prevent is curtailing the human rights and 
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particularly the right to free speech, of Muslim students (OSFJI, 2016). 
It would also make Prevent counter-productive on its own terms, as 
Prevent cannot succeed without community members being willing to 
share concerns and challenge the extremism of others within day-to-day 
life. There is certainly evidence from the Higher Education (HE) sector 
(Scott-Baumann, 2018) that Muslim students perceive themselves to be 
under Prevent surveillance, although other studies of Prevent Duty 
implementation within higher education suggest something more akin to 
a form of ‘tick box compliance’, rather than more significant changes in 
practice (McGlynn & McDaid, 2019). Indeed, the Prevent Duty provi-
sions for HE were amended after legal challenge to reflect the equal legal 
responsibility to uphold free speech. A highly relevant context for this 
concern is the very significant anti-Prevent campaigning by civil society 
groups (Thomas, 2017) and the National Union of Students, based on 
claims that Prevent is indeed surveillance of Muslims. Here, the socio-
logical theorem that if enough people believe something to be true, it is 
real in its consequences, has considerable relevance for the public under-
standing of Prevent and its legal duty, and it certainly makes empirical 
analysis of any ‘chilling effect’ amongst students in schools and colleges 
more complicated. Has the Prevent Duty led to a ‘chilling effect’ amongst 
Muslim students, and if so, how can we judge this?
 Closing Thoughts
This chapter has charted the development of the Prevent strategy from its 
introduction in 2006/7 to the introduction of the Prevent Duty in 2015. 
In doing so, it has highlighted the very significant changes in Prevent’s 
content and priorities from the ‘Prevent 1’ phase of community develop-
ment work with British Muslims to the ‘Prevent 2’ focus on systems for 
identifying, reporting and intervening with individuals perceived to be ‘at 
risk’ of radicalisation, which was expanded by the Prevent Duty. This 
shift from ‘Prevent 1’ to ‘Prevent 2’ also involved a shift from a primary 
Prevent concern with youth and community workers to a concern with 
the educational professionals working in early years, school and further 
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education settings, a shift which the enhanced Prevent Duty phase con-
firmed and deepened.
This chapter highlighted the significant public controversies over 
Prevent in its original, ‘Prevent 1’ form, particularly its overt focus on 
Muslims only, and the resulting contradiction with policies of commu-
nity cohesion, and the role of the Police in community engagement with 
young people. The argument I make in this chapter is that those original 
‘Prevent 1’ controversies have significantly shaped public perceptions and 
criticisms of the very different content and focus of ‘Prevent 2’ and its 
post-2015 phase of the implementation of the Prevent Duty.
Specifically, this chapter has highlighted how the Prevent Duty’s intro-
duction elicited a number of key criticisms that built on those prior 
objections to Prevent. These included concerns over whether the Duty’s 
new version of Prevent represented an enhanced suspicion and stigmati-
sation of young Muslims, whether it was consequently ‘chilling’ the 
speech and behaviour of Muslim students and whether the Duty repre-
sented a significant securitisation of education. Alongside this were ques-
tions of whether the government’s ‘Prevent-as-safeguarding’ frame was 
understood and accepted by educational professionals, whether those 
professionals felt clear about the role of identifying radicalisation that the 
Duty requires them to play and whether they generally had the confi-
dence, clarity and skills to implement the safeguarding and pedagogical 
dimensions of the Prevent Duty.
This in turn raises questions for researchers about the extent to which 
these vociferous public criticisms reflect the reality of the Prevent Duty’s 
implementation within education, or rather whether they actually repre-
sent a form of inertia or ‘lag’ amongst critics who still understand Prevent 
as what it was, rather than the significantly modified strategy that it now 
is. It suggests the possibility that government and the Prevent critics are, 
in effect, ‘talking past each other’ in their heated dialogue about justifica-
tions for and impacts of Prevent, with educators at the centre of these 
disputes. Others will reject such a view and argue that Prevent Duty 
implementation is a damaging reality within education. These are impor-
tant questions and issues that we need more empirically based investiga-
tion of, and the following chapters respond to that challenge.
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four key questions: (1) To what extent did staff express overall opposition 
to or support for the Prevent Duty? (2) To what extent was the Prevent 
Duty interpreted by staff in schools and colleges as a straightforward 
extension of existing safeguarding responsibilities? (3) To what extent did 
staff perceive the Duty to be exacerbating the stigmatisation of Muslim 
students? (4) To what extent did staff perceive the Duty to have a ‘chilling 
effect’ on classrooms and on student voices?
Keywords Prevent • PVE • Education • Policy enactment • 
Safeguarding • Fundamental British values
In this chapter we examine how staff in schools and further education 
colleges in England understood, enacted and perceived the impacts of the 
Prevent Duty during the first 18 months after its introduction in July 
2015. In doing so, this chapter provides insight into how the Duty 
‘landed’ during this initial period and begins to empirically draw out 
themes that are explored further in the subsequent chapters.
We organise our discussion around four questions that cut to the heart 
of the policy debates that have surrounded the Prevent Duty and the 
wider Prevent strategy (Chap. 2):
 1. To what extent did staff express overall opposition to or support for 
the Prevent Duty?
 2. To what extent was the Prevent Duty interpreted by staff in schools 
and colleges as a straightforward extension of existing safeguarding 
responsibilities?
 3. To what extent did staff perceive the Duty to be exacerbating the stig-
matisation of Muslim students?
 4. To what extent did staff perceive the Duty to have a ‘chilling effect’ on 
classrooms and on student voices?
This chapter draws on mixed methods research carried out during 2015 
and 2016. This comprised 70 semi-structured interviews across 14 
schools and colleges in London and West Yorkshire; semi-structured 
interviews with Prevent practitioners in 8 local authority areas; a national 
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online survey of school and college staff in England (n = 225) and a series 
of focus group discussions with policy stakeholders, including individu-
als from national teaching unions, relevant local and national govern-
ment departments, and prominent national Muslim and black and 
minority ethnic (BME) civil society organisations (for further details see 
Busher, Choudhury, Thomas, & Harris, 2017).
 To What Extent Did Staff Express Overall 
Opposition to or Support 
for the Prevent Duty?
Since the Prevent Duty was first discussed in Parliament, it had been the 
focus of extensive and often highly critical debate (Chap. 2). We expected 
therefore to encounter widespread opposition to the Duty among school 
and college staff, particularly in the context of confidential research inter-
views and an anonymous survey. Yet while we found some unease about 
the Duty, and some concerns, we did not find the breadth or depth of 
opposition that we anticipated.
Within the survey data we found more agreement than disagreement 
with the statement ‘the Prevent Duty on schools and colleges is a propor-
tionate response to a clearly identified problem’. About 54.5% of the 
survey respondents agreed or agreed strongly (1–4 on a scale of 1–10), 
compared with 29.3% of respondents who disagreed or disagreed strongly 
(7–10) and 16.2% who gave a broadly neutral response (5–6).
This picture was supported by the interview data. Here we encoun-
tered a number of criticisms and concerns about the Duty. The most 
frequent of these was about the possible stigmatisation of Muslim stu-
dents, to which we return below. Alongside this we encountered some 
scepticism about the effectiveness of the Duty, with several respondents 
expressing doubts about whether it was possible to effectively identify, or 
train people to identify, signs that a student was being drawn into terror-
ism. Such doubts were often reinforced by expectations, and anxieties, 
that students who were a ‘genuine’ risk would be adept at not giving 
themselves away—a clear recognition of student agency and one that 
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raises important questions about the use and limitations of the concept 
of ‘vulnerability’ in this area of policy and practice (see O’Donnell, 2016).
I think the problem with a lot of this training is that it is very difficult to 
identify someone who is at risk of this. If people had a very tell-tale sign 
then you would be able to stop it happening, wouldn’t you, all of the time? 
So how do you successfully spot the correct signs? All you can really do is 
hope that someone will be able to pick up something that is not quite right 
and report it to the correct channel. (R32, teacher, secondary school, 
Yorkshire)
Some respondents indicated they believed the Duty might even be coun-
terproductive because, by making the students more guarded, it could 
make detection of ‘at risk’ students more difficult.
I have not had any serious suspicions that any of them might want to go [to 
Syria] or if they do harbour those extremist views they are very cautious in 
keeping it to themselves. The kids know exactly what they can and can’t say 
so they are very guarded. So, if anything, it has really driven it underground. 
(R50, Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL), secondary school, London)
Yet with the exception of one college, where multiple respondents 
expressed both concern that Prevent is an anti-Muslim agenda and reluc-
tance to raise this with senior colleagues, few respondents expressed gen-
eral opposition to the Duty or reported encountering substantial 
opposition among their colleagues. Furthermore, where opposition was 
observed, it was described as having dissipated fairly quickly after staff 
received training, and once the policies and practices that came to be 
associated with Prevent had been embedded within wider organisational 
policies and practices (see also Chap. 7).
As we have argued elsewhere, part of the explanation for the relative 
absence of expressed opposition likely lies in ‘pragmatic acceptance’ 
(Busher, Choudhury, & Thomas, 2019). The Duty was a legal require-
ment and non-compliance risked significant institutional and profes-
sional sanction. As one respondent recalled, in their institution senior 
management had responded to initial expressions of staff reticence about 
the Duty by telling them,
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This is a duty and we have to implement it, and if we don’t implement it 
the college could be closed down. So there’s your facts, okay? (R1, DSL, 
college, Yorkshire)
Yet pragmatic acceptance only appears to be part of the explanation, and 
certainly insufficient to explain observed instances of positive acceptance 
(see below). Another part of the explanation appears to relate to the fairly 
widespread perception that, despite some of the concerns described 
above, the Duty was responding to a real and important issue. For exam-
ple, the same respondent who expressed concern that the Duty had ‘really 
driven it underground’ nonetheless described the Duty as ‘completely 
necessary’:
I understood that it was completely necessary. Initially when you don’t see 
[the students] on a daily basis, you think, ‘is it; does it really need to be that 
strong?’ But I actually think it probably does; I do see the point of it. Again 
I do remember just thinking, ‘Oh this is just another thing that we need to 
be vigilant about’, but actually it is really important. (R50, DSL, secondary 
school, London)
Such perceptions were particularly acute in 2015–16, amidst frequent 
news stories about young people travelling to join the so-called Islamic 
State. There were also growing concerns about the extreme right at the 
time, fuelled at least partly by the murder of Jo Cox MP on 16 June 
2016, and by emerging evidence that the UK’s referendum on leaving the 
European Union had been accompanied by a significant rise in hate 
crime (Cavalli, 2019).
What also seems to be relevant to this picture of fairly broad accep-
tance of the Duty is the fact that the challenges that respondents associ-
ated with the Duty were usually described as challenges that could largely 
be addressed through careful management and suitable training and sup-
port. With the exception of the college mentioned above, most respon-
dents drew important distinctions between the potential impacts of the 
Duty in the education sector in general, and the practice and experience 
of Prevent within their specific institution, with discussion of the latter 
largely characterised by stories of effective management and adaptation. 
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Indeed, some respondents described the Duty as having positive enabling 
effects in their particular institution. Some stated, for example, that it 
had given them more confidence to work with students on topics previ-
ously considered too contentious. As one respondent put it,
It’s a real sort of backbone to have that behind you, to say ‘actually we are 
entitled to teach this’, and especially to tackle the staff and say ‘we don’t 
need to pussy foot around this anymore’. (R24, teacher, secondary school, 
Yorkshire)
Other respondents reported that the Duty had provided an opportunity 
to reinvigorate work around anti-racism and positive citizenship, which 
was perceived to have been de-prioritised in recent years within national 
policy frameworks (Thomas, 2016).
Where we did encounter clear and frequent opposition to the Duty 
was around the requirement to promote ‘fundamental British values’ (see 
also Revell & Bryan, 2018). Respondents consistently expressed support 
for, and described extensive experience of, values-based teaching. 
However, the emphasis placed on the supposed Britishness of these values 
was repeatedly identified as unnecessary and potentially problematic. 
Specifically, respondents expressed concern that this framing of values 
played into societal narratives of exclusion, superiority, fixed cultural 
boundaries and a them-and-us politics that could too easily play into the 
hands of the far right and others who prosper from sowing division.
The title ‘British values’, the title ‘fundamental British values’, whoever 
thought that up should’ve been shot in my opinion. I think it’s disgraceful, 
because it just has too many connotations, it’s like tit for tat, ‘well you want 
to be fundamental, well we’ll be fundamental’. (R20, DSL, college, 
Yorkshire)
As a result, respondents in some institutions described subtle forms of 
individual and institution-level resistance, such as opting to talk about 
‘school values’ or simply ‘our values’ rather than actively labelling them 
‘British values’ (see also Chaps. 5 and 8).
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 To What Extent Was the Prevent Duty 
Perceived by Staff in Schools and Colleges 
as a Straightforward Extension of Existing 
Safeguarding Requirements?
The idea that the Prevent Duty comprised a straightforward extension 
of existing requirements to safeguard young people from harms such as 
child sexual exploitation, gangs, neglect or drug use was central to the 
government’s framing of the Duty and reflected the way that, since 
2011, Prevent itself had increasingly been framed in terms of protecting 
‘vulnerable’ people. Such framing of Prevent has faced criticism, how-
ever. As discussed in Chap. 2, social workers and social work academics, 
for example, have criticised this elision of Prevent and safeguarding, 
arguing that it risks silencing and pathologising individuals rather than 
understanding and engaging with their practices as acts of dissent, and 
that the expansion of surveillance entailed by Prevent could actually 
undermine safeguarding work by generating a climate of suspicion 
between service providers and the individuals and families with which 
they work.
To what extent then did our respondents accept or challenge the gov-
ernment’s framing of Prevent as a straightforward extension of safeguard-
ing? On one level, our findings were clear: a very significant majority of 
interview and survey respondents did indeed describe Prevent simply as 
an extension of safeguarding. Among survey respondents, 86% agreed or 
agreed strongly that ‘The Prevent Duty in schools/colleges is a continua-
tion of existing safeguarding responsibilities’, with only 9% disagreeing 
or disagreeing strongly.
The majority of interview respondents also expressed little doubt that 
Prevent fitted within existing safeguarding practices—as ‘just a bit of 
extra vigilance that were put on us: not an extra duty’ (R19, estates man-
ager, college, Yorkshire). The Duty was frequently described as entailing 
little more than subtle adjustments, or even just some relabelling of what 
they were already doing.
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I’ve always seen Prevent as being a model of safeguarding. I don’t see it as 
much different from safeguarding. Indeed, we’ve had a line in our safe-
guarding for extremism for many, many years, so it’s been a part of our 
safeguarding. (R20, DSL, college, Yorkshire)
A number of factors have contributed to this broad professional accep-
tance of the Prevent-as-safeguarding policy frame. First, the organisa-
tional processes used to meet Prevent-related obligations were in practice 
very similar to those used for safeguarding, with Prevent-related training, 
monitoring, referrals and coordination all managed through existing, 
albeit in some cases expanded, safeguarding structures and processes. 
Here, an important part of the backstory is the extent to which educa-
tional institutions in the UK had, particularly since 2001, already become 
sites of extensive surveillance, usually in the name of student safety 
(Taylor, 2013). By the summer of 2015, online safety was already high on 
the agenda, the use of software to block access to ‘dangerous material’ was 
widespread, and there was growing use of digital systems to report and 
collate safeguarding concerns, meaning that on a day-to-day level Prevent 
felt to most respondents to be largely a case of adapting and repurposing 
existing tools and procedures.
Second, there was considerable similarity between what the respon-
dents’ understood as the signs and indicators that a young person is being 
drawn into terrorism and the behaviours they had previously been trained 
to identify as indicators of ‘vulnerability’ to other safeguarding issues—
such as sudden changes in behaviour, disposition and friendship groups.
When you look at the action it’s exactly the same as the actions we’d take 
against FGM [female genital mutilation] and against child sexual exploita-
tion … It is a safeguarding issue. It’s the same, it’s about keeping children 
safe from predators. If you look at, well when I look at a profile of a radi-
caliser, you know, and a groomer, it’s the same tactics and they’re targeting 
the same sorts of vulnerabilities in children. (R61, DSL, secondary 
school, London)
Third, these narratives of policy and practice continuity were consoli-
dated as staff incorporated the new requirements into their existing 
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practice and organisational culture through activities such as ‘mapping’ 
or ‘self-assessment’ exercises. Without exception, these exercises, in which 
staff essentially assessed what they needed to do to ensure compliance 
with the Duty, were reported to have revealed to participants that they 
were already largely addressing the requirements of the Duty—a ‘realisa-
tion’ often accompanied by strongly recalled feelings of relief. Such pro-
cesses reflect established patterns of response in schools as they comply 
with new policy (Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012), and helped to generate 
narratives of policy and practice continuity both for the ‘safeguarding’ 
dimension of the Duty and for the curriculum requirements around the 
promotion of fundamental British values.
We went through [the policy documentation] and decided whether we 
were meeting what was required as a school or whether we still had some 
work to do in some areas. For a lot of them we decided that we were already 
providing adequate provision through our policies … We had a copy of the 
document each, [name A] was leading the meeting and we read through all 
of the individual points and we discussed the elements that we cover. So 
sometimes [name B] would be saying, well we already covered this through-
out PSHE, or I would be saying, actually in our scheme of work within 
history we promote tolerance and democracy through this. (R32, teacher, 
secondary school, Yorkshire)
These narratives of continuity played an important role in smoothing the 
introduction of the Duty and softening possible opposition. This was 
partly about the relief that staff experienced as the Prevent Duty came to 
be seen as something that did not entail substantial changes to their day- 
to- day practices. They also helped to ‘cushion’ fears about possible nega-
tive consequences and implications of the Duty.
One of the things that we’ve found when we’ve been rolling out the train-
ing is staff can get quite nervous about it. They feel, some of them, not all, 
feel that, what does it exactly mean ‘referring our students’? Are we going 
to lose the element of trust? But we talk about duty of care, which our 
lecturers have always had for years. Whether or not that’s making sure the 
students are happy, safe, on the right course, all those kinds of elements. 
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And this is just another thing. But we kind of like cushion it with, we refer 
to our safeguarding team, which I think does make some people feel better. 
(R2, middle manager, college, Yorkshire)
The fact that it sits under the safeguarding thing makes things much easier 
with staff, and it’s less sort of racist in its tones, and the assumptions and 
the sort of Islamophobia kind of viewpoint on things disappears when 
you’re saying ‘we’re just trying to keep kids free from grooming, all types of 
grooming’. (R21, middle manager, secondary school, Yorkshire)
Yet these narratives of continuity were not entirely straightforward, and 
there were several instances in which they were disrupted, at least tempo-
rarily. In the following quotes, for example, while Prevent is seen as being 
similar to safeguarding, the straightforward narrative of continuity is dis-
rupted either by the additional ‘depth’ of surveillance that Prevent entails or 
by the way that Prevent is seen to have refocused work on safeguarding.
[It is] like safeguarding: we must be there to protect and to be there for the 
young and vulnerable people, the vulnerable adults and so on. But then 
Prevent is a little bit more deeper, where we have to know what is terrorism, 
what is radicalisation, what to listen for. (R19, estates manager, college, 
Yorkshire)
Obviously, safeguarding had fallen off the radar really for Ofsted, and then 
suddenly it zoomed. […] we thought […] Ofsted were relaxing about it a 
bit, suddenly it’s right up there, and now they’re fierce about it. (R1, DSL, 
college, Yorkshire)
Other respondents observe how, in comparison with previous safeguard-
ing expectations, the Prevent Duty had foregrounded and intensified 
security and reputational risks, and induced or deepened anxieties about 
‘missing something’.
I think what the Prevent agenda does, is, as a teacher it makes you feel 
anxious and that you will miss something in some way, that you will get 
into trouble because you’ll miss something. (R5, senior leader, secondary 
school, Yorkshire)
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There were also other comments and observations that suggest the conti-
nuity between safeguarding and Prevent was more unstable than it might 
at first glance appear. When asked, teachers were often uncertain about 
what happens to referrals once they go outside the school or college, and 
some respondents questioned whether Prevent-related referrals might in 
fact result in students coming under wider state surveillance mechanisms. 
For example, one respondent mused over what it meant once a student 
was on ‘the Prevent list’:
[Is that] being tracked, followed, all his movements for, I don’t know, is 
that forever? … You are on a database. You are on there aren’t you? That’s it 
forever more? If anybody wanted to look it up you are there? All your 
details and where you live and who you associate with? (R48, middle man-
ager, secondary school, London)
In another interview, an institutional safeguarding lead observed that in 
other areas of safeguarding they are able to obtain a clearly evidenced 
assessment of their local risk profile, but that this has not been the case 
with Prevent-related concerns.
With Prevent, I mean, there’s no data available, there’s no, it’s all secret 
secret. We’re a category two, or category one borough, so it’s a high risk 
borough, but low referrals under eighteens, very low. I don’t know what the 
over eighteen referral rate is, do you know? And there’s no comparative 
data so you can’t compare it to other boroughs: it’s very, it’s all quite clan-
destine so I can’t tell you if things are better elsewhere. […] What is the 
actual risk? Like, we know, for example with female genital mutilation we 
know how many, up to about three years ago, two years ago, were affected 
in [name of borough]. So like, wow, you know, it’s huge, so we’ve got to 
sort this out, you know? But we don’t know how many are affected [in 
terms of Prevent-related concerns], I don’t know how many are affected, 
and all I know is that we’re category one, or whatever, but there’s no, I can’t 
find a …, there’s …, no-one’s given us a description of what that is. Well 
why is it a category one? What is it? I think it’s just based on the number 
of Muslims, but I don’t know. Is it? (R61, DSL, secondary school, London)
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Wider evidence also problematises narratives of straightforward continu-
ity. Within our survey data, we found that a substantial proportion of 
respondents—33% across the whole sample, but 54% among senior 
leaders—describe the introduction of the Prevent Duty as increasing 
their personal workload ‘a lot’ or ‘a moderate amount’, at least initially. 
And after the first year of the Duty being in place, there had been a dra-
matic 75% year-on-year increase in referrals to Channel, the govern-
ment’s anti-radicalisation mentoring scheme (Chap. 1).
As such, while the Prevent-as-safeguarding frame appears to have 
achieved fairly broad professional support, this narrative of continuity 
was not quite as straightforward as it might at first have seemed. It con-
tained within it anxieties about the heightened risks and pressures that 
Prevent brought with it, and there were moments during the research 
interviews in which the narrative of continuity was disrupted, at least 
temporarily, as respondents struggled to reconcile apparent contradic-
tions. Furthermore, the dominant narrative of continuity, and the signifi-
cant professional relief that accompanied it, was at least partly a product 
of the policy enactment processes through which staff had actively sought 
to ensure that the Duty fitted within existing practices, policies and their 
own personal comfort zones.
 To What Extent Did Staff Perceive the Prevent 
Duty to Be Exacerbating the Stigmatisation 
of Muslim Students?
Where our respondents’ perceptions of the Prevent Duty coincided most 
closely with criticisms of the Duty and of Prevent more broadly was in 
relation to concerns that the Duty could exacerbate the stigmatisation of 
Muslim students. There was strong support both within the survey and 
interview data for the idea that the Prevent Duty was about all forms of 
extremism and not just that associated with Al Qaeda or Islamic State. 
Among survey respondents, 82% agreed or agreed strongly, and just 13% 
disagreed or disagreed strongly, with the statement ‘the Prevent Duty is 
about all forms of extremism’. Nonetheless, over half (57%) the survey 
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respondents said that the Duty has made Muslim students more likely or 
considerably more likely to feel stigmatised. This pattern was stronger 
still among BME respondents, where 76% said that the Duty made 
Muslim students more likely, or considerably more likely, to feel 
stigmatised.
These findings were supported by the interview data. Here we again 
found broad agreement that the Duty was intended to address all forms 
of extremism. Respondents across all of the schools and colleges also 
spoke about how they and, in most cases, their colleagues had sought to 
ensure the Duty did not result in Muslim students feeling alienated or 
stigmatised. Respondents reported that staff training had emphasised 
that the Duty was about all forms of extremism, that within their institu-
tion Prevent had been closely linked to ongoing work around anti-racism 
and anti-discrimination, and some described working with older Muslim 
students in their institution to assess how teaching materials relating to 
Prevent might be perceived and interpreted by other Muslim students.
Nonetheless, concerns persisted that Muslim students might be expe-
riencing greater stigmatisation as a result of the Prevent Duty. These con-
cerns were sometimes externalised and projected onto other institutions. 
In several cases interviewees drew distinctions between institutions, like 
their own, where staff were seen to be well trained, supported and man-
aged, and those where ‘knee-jerk reactions’ and staff ‘jumping to conclu-
sions’ were more likely to give rise to poor decision making or the Duty 
being ‘done badly’ (Busher et al., 2019, p. 456). Yet some respondents 
also expressed concern about how the Duty might be affecting students 
within their own institution.
Some of these concerns were related to respondents’ appreciation of 
the wider societal context of social and political marginalisation facing 
Muslim students and colleagues, including an awareness of the history of 
and debates surrounding Prevent and the Prevent Duty.
I think some of the negativity that I’ve picked up on, and it’s not been said 
in the training sessions, it’s just in conversations, that although the presen-
tation is all around extremism, radicalisation – that it also includes radicali-
sation and extreme of right-wing as well as ISIS, and animal rights and the 
Northern Ireland issues – I think still people still believe it’s actually aimed 
3 The Introduction of the Prevent Duty into Schools… 
46
at Muslims and ISIS … They believe that Prevent has come about because 
of Muslims. I don’t think they think Prevent has come about because of 
animal rights or right-wing. (R17, student advisor, college, Yorkshire)
Respondents’ concerns were also bound up with reflections on their own 
practice and the challenges of dealing with issues around unconscious 
bias and the limits of their own knowledge and understanding. Some 
respondents observed that, regardless of the intention of staff, Muslim 
and non-Muslim students might be treated differently, simply because 
the mainly white and non-Muslim staff were likely to feel more familiar, 
and therefore more confident making judgement calls about what did or 
did not constitute a ‘genuine’ concern, when dealing with white students 
and possible issues of far right engagement:
[The anxiety of staff] is not about right-wing extremism, which I think they 
are confident in challenging. I think it’s anything to do with Islam, any-
thing to do with the Muslim side of things, anything to do with Syria. 
They’re worried that they’ll say the wrong thing, do the wrong thing, be 
seen as saying and doing the wrong thing. (R1, DSL, college, Yorkshire)
Discussion of these concerns was clearly challenging for respondents, 
particularly when this tipped into reflections that they might themselves 
be contributing to forms of racialised stigmatisation. One respondent, 
for example, reflected on how, when a Muslim primary school student 
had said that their father was not contactable at the time, this, along with 
a perception that that particular student’s ‘life seems to be ruled by the 
mosque’, led them to wonder whether the father might have travelled to 
Syria—something that with hindsight seemed like a ‘massive leap’ (R28, 
teaching assistant, primary school, Yorkshire).
This left some respondents struggling to navigate acute and shifting 
tensions and anxieties as they tried to pick their way through a complex 
and seemingly sometimes competing set of responsibilities and emotions. 
In the following passage, for example, a respondent describes picking up 
on changes in the behaviour of a student that they think could possibly 
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indicate a process of radicalisation; how reflection on the nature of these 
indicators raises fears and a sense of guilt when they perceive that they 
might be acting in a way that is racist; but also how these fears are inter-
twined with worrying that failure to escalate the case further could result 
in ‘missing something’; and how they eventually come to rationalise this 
dilemma.
she came in with some Pakistani friends. She’d met her father for the first 
time in years, and she was wearing a headscarf. And of course, it’s hard, as 
somebody who’d known her for 3 years, with absolutely no link to her 
Pakistani heritage, the first thing I was thinking was ‘What’s she wearing 
that scarf for?’ She’s with this group of her boyfriend and some Asian girls, 
and she’s now wearing a headscarf. Now that’s what I mean – you can’t 
become complacent. I admit to feeling a sense of panic, when I saw that, 
you know, knowing that she was a vulnerable, looked after child, my first 
reaction was, ‘Oh my god, she’s been radicalised somehow. She’s got this 
boyfriend, she’s within this group, what on earth has happened?’ And of 
course when you unpick the situation, it wasn’t like that at all, I think she 
was just crying out for a group where she fitted in … what you feel is, you 
know, you’re honestly looking at the situation thinking, you’ve got a girl 
who has a half-Pakistani heritage, and yet you’re deeming her at risk of 
radicalisation because she’s exploring that part of her culture. That feels, 
you almost feel racist for thinking that, do you see what I mean? Thinking 
that you’ll get it wrong, and yet, your overriding concern is that you’ll miss 
something. […] I suppose that’s what I’m trying to get at, and I don’t mean 
to blame it [the Prevent Duty], because there’s an overriding system, I 
think, you know, better to be vigilant and make that mistake, and find out, 
like we did, that there was absolutely nothing to be concerned about. […] 
Does that make sense? (R5, senior leader, secondary school, Yorkshire)
As such, while few respondents perceived in the Prevent Duty an inten-
tion to stigmatise Muslim students, there were nonetheless persistent 
concerns that this could be one of the outcomes. This raised difficult 
questions for staff and their institutions about how to mitigate these risks 
and how to resolve and manage the attendant anxieties.
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 To What Extent Did Staff Perceive the Duty 
to Have a ‘Chilling Effect’ on Classrooms 
and Student Voices?
The final question concerns whether staff perceived that the Prevent Duty 
was, as anticipated by some critics, having a ‘chilling effect’ on classrooms 
and student voices. Here, as expected, respondents again raised a number 
of concerns. Several reflected on the possible tension between wanting to 
create open spaces for discussion and the effect that reporting require-
ments might have on students.
I think particularly at the age we’re dealing with, it’s more them saying 
things that don’t quite sit right […]. But it is hard, because I can totally see 
why some of the criticism has come about. If children feel that they can’t 
talk about things or disclose things, then you’re not creating the environ-
ment that you want. (R28, teaching assistant, primary school, Yorkshire)
Some respondents also spoke about self-censoring among students. For 
example:
They know they can’t say things, they know that they are not allowed to get 
involved in things, they know it will bring them trouble if they make com-
ments or say things. (R55, senior leader, secondary school, London)
I’d think they’d be quite vocal, but I think they’re afraid to be vocal […] I 
just think like with everything that’s going on they don’t want to be singled 
out in terms of – or being misinterpreted. There has to be a culture where 
they can speak freely and discuss things but I don’t think that there is such 
a culture. (R64, support worker, secondary school, London)
Yet respondents also spoke at length about how they and their institu-
tions had sought to address these challenges, often by reinvigorating or 
initiating new activities intended to foment discussion about topics 
around politics, peace, conflict and discrimination. These activities 
included special assemblies, sometimes led by an external expert speaker; 
‘drop-down days’ where the normal curriculum was suspended to allow 
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groups of students or the whole student cohort to focus on what were 
perceived to be relevant issues; the inclusion of anti-extremism material 
during form time in schools; the inclusion of new material within exist-
ing curriculum; and extra-curricular activities, such as debating clubs, 
and intercultural dialogue events. Respondents often perceived these ini-
tiatives both to have been largely successful and to have softened staff 
concerns about the impacts of the Duty.
I think in the early years when we did it, I think maybe because of the 
things that were being said around, [students] said ‘we can’t say that to you 
because you can report us’. So, for me, I had to convince them that, ‘that’s 
not what we’re here for. We’re here to actually create a safe environment for 
you to be able to share your views and hear what other people say and that 
will help to bring a balance to your own perspective of things’. So yeah, so 
I think it varies, but as we’re going on with it I think people are getting to 
understand part of the reasoning behind the Prevent agenda. (R68, sup-
port worker, college, London)
Some respondents even argued that the Duty had actually opened up 
more opportunities for dialogue and discussion on issues around extrem-
ism, politics and conflict. Here, the Duty itself was reported to have been 
a ‘vehicle’ for discussion.
I do think it serves a purpose in school because, like I said, it’s a vehicle for 
discussion and it’s almost, it’s something that’s been a bit taboo in the past 
and it’s made it, it’s brought it to the forefront of school life, and it’s some-
thing that now not only should be discussed but it has to be discussed. 
(R24, teacher, secondary school, Yorkshire)
Others saw in the Duty an opportunity to pick up again on approaches 
to equality and anti-racism that go beyond simple proscription of ‘unac-
ceptable’ language to critical reflection on how students are engaging 
with the world around them.
If students are making racist comments, you know, it’s not saying ‘we don’t 
want any of that language in here’, and job done: its more about ‘why do 
you feel like that?’, ‘where have you got that information?’ […] I think it’s 
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a new way of thinking. Actually it’s not a new way of thinking: it’s the old 
equality and diversity way of thinking, but I think that’s slipped over the 
past few years and we need a lot of input in bringing that back. (R12, stu-
dent support officer, college, Yorkshire)
The survey data paint a similar picture. To our initial surprise, only 12% 
of respondents stated that the Duty had resulted in less open discussions 
on topics such as extremism, intolerance and inequality, compared with 
32% who stated that it had made no difference, and 41% who stated that 
the Duty had actually led to more open discussions around these topics.
These findings would appear to bring into question some of the 
assumptions about the likely impact of the Duty. While staff had clearly 
been aware of and alert to the possible negative effect of the Duty in 
terms of producing a ‘chilling effect’, most appeared fairly confident that 
such risks had largely been mitigated. Yet we are only talking about staff 
perceptions here: it does not tell us how accurately those perceptions 
reflect the lived reality of students themselves (see Chaps. 4 and 8), and 
some critics have argued that reports of increased classroom debates in 
the wake of the introduction of the Duty might be ‘conflating the abstract 
discussion of a news story with a more authentic, dialogic, exchange of 
views’ (Faure-Walker, 2019, p. 372).
Furthermore, it is noticeable in both the survey and interview data that 
BME respondents were generally less optimistic than white British 
respondents about the ability of staff to mitigate the possible negative 
effects of the Duty in this regard. In the survey data, for example, 29% of 
BME respondents state that the Duty has led to less open discussions, 
34% that there has been no change and only 25% that there have been 
more open discussions. This is in sharp contrast with their white British 
colleagues, among whom just 9% reported a decline in open discussions, 
32% stated that there has been no change and 43% stated that the Duty 
has led to more open discussions. Given evidence elsewhere about self- 
censorship among people who perceive themselves to be a focus of secu-
rity policy attention (Mythen, Walklate, & Khan, 2013; Younis & Jadhav, 
2019), this variation warrants serious attention.
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 Conclusions
By exploring the enactment of the Prevent Duty during the first 
18 months after its introduction, the findings and discussion presented in 
this chapter begin to highlight the complexity of how the Duty has played 
out ‘on the ground’. In doing so, they challenge the more straightforward 
narratives often offered by advocates and critics of the Duty.
While supporters of the Duty might point to our findings as evidence 
of the easy fit between safeguarding and Prevent, and as evidence that the 
Duty is not having the type of chilling effect that some anticipated, it is 
clear that the Prevent-as-safeguarding policy frame was not quite as stable 
as it might at first glance appear. It is also clear that both the seemingly 
broad professional acceptance of the Duty and the limited reports of a 
chilling effect in classrooms were to an important extent a product not of 
policy design as such but of processes of policy enactment by profession-
als as they sought to minimise the Duty’s disruption of their existing 
practice and institutional culture and ethos.
Similarly, while some of the findings resonate with criticisms of the 
Duty, particularly around concerns that it has the potential to exacerbate 
the stigmatisation of Muslim students, they also draw attention to how 
education professionals have worked to mitigate those risks and have 
identified opportunities to reinvigorate areas of work around citizenship, 
democracy, equalities and anti-racism that had previously been 
de-prioritised.
Such observations do not lend themselves easily to grand narratives of 
policy success or failure. They might however take us a little closer to an 
appreciation of something approaching the reality of what the Prevent 
Duty looks like in practice.
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Abstract In this chapter we shift our focus away from adults enacting 
policy to consider how young people think schools can help them to 
develop their knowledge and understanding of terrorism and extremism. 
The evidence suggests that young people generally support the values of 
democracy and reject the use of political violence, but they want their 
teachers to develop critical media and political literacy and trust them to 
explore multiple perspectives. Our review of government-endorsed edu-
cational resources concludes that they fall short of what young people 
want and often represent simplistic and uncritical counter-narratives. We 
argue that a genuinely educational approach will take more heed of young 
people’s opinions and engage in a more critical exploration of the issues.
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 Introduction
Research in relation to Prevent in education has tended, as with much 
education policy research, to focus on the ways in which the policy is 
interpreted and enacted, primarily by teachers. In this chapter we focus 
on what we know about young people’s views and experiences (see also 
Chap. 8). One of the most obvious ways in which young people have 
been affected by the Prevent Duty is through referrals to the Channel 
programme and approximately half of all referrals to date have been 
young people up to the age of 20, including several hundred primary 
school children (see Chap. 1 for more details). There is also a second 
strand of activity which is more explicit about promoting a positive set of 
ideas and values that run counter to extremist narratives. Department for 
Education (DfE) policy states that ‘schools and childcare providers can 
also build pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental 
British values and enabling them to challenge extremist views’ (DfE, 
2015, p. 5). The same DfE guidance has a whole section on building 
children’s resilience towards radicalisation which notes that:
Schools can build pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by providing a safe 
environment for debating controversial issues and helping them to under-
stand how they can influence and participate in decision-making. Schools 
are already expected to promote the spiritual, moral, social and cultural 
[SMSC] development of pupils and, within this, fundamental British val-
ues. (DfE, 2015, p. 8)
This link between SMSC education, fundamental British values (FBVs) 
and Prevent is further emphasised in Home Office guidance (2019), 
which highlights that ‘all publicly-funded schools in England are required 
by law to teach a broad and balanced curriculum which promotes the 
spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils’ 
(Home Office, 2019).
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As the rest of this volume illustrates, the Prevent policy tends to reduce 
young people’s agency, almost inevitably framing them as vulnerable and 
in need of protection (see Chap. 7 for a discussion of how age has an 
impact on this). However, it is also important to remind ourselves that 
children and young people exercise their own agency in the education 
system. Most obviously they can choose to engage positively, or challenge 
and reject aspects of what schools attempt to teach them. More subtly, 
they bring their own life experiences, identities, preconceptions and con-
cerns to school, and experience the curriculum through those individual 
perspectives. A complete picture of policy enactment will address not just 
how high-level policy is translated into practice by professionals, but also 
how the policy is experienced by the young people who are the object of 
the policy.
This chapter exemplifies how useful it can be to adopt a student per-
spective by focusing initially on the issue of what students want to learn 
about terrorism, extremism and Prevent. Once we have outlined the 
answer, we move on to consider the extent to which the educational 
resources endorsed by the government provide the kind of education 
young people want in relation to these issues. We show there is a mis- 
match between what students want and what the government directs 
teachers towards, and we start to explore some of the implications of this 
tension for teachers.
 What Do Students Want to Learn?
In the first part of this chapter we draw on an evaluation conducted by 
Jerome and Elwick (2016, 2019a) of a project run by the Association for 
Citizenship Teaching (ACT) with ten secondary schools.1 The data 
includes questionnaires from 232 secondary students and 10 student 
focus groups. Citizenship teachers in each school planned and taught a 
unit of work related to Prevent, covering an aspect of terrorism or extrem-
ism that they thought would be of relevance and interest to their stu-
dents. The evaluators invited students to reflect on the lessons they had 
experienced, and also addressed some more general questions about their 
knowledge and attitudes. In addition we draw on several other relevant 
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studies, which have started to investigate the Prevent Duty from students’ 
perspectives. Quartermaine (2016) conducted research in six schools, 
which included 264 student questionnaires and group discussions with 
73 students, and Lockley-Scott (2016) conducted similar work in three 
case study schools. In addition Green (2017) conducted three focus 
groups with Muslim teenagers, which included some discussion of their 
experiences of school and college. We have also identified one relevant 
secondary study in which Janmaat (2018) re-analysed existing data from 
420 young people for evidence of their knowledge of, and support for, 
the FBVs. Given that there are over 12 million people below the age of 
18 in the UK, we cannot claim to provide a reliable overview of the situ-
ation for all children and young people, especially given the small research 
base on which we are able to draw. However, the findings from these 
projects illustrate how useful it is to consider young people’s views and 
the data below identifies some insights into how young people feel 
Prevent should be implemented in the education system.
It is worth making one obvious observation at the outset—that all 
young people currently in school were born after the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in the USA, and for most of them ‘terrorism’ is generally associated with 
Islam. This connection is almost inevitable given the dominant media 
and policy framing of Islamist extremism, and the promotion of 
Britishness and British values in various guises as a form of antidote to 
extremism or radicalisation (Revell & Bryan, 2018). Nevertheless, stu-
dents in our research routinely told us that they had few opportunities to 
discuss terrorism, extremism or the media portrayal of these issues, either 
in school or at home (Jerome & Elwick, 2016). Those we spoke to often 
argued that not only did they want opportunities to learn about the facts, 
but they also need to be guided by teachers they trust to develop a deeper 
understanding of what is happening and how to make sense of it. As we 
listened to the focus groups we developed a strong sense that the students 
themselves felt that better knowledge and understanding would help 
them to build some form of resilience—especially against the fear and 
confusion that often accompanied high-profile terrorist attacks.
Terrorists want us to be scared … and we just can’t be scared of it, so we 
need to talk about it more.
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Here they tell you the facts and the truth … not protecting us … they 
let us know what these people actually do. (Students quoted in Jerome & 
Elwick, 2016)
In the following sections, we consider some of the data about what stu-
dents feel about terrorism, extremism and the FBVs, and explore what the 
students think would be useful to them in building their understanding.
 Young People Are Already Very Supportive 
of the FBVs and Less Likely to Support Political 
Violence Than Adults
When teachers enact Prevent in the curriculum, this is often framed by the 
requirement to promote the FBVs (as the other chapters in this volume 
confirm). In this section we argue that listening to students provides sev-
eral reasons why this might be both unnecessary and counterproductive.
Within the Prevent policy the FBVs are seen as one way in which 
schools can promote resilience, as those who agree with the FBVs are 
likely to reject extremist ideologies. Janmaat (2018) has undertaken a 
secondary analysis of survey data collected from school students before 
the introduction of the FBV guidance and Prevent Duty and reports that 
there were already near universal levels of support for the values listed as 
FBVs. He combined a number of survey items related to young people’s 
level of support for democracy, the rule of law and toleration (now bun-
dled together in policy as the FBVs) in order to construct what he 
describes as a measure of ‘support for FBVs’. This measure refers to stu-
dents’ attitudes towards the concepts, not to the Prevent policy itself. 
Janmaat reports that levels of support for FBVs among young people are 
already very high (97.5% of the respondents scored higher than the neu-
tral mid-point of 3 on his 1–5 FBV scale [p. 260]) and do not differ 
between the white British majority and various minority ethnic groups 
(p. 251).
There is also some evidence to suggest that young people are particu-
larly sceptical about whether acts of political violence can ever be justi-
fied. In the ACT evaluation research (Jerome & Elwick, 2016) the 
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questionnaires included some questions to explore whether political vio-
lence could be justified for a variety of causes (such as religion, the envi-
ronment, animal rights). These questions were based on an opinion poll 
conducted in 2011 and discussed in Sobolewska (2012), to enable a com-
parison between the student sample and the general population. As 
Sobolewska indicates in her discussion of the opinion poll data, younger 
respondents tended to be less likely to suggest any justification for terror-
ism could be legitimate, and our findings reflect this. For example, when 
asked if terrorism could be justified on the grounds of environmental 
causes, animal rights or protecting one’s faith, only 6–8% thought it 
could ever be justified (this includes ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ options 
on a 5-point scale, with the mid-point being ‘uncertain’). In the opinion 
poll this was 8–9% when respondents drawn from the general popula-
tion were given a straightforward yes/no/don’t know option, but 13–15% 
when they were allowed to offer a ‘qualified yes’. Over half the opinion 
poll respondents thought terrorism could be justified if it was part of a 
fight against foreign occupation or an oppressive government, but only 
8–13% of students agreed. The large difference between the students and 
the general population in the final two questions may well indicate a lack 
of understanding of how contextual factors may influence judgements 
about the use of violence, an interpretation supported by the observation 
that more students opted for ‘uncertain’ in the last two questions.
Given these two observations, one might reasonably conclude that 
there is no particular reason to believe that all young people need a spe-
cific FBV intervention—on the face of it they are almost unanimously 
supportive of the concepts now described as FBVs and less likely to sup-
port violence than the general population. One might criticise this aspect 
of policy for being unnecessary, but perhaps no more than that. However, 
the qualitative data from other studies (e.g. Green, 2017) has indicated 
that some students experience the specific framing of democracy, the rule 
of law and tolerance as being ‘fundamentally British’ in particularly prob-
lematic ways, and this raises the possibility that rather than being merely 
redundant, it may have unintended negative effects.
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 Some Muslim Students Experience FBV 
as Discriminatory, Exclusionary and Intimidating
Islamophobia in schools has been the subject of much debate that pre-
dates the introduction of the Prevent Duty (see, e.g. Van Driel, 2004). 
Against this background, it is perhaps unsurprising that Lockley-Scott 
(2016) noted that Muslim students do not always feel school is a ‘safe 
place’ because of negative labelling and stereotyping—both from stu-
dents and sometimes from staff. Several of her female respondents 
reported they felt they were being closely observed and treated in ‘a bad 
way’. For example,
[School] is not always a safe place as ignorant people will associate you with Isis.
My headscarf makes society view me as a terrorist.
I think people are intimidated because I wear a headscarf. (Students quoted 
in Lockley-Scott, 2016, p. 6)
Lockley-Scott also notes that Muslim students sometimes reported an 
anxiety about ‘who’s listening’, leading to self-censorship. These findings 
suggest that Muslim students may find the discussion of terrorism and 
the FBVs particularly uncomfortable.
This conclusion is supported by Green’s focus groups with Muslim 
teenagers in Tower Hamlets, London, who reported feeling discrimina-
tion, being spied on and experiencing pressure to secularise. One group 
who attended the same sixth form cited the example of a school talk by 
the Quilliam Foundation, which they interpreted as implying, ‘if you’re 
not a Quilliam Muslim, you’re an extreme Muslim’ (Green, 2017, p. 247). 
For a majority of these young people, despite the fact that they identified 
as British, greatly valued democracy and embraced the principle of tolera-
tion, they felt their Britishness was often not recognised by others and 
that they were marginalised. One of Green’s participants argued:
I don’t think British culture and Islam contradict so much, but I think that 
they want us to change so much that we’re no longer following Islam, we’re 
just following British culture. (Focus group participant from Green, 
2017, p. 248)
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This sentiment implies that the conflation of FBVs and Britishness, and 
the sustained critique of multiculturalism (Vincent, 2019) are making 
themselves felt in particularly harmful ways for some young Muslims.
 Young People Want to Learn About Terrorism 
and Extremism to Build Their Religious, Political 
and Critical Media Literacy
Given the commonplace connection between Islam and terrorism in the 
media and social attitudes (Matthes, Schmuck, & von Sikorski, 2019), it 
is not surprising that Quartermaine found ‘there is a genuine interest 
from pupils in discussing the relationship between terrorism and religion’ 
(2016, p. 25). When they were given the opportunity to engage in such 
discussions, students were indeed grateful for the opportunity to criti-
cally explore the relationship between religion and terrorism. In particu-
lar, one of the consistent findings from the evaluation of the ACT project 
(Jerome & Elwick, 2016) related to the way that students came to per-
ceive the role of the media in reinforcing the idea that there is a relation-
ship between Islam and terrorism:
It’s strange to think that maybe the way the media represents these people 
completely changes the opinion of a person. They might have been fine 
with a certain person before and then after they’ve read something about 
the person or their religion and it completely changes the way they see 
people … (Student quoted in Jerome & Elwick, 2016)
The teachers in the ACT project generally made sure that students were 
introduced to several different examples of terrorism, such as the IRA or 
anti-apartheid activists, in order to expand their understanding beyond 
Islamist terrorism. Having learned about other forms of terrorism and 
political violence, several students noted that ‘the media only really talks 
about Muslim terrorists, they brush over other forms of terrorism’. For 
some they were then able to think about how this influenced their own 
views, both about terrorism and about Islam.
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I don’t know because the media is so powerful I think we’re all just brain-
washed and we’re all stuck in that mentality that we should be scared of 
them [Muslims]. (Student quoted in Jerome & Elwick, 2019a)
This raises the prospect that the right kind of critical educational engage-
ment with Prevent and the FBVs may also provide students with the 
resources to question and intervene in the unconscious perpetuation of 
islamophobia.2
Here there are clear indications of the kind of knowledge that is help-
ful to expand students’ understanding of the relevant issues. For example, 
having studied media representations, one student commented:
The word Islamophobia is quite interesting because you hear about all the 
racism that goes on in the world and it kind of sums it up … I like giving 
it a name, you can identify it more. (Student quoted in Jerome & 
Elwick, 2019a)
Quartermaine’s students said they wanted opportunities to consider the 
ideological views of the 9/11 bombers, and those students who studied 
the motivations of terrorists as part of the ACT project confirmed that 
this was valuable and that they were capable of engaging with the open-
ended nature of such an investigation. This questions assumptions from 
some quarters that young people need to be protected from extremist 
ideology.
The whole project is to make the students aware of what protests are like 
for different people and to understand the full story because when you go 
home the media don’t give you the full story … teachers don’t want you to 
believe that – they want you to get the full story. (Student quoted in Jerome 
& Elwick, 2019a)
Students often referred to this idea that they wanted to move beyond 
partial media representations and to get the ‘whole story’ including the 
views of those involved in terrorism. In this way students felt that teach-
ers were best placed to help them move beyond the superficial knowledge 
they gain through media and social media:
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Before I didn’t know, I knew what was going on the news, but I didn’t 
know how to understand it.
Lessons help you understand why they’re doing it … sometimes when 
you hear things on the news you think ‘why are they doing that?’ (Students 
quoted in Jerome & Elwick, 2019a)
If schools do not offer this kind of educational approach, it is difficult to 
imagine where else young people might get such an education.
Some students demonstrated that there was a level of basic knowledge 
that they would not gain if it was not covered in lessons. In one school 
with high levels of English Defence League (EDL) activity in the com-
munity, one group of Muslim boys speculated that the ‘far right’ might 
be a group of people who were very supportive of rights, demonstrating 
that it is dangerous to assume young people learn about such issues 
through informal means. A similar point was made in a focus group:
Before we were learning about this I didn’t really know what an extremist 
group was, I never heard about the neo-Nazis or things like that, but when 
we started learning about it I started like not only knowing what the groups 
were and what they did but also two points, like I didn’t know you could 
have a different opinion, I thought they would all just be the same … 
(Student quoted in Jerome & Elwick, 2019a)
Several students in our focus groups went beyond the personal factors 
often discussed in relation to radicalisation to consider how such pro-
cesses are shaped by political context and lived experience. For example, 
some students speculated on how a person’s attitudes towards groups 
such as ISIS might be shaped by how they perceive the West’s bombing 
and other foreign policy interventions in majority Muslim countries, or 
how they might experience Britain’s democracy if they felt marginalised, 
discriminated against and disempowered.
Obviously a group like ISIS didn’t start from nothing, obviously there’s 
something there to help it start and help it build … there’s a purpose to it 
and something has made them do it.
I think the main thing that is the most difficult thing to find out about 
this topic is why the extremist groups … obviously they have their reasons 
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and their beliefs … I think that’s the hardest thing to find out and I don’t 
know if you’ll ever get the answer to it. (Student quoted in Jerome & 
Elwick, 2019a)
In these considerations students demonstrated an ability to apply politi-
cal empathy and consider how similar situations could be interpreted by 
others, and to consider how those drawn to terrorism might justify their 
own actions and perceive their own agency. In doing so they in fact reflect 
some of the academic critique of simplistic and over-individualised 
accounts of how people come to engage in or support political violence 
(Coolsaet, 2016).
The first part of this chapter provides some useful insights into second-
ary students’ perspectives on the Prevent Duty. First, it suggests that 
young people are sympathetic to the concepts included in the FBV 
framework, but the framing of the ideas as ‘fundamental’ and ‘British’ 
may be unnecessary (they are supported anyway) and possibly counter-
productive. Second, it indicates that young people want opportunities to 
learn about terrorism, the motivations of terrorists and the different 
forms of terrorism. Third, they also value opportunities to learn about 
how the media represents terrorism and the relationship between this and 
their own perceptions of who constitutes a threat. And finally, we would 
argue that these responses indicate young people have the capacity to live 
with a level of uncertainty—they want to be better informed about ter-
rorism as a political phenomenon, but they do not expect to find easy 
answers or simple explanations.
 What Do Government-Endorsed Educational 
Resources Offer Students?
Having reflected in the previous section on what the evidence to date tells 
us about student views related to the Prevent Duty, in this section we 
examine the educational resources that have been developed and pro-
moted by the government, and consider to what extent they meet the 
challenges outlined above.
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We explore resources suggested for teachers in the Educate Against 
Hate (EAH) website (https://educateagainsthate.com), which has been 
developed by the Department for Education and the Home Office ‘to 
provide practical advice, support and resources to protect children from 
extremism and radicalisation’. Methodologically, we follow Ford’s (2019) 
analysis of how textbooks discuss terrorism and extremism, which 
employs a flexible approach to discourse analysis, reading materials to 
explore the ‘themes, labels, subjectivities and imagery deployed’ (Ford, 
2019, p. 5). In practical terms this means looking at the ways in which 
key concepts are defined and employed, what examples are given, who is 
represented and what narratives are constructed. Our primary objective 
was to examine the materials promoted by the government to consider 
how they interpreted the Prevent Duty, the balance they struck between 
safeguarding and the FBVs, and the extent to which they engaged with 
the kinds of issues highlighted by the students themselves (as dis-
cussed above).
At the time of writing the DfE was reviewing the website, with the 
possibility that a considerable re-design or replacement project may be 
implemented. However, as of January 2020 the Teachers Classroom 
Resource section of the website included references to 40 resources. In 
deciding which of these to focus on for our review, we went through sev-
eral screening processes. First, we excluded any links to generic websites 
or resources which were not explicitly related to the Prevent Duty, the 
DfE guidance or FBVs, and which failed to refer to terrorism, extremism 
or radicalisation. One example of such material is UNICEF’s Rights 
Respecting Schools Award which, despite being a popular resource for 
promoting children’s rights, does not relate explicitly to the rationale, 
aims or themes of the EAH website, nor the Prevent/FBV context. A 
second stage of screening consisted in testing the web-links, where proj-
ects were held on other websites, this resulted in several more exclusions 
where there were no live links to follow or where users had to register 
personal details with a third party organisation to get access to material. 
This left 26 resources for further investigation. Based on the titles and 
introductory pages for each we identified which resources explicitly 
addressed the following criteria:
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• Links to the citizenship curriculum
• Links to other subjects such as Religious Education (RE) or Personal, 




• Active citizenship/student voice
• Safeguarding
We then selected five resources3 which met four or more of these criteria. 
This was intended to enable us to focus on those resources most likely to 
provide comprehensive coverage to enable a fair evaluation of the con-
tent. These resources are summarised in Table 4.1.
The sample we have selected represents a rather open and inclusive 
approach to the production of resources. Some schools and colleges have 
been involved, some community groups with potentially relevant exper-
tise have contributed resources (e.g. organisations with expertise in work-
ing with young people or tackling islamophobia), and victim perspectives 
are also represented. In reviewing this selection of resources, we seek to 
illustrate how the Prevent Duty is being enacted within these documents 
Table 4.1 Resources selected for review from Educate Against Hate website
Resource Brief description
(1)  Think. Protect. 
Connect.
6 lessons, a teacher and student pack for youth settings, 
schools and post 16 colleges and for people on the 
Autistic Spectrum produced by East Sussex Safer 
Communities Partnership
(2)  No Love for 
Hate
A series of lessons aimed at 14–19-year-olds and produced 
by Harlow College and Luton Sixth Form Colleges, in 
partnership with the Home Office
(3)  Democracy 
Challenge
A programme of creative activities broadly targeted at 
11–18-year-olds developed by UK Youth in partnership 
with the Cabinet Office
(4)  Getting on 
Together 
(Secondary)
Two lessons and their resources produced by the Welsh 
Getting on Together project to counter Islamophobia
(5) Miriam’s Vision Miriam Hyman was killed in the London Bombings, 2005, 
and this resource is produced by the Miriam Hyman 
Memorial Trust. Lessons are aimed at 11–14-year-olds
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and thus how these contributors have already re-framed the Prevent Duty 
from their own perspectives (Lundie, 2017, p. 16). We cannot comment 
on how teachers might select, adapt or interpret such materials in practice 
(see Chap. 8), and so here we offer some questions that might be useful 
for teachers encountering these resources.
 Where Do These Resources Come from? Who 
Produced Them and Why?
Lundie (2017) has noted that the Prevent Duty provided the stimulus for 
a new group of experts to emerge, often from backgrounds other than 
education. Such experts emerge as policy entrepreneurs or champions 
(Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012), as the policy opens up new career pros-
pects and new opportunities to advocate for their interpretation of the 
policy. Whilst the uniform style of the website tends to obscure these 
issues of provenance, our review demonstrated that the resources reflect 
the particular expertise or backgrounds of the organisation that produced 
them. For example, Miriam’s Vision was produced by a trust established 
by her family; unsurprisingly, therefore, this resource tends to focus on 
the victims of terrorism, rather than on understanding the nature of ter-
rorism itself. By contrast the Getting on Together resources emerge from 
a long-term ongoing project in Wales to counteract Islamophobia in the 
wake of the 9/11 bombings. This therefore tends to focus on presenting 
positive messages about Islam. No Love for Hate is produced by two 
further education (FE) colleges in Prevent Priority Areas and is largely 
focused on right-wing extremism in these local areas.
Whilst each of these resources therefore takes a distinctive approach, 
this reflects the nature, purpose and interests of the groups producing 
them. One issue that is relevant here is that the organisations rarely have 
expertise in the issues being discussed, for example, UK Youth produced 
the Democracy Challenge, but its expertise is in youth associations rather 
than democracy. Similarly, No Love for Hate is produced by staff and 
students at the FE colleges, but no contributors are identified as having 
expertise in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) or right-wing extrem-
ism. This may well be a contributory factor in the issues we discuss below.
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 What Is the Purpose of These Resources? Do They 
Promote Critical Thinking or Passive Acceptance 
of a Simplified Narrative?
The FBVs are presented in policy as something to be ‘promoted’ whereas 
the young people discussed above are clear that they want opportunities 
for critical, open-ended discussion. Teachers have to make their own 
judgement about the extent to which they are happy to promote the 
FBVs as some kind of antidote to the ‘fixed, rigid and dogmatic’ views 
espoused by extremists (LGFL, 2015), as opposed to using them as a 
starting point for deeper exploration. Some of the resources simply 
imported government definitions of the FBVs and the definition of 
extremism as ‘opposition’ to them (see, e.g. Think, Protect, Connect). 
Similarly, No Love for Hate featured an on-line quiz that included the 
following question:
Question. What do you think the British values project is all about?
Answer 1. It means displaying the Union Jack.
Answer 2. Showing fair play and stiff upper lip.
Answer 3. Speaking English and eating fish and chips.
Answer 4. Showing tolerance/respect for different faiths and beliefs.
At times the resources slipped from discussing (or promoting) the FBVs 
into narrow cultural representations of Britishness, such as Big Ben, the 
Queen, fish and chips (Think, Protect, Connect). Another approach was 
adopted by Democracy Challenge, which simply describes and advocates 
for a rather narrow (formal, Westminster-centred) version of British 
democracy. Similarly, the citizenship lessons in Miriam’s Vision largely 
avoid issues related to terrorism in favour of exploring the range of cam-
paigning strategies available to people protesting against the third runway 
at Heathrow. These examples position the teacher as an uncritical pro-
moter of pre-determined answers and fail to provide students with the 
opportunities they wanted to discuss and explore the FBVs and terrorism.
In contrast to these positive presentations of the FBVs, No Love for 
Hate is more explicit in attacking the basis of far-right extremist belief. In 
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this project there is a Prezi on-line presentation which plays along to 
Beethoven’s 7th Symphony. This shows the rise of European fascism as a 
result of the Wall Street Crash, featuring graphic pictures of dying chil-
dren and prison camp inmates, and then argues the rise of far-right 
extremism in the USA and Europe today is a parallel political phenome-
non. There is no learning activity, simply some facts and information 
aligned into a single and simplistic narrative. The shocking images, stir-
ring sound-track and single simplistic narrative/perspective actually illus-
trate the very propaganda methods students are warned against in a 
previous lesson on far-right social media strategies.
Taken together these examples indicate that counter-narratives within 
these resources tend to be fairly simplistic and lack criticality or nuanced 
engagement with a range of perspectives. This stood out as one of the key 
requests of young people in our research—they trusted teachers to tell 
them the truth and introduce them to multiple perspectives. Whilst 
teachers are among the most trusted professionals in young people’s lives 
(Ipsos MORI, 2018), it seems to us that such trust might be squandered 
if teachers use it to promote simplified and simplistic thinking, where 
students want critical and open thinking. The promotion of ideas such as 
democracy, liberty and toleration in the abstract also fails to induct young 
people into the kinds of difficult ‘turbulent’ discussions that are essential 
in democracy (Davies, 2014).
 Who Is Represented in the Resources and How Are 
They Represented?
It is not surprising that sometimes teachers reproduce some of the domi-
nant social tropes evident in mainstream discourse around terrorism and 
extremism (see Chap. 3). To some extent one could argue that for a 
teacher to engage in preventing something, they have to imagine some 
sort of threat or problem, and there is some evidence that teachers come 
to perceive (elements of ) the communities they serve as the problem to 
be solved (Jerome & Elwick, 2019b).
Some of the most obvious examples of unconscious bias are evident in 
the material produced by teachers—perhaps reflecting the fact that they 
may lack expertise in the area, lack professional editing services or may 
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have had less time to spend on such projects. It may also reflect the fact 
that they are imagining their resources being used and interpreted in their 
particular context, responding to their perception of the problem. In 
Think, Protect, Connect, for example, all but two of the examples of 
extremism relate to Islamism and are all related to individuals, rather than 
groups or movements, but the two examples of the far-right are both 
linked to images of flags not individuals. In this way pre-existing stereo-
types of what terrorists look like are likely to be reinforced—perhaps this 
is even more serious given this resource claims to be particularly suitable 
for students with autism, who the authors describe as ‘more likely to take 
things literally’ (p. 5 of the teacher toolkit). By contrast, No Love for Hate 
is almost exclusively concerned with far-right extremism and portrays 
such people as directly comparable to Nazis. A quiz includes this question:
Question. What do you think of a white boy saying, ‘I don’t feel I belong 
here. I’m the odd one out’.
Answer 1. It sounds like he lives in his own little world.
Answer 2. He probably said it because he is feeling alone.
Answer 3. Get over it, No love for hate.
Answer 4. Perhaps he doesn’t understand the terror families run from.
None of these responses acknowledge the boy’s perceptions, and as 
Busher’s (2015) research into the EDL has shown, such sentiments are 
complex but very real among people who endorse such organisations. 
These approaches seem to fail to provide space to consider the different 
perspectives of people and how their views develop, which students in 
our research said they wanted. In their place there are sometimes rather 
stereotypical or caricatured images of people identified as extremist.
 Do These Resources Engage Directly with the Problem 
of Terrorism and Extremism, or Do They Skirt Around 
the Issues?
As noted above, some resources, such as Democracy Challenge, are 
framed on the EAH website as linked to the FBVs, but in reality they do 
not engage with the broader debates about the nature of democracy or 
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the threats to it. Others which appear as though they will tackle the 
Prevent agenda more directly often seem to skirt around the core issues of 
terrorism, extremism and the dilemmas that arise. Getting on Together 
includes some distinctive elements; for example, it represents a range of 
positive voices about Islam (to counteract negative images in mainstream 
culture) and it suggests that there are different types of extremism. We 
supplemented our review by looking at the primary lesson on extremism, 
to assess how the authors explored this issue, and here the story of Rosa 
Parks is presented for discussion, presumably as an example of positive 
extremism. As is all too typical, the Rosa Parks story is invoked as an 
individual story of bravery, rather than as a collective story of political 
action (Schmitz, 2015), but here it seems compounded by the suggestion 
that it might also be considered an example of extremism.
The citizenship lessons in Miriam’s Vision similarly hint at a topic that 
appears to be at the core of the Prevent agenda, but then veer away. These 
lessons start with a focus on the Human Rights Act and prompt students 
to think about what level of surveillance is compatible with our right to 
privacy. These opening activities encourage students to consider how 
rights must be balanced, but the lessons then move on to consider how 
one can achieve non-violent change (through the case study of the third 
runway at Heathrow) and therefore fail to explore the big issue hinted at 
initially. A third example is evident in the Democracy Challenge where 
teachers are urged to engage in ‘hot potato’ debates, such as around immi-
gration, but there are no resources or guidance to help with this (beyond 
logistical advice around putting students into groups, handing out sticky 
notes, etc.), and no clear objective about the purpose of such a discussion.
 Conclusion
The data considered in this chapter indicate that young people are gener-
ally supportive of the FBVs but that the translation of them into the cur-
riculum may lead to new problems of marginalisation or ‘othering’. This 
is not to imply that an educational response is not potentially helpful, 
and we have outlined some of the ways that students feel schools could 
help them develop their understanding. Their requests seem fairly 
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obvious—they want to build their understanding of terrorism and 
extremism so they can develop a better understanding of what is happen-
ing around them, and in this they find specific information valuable, 
such as different types of terrorism, the perspectives of those involved, 
and the way the media and social media operates in relation to recruit-
ment and reporting. Yet the materials on offer to teachers to help them 
address this demand largely fall short. In the second part of this chapter, 
we have demonstrated that some of the resources risk reproducing nega-
tive or simplistic ideas that are evident in popular cultural tropes around 
terrorism and extremism. Starting with a focus on young people leads us 
to be concerned that the Prevent Duty may well be contributing to prob-
lems with the policy rather than equipping young people with the capac-
ity to make sense of the post-9/11 world in which they live.
Notes
1. The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support of ACT for 
this evaluation, and the Home Office for funding of the overall project.
2. Since we collected this data there has been more media coverage of the 
extreme right, so it is possible that these perceptions may have altered 
somewhat.
3. This filtering process also identified ‘The Deliberative Classroom’ project 
(a collaboration between ACT, Middlesex University and the English- 
Speaking Union) but, as the authors of this chapter were very involved 
with this project, we decided to omit it from this analysis to avoid a con-
flict of interest.
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5
Enacting the Prevent Duty in Early 
Childhood Education Settings
Jenny Robson
Abstract This chapter examines the implementation of the Prevent Duty 
in early childhood education (ECE) provision in England. Findings from 
a small-scale empirical study suggest that ECE practitioners simultane-
ously performed, resisted and embodied the requirements of the Prevent 
Duty in practice. ECE practitioners were performative in their response 
to the requirement to promote fundamental British values (FBVs) as they 
evidenced compliance within an environment of regulation. However, 
ECE practitioners simultaneously operated a pedagogy rich in values 
education in which children were positioned as constructors of values. 
The layering of counter-terrorism within safeguarding policy led to a 
repositioning of practices of surveillance of children and families, which 
resonates with some critical readings of counter-terrorism policy in ECE.
J. Robson (*) 
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 Chapter Summary
The Prevent Duty brought providers of publicly funded early childhood 
education (ECE) provision in England within the scope of the govern-
ment’s counter-terrorism strategy in 2015. Findings from a small-scale 
empirical study exploring the implementation of this new duty are dis-
cussed in this chapter. They show that enactment of the Prevent Duty 
within ECE provision was complex and multi-layered: practitioners 
simultaneously performed, resisted and embodied the Prevent Duty in 
their practice. Following a brief examination of the context, the chapter 
is structured into three parts: the response to fundamental British values 
(FBVs), values education in ECE and the implications of the alignment 
of Prevent with safeguarding policy.
Whilst ECE practitioners in this study were critical of FBVs from the 
perspective of their emphasis on Britishness, they evidenced compliance 
in order to meet the requirements of regulation. Visual displays designed 
by ECE practitioners to communicate FBVs are performative acts; how-
ever, the positioning of symbols of Britishness to represent values poten-
tially obscured reflection on the associations such symbols may have with 
nationalism, colonialism and oppression. Values are central to relation-
ships and the negotiation of knowledge in ECE and they shape everyday 
pedagogical practice. In this study, findings suggest that values in ECE 
remained distant from and unconstrained by FBVs. Children constructed 
and co-constructed values of relevance to their lives and their immediate 
issues of concern. This reflected a contextual moral pedagogy where chil-
dren are positioned by ECE practitioners as competent in forming val-
ues. The alignment of safeguarding and counter-terrorism within ECE 
policy led to practices associated with preventing people being drawn 
into terrorism becoming synonymous with safeguarding children, legiti-
mising new acts of surveillance. This chapter concludes by raising ques-
tions about the ways in which values and relationships between children, 
 J. Robson
79
practitioners and families are governed by counter-terrorism policy. Such 
debates have the potential to provide a critical reading of counter- 
terrorism strategy in the ECE sector.
 Context: Prevent and Early 
Childhood Education
Policy development and implementation in ECE is not developed out-
side of ‘real life’ (Baldock, Fitzgerald, & Kay, 2013) but is shaped by a 
social cultural context, where there is an increased emphasis on national 
security as a result of terrorist attacks and the subsequent loss of human 
life. ECE policy and debates surrounding policy implementation can be 
viewed as a ‘sociocultural mirror’ (New, 2009, p. 309). McKendrick and 
Finch (2016) suggest that there is a prevailing approach of strategies asso-
ciated with securitisation across a range of child and family policy includ-
ing, for example, enhanced practices of surveillance and that such policy 
is situated within a global narrative of a ‘war on terror’ (p. 3). Early child-
hood education settings, including childminders and nurseries, as regis-
tered early years childcare providers in England, came within the scope of 
the Prevent Duty if they delivered publicly funded provision for children 
aged from 2 to 4 (HMG, 2015 updated 2019).
The UK governments’ policy response to terrorism had gradually 
shifted from a reactive to a preventative approach with an increased 
emphasis on work with communities (Panjwani, 2016). However, the 
implications and responsibilities arising from this shift for practitioners 
working with young children and families in communities remained 
ambiguous until the introduction of the Prevent Duty (Robson, 2019a). 
Lander (2016) argues that this new duty imposed a political agenda of 
securitisation onto practitioners working in community contexts and 
those working directly with children. Significantly, the ECE sector is now 
harnessed by statute to the government’s counter-terrorism strategy 
(Robson, 2015) and practitioners working within registered early years 
childcare provision are constituted as both subjects and agents of state 
counter-terrorism policy (Robson, 2019a).
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The Prevent Duty placed two statutory requirements on the ECE sec-
tor; first, registered early years providers were required to promote a pre- 
determined set of fundamental British values (FBVs) and, second, to 
identify those at risk of radicalisation. ECE policy designs lead to struc-
tures that promote accountability through regulation (Osgood, 2010). 
The Prevent Duty was reinforced through the Statutory Framework for 
the Early Years Foundation Stage (Department for Education, 2017). 
This policy sets out requirements across all aspects of ECE practice and 
providers are inspected by the state to assess their compliance with it. 
Similarly, the regulatory framework for education in England requires 
inspectors of registered early years provision to consider how well FBVs 
are promoted. Initially, this was part of the judgement on leadership and 
management (Ofsted, 2015) but in 2019 a revised regulatory framework 
changed the way the duty to promote FBVs is inspected in two ways. 
First, FBVs are situated within the judgement evaluating how the provi-
sion promotes children’s personal development and, specifically, the 
extent to which the provider develops children’s ‘understanding of funda-
mental British values’ (Ofsted, 2019a, p. 38).
Second, although FBVs remain a focus in the judgement on leadership 
and management, the new regulatory framework makes clear that leader-
ship and management is inadequate where ‘British values are not actively 
promoted in practice’ (Ofsted, 2019a, p.  41). Furthermore, the 2015 
Prevent Duty statutory guidance states that failure to promote FBVs in 
registered provision may lead to local authorities withdrawing early edu-
cation funding (HMG, 2015). Through the inspection framework for 
ECE, the parallel policy agendas of counter-terrorism and safeguarding 
are aligned. Guidance on the inspection of safeguarding requires inspec-
tors to assess how leaders create a culture of safeguarding; this includes 
how they keep ‘children and learning safe from the dangers of radicalisa-
tion and extremism’ (Ofsted, 2019b, p. 13). Regulation in this context is 
a practice of surveillance where inspectors assess compliance with the 
Prevent Duty and in doing so validate both FBVs and the practice of 
identifying families or individuals at risk of radicalisation. This raises 
questions about how ECE practitioners navigate the roles assigned to 
them by this powerful policy discourse of counter-terrorism, particularly 
the ways in which they evaluate the implications of the Prevent Duty for 
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their relationship with children and families or question the relevance of 
FBVs to their pedagogical practice.
 Outline of Research Project
This chapter draws on a small-scale empirical research study reported in 
Robson (2019a, b). Conducted within the interpretivist paradigm 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005), the study explored the multiple under-
standings of the Prevent duty operating in a small sample of six ECE 
providers in an ethnically diverse city in England. ECE settings were reg-
istered early years childcare providers subject to the Prevent Duty. There 
is a diversity of terminology applied in policy, practice and research in the 
study of the education and care of young children (Lloyd, 2012). The 
term ‘early childhood education’ is used here to describe publicly funded 
early education and care for young children that are provided by regis-
tered early years providers who are private enterprises or not for profit 
organisations. Participants in this study included ECE practitioners with 
responsibility for leadership of pedagogy and ECE practice and children 
(aged two to four). Data was collected through semi-structured inter-
views with practitioners and walking tours of the provision with children 
and practitioners. During the walking tours, participants shared docu-
mentation emerging from their engagement with the curriculum and 
pedagogy in the setting. As this was a small-scale study the findings aris-
ing from the analysis of data are intended to raise questions about, and 
provide insights into, the implementation of the Prevent Duty within a 
specific context. The findings, therefore, cannot be generalised across all 
ECE settings in England. In the discussion that follows, pseudonyms are 
used for all participants and the ECE settings in order to maintain 
anonymity.
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 The Performance of Fundamental British 
Values in Early Childhood
The emphasis placed on Britishness in FBVs was contested by the ECE 
practitioners. They questioned the relevance of an instituted form of 
Britishness to children, their families and the practitioners in the nursery. 
Specifically, practitioners appeared troubled that the diverse histories, 
nationalities and ethnic backgrounds of children and families within the 
ECE provision may not be considered British or that the families may 
not identify themselves with the specific version of Britishness repre-
sented in the policy of FBVs. One ECE practitioner stated:
I don’t think some children and families would see themselves as British. If 
I go home and say to my Mum ‘I am British’ she would say ‘No you are not 
you are…’ We have been given FBV as a tool to work with, but a lot of 
people would question FBV because they would not see themselves as 
British. (Sandra, Little House Day Nursery)
Sandra’s perspective reflected the complexity of individual identities and 
histories within the practitioner group and the way this affected their 
enactment of the policy. The ECE practitioners’ questioning of Britishness 
resonates with the critique of FBVs in the broader literature concerned 
with primary and secondary education. For example, Lander’s (2016) 
analysis queries whether FBVs can be claimed as uniquely British or 
whether there is an assumption in the Prevent Duty that FBVs are shared 
by all citizens.
Representations of FBVs in resources were challenged by ECE practi-
tioners, reflecting recent critical perspectives in the literature where mate-
rials used to promote FBVs were found to ‘rarely trouble the nature of the 
values or which present them in ways that are simplistic and formulaic’ 
(Revell & Bryan, 2018, p. 13). In the Grand House Day Nursery practi-
tioners were critical in their approach to resources produced commer-




A lot of the resources we saw on line were posters that had a British flag on 
it. Our children are not from a British background and we did not want to 
display something that did not belong to them. We did not want to display 
the flag. The posters had the Queen’s face and how did that relate to the 
[young] children? (Rebecca, Grand House Day Nursery)
Symbols such as the Union Flag and the monarchy were considered as 
patriotic and nationalistic; many practitioners suggested that they were 
decontextualized from children’s lives and therefore irrelevant. The criti-
cality evidenced by the ECE practitioners is significantly different to that 
Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe found in primary school teachers, who 
endorsed images to represent FBVs and maintained ‘the power of exclu-
sive monocultural white identities and perspectives’ (2019, p. 66.). The 
ECE practitioners identified that FBVs are represented in and by the 
symbols of civic life in resources available to ECE settings for purchase. 
Symbols of Britishness, now aligned to national values, are considered by 
the ECE practitioners as an exclusionary force. An alternative perspective 
on national values is provided by Soutphommasane (2012 also cited by 
Vincent, 2019); he proposed that a ‘shared national identity’ is character-
ised by ‘reciprocity and cooperation’ enabling a ‘community of shared 
belief ’ (pp.  71–72). Within this approach national identity emerges 
through a shared public culture represented in institutions and values; 
this is a dynamic process of debate opening possibilities for dialogue and 
new interpretations of national values. However, FBVs are perceived and 
experienced by the ECE practitioners as an imposed emblem of Britishness 
distant from their practice.
While the ECE practitioners challenged the appropriateness of par-
ticular and imposed views of Britishness, their responses to FBVs were 
complex and sometimes contradictory (Robson, 2019a). Despite the 
criticality evident above, the walking tours with the ECE practitioners in 
the settings revealed that there were displays about FBVs in the settings. 
Such displays generally included the names of the four FBVs and the 
Union Flag together with some information about the practices that 
realised the value. For example, in Grand House Nursery, the display 
stated that the practice of role modelling behaviours was linked to the 
rule of law. Similarly, the practices of children’s planning meetings and 
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children’s role in setting up their activities were linked to democracy. In 
Arcade Day Nursery, the display in the reception area included a state-
ment of how the values of the nursery mapped across to FBVs. Vincent 
(2019) suggested that this approach to the promotion of FBVs takes the 
form of ‘Representing Britain’ (p.  23) where displays listing the FBVs 
have Union Flag decoration and symbols associated with Britain. All the 
ECE practitioners referred to their displays in the context of regulation 
and the requirement to provide evidence during the inspection visit that 
they were promoting FBVs. The ECE practitioners understood this to be 
important because, at the time of the fieldwork, the degree to which the 
setting promoted FBVs formed part of the inspection judgement on lead-
ership and management in the provision. Although the displays gave 
some insight into how the provision was meeting its statutory obliga-
tions, they were afforded low status by the ECE practitioners relative to 
other aspects of the visual environment that reflected the everyday prac-
tice with children and children’s engagement with learning. Most of the 
ECE practitioners were apologetic in introducing the displays about 
FBVs; it was as if they considered them outside of their ECE practice.
The displays formed part of a deliberate strategy on the part of the 
ECE practitioners to evidence compliance with the requirement to pro-
mote FBVs. They can be considered as performative acts by the practitio-
ner (Butler, 1997; Osgood, 2006). The ECE practitioners here are 
performatively constituted; they are subject to the duty to FBVs, and 
they perform this duty in order to avoid the negative consequences aris-
ing from an inadequate inspection judgement. However, my analysis of 
the daily practice of values education (discussed later in the chapter) 
reveals how the ECE practitioners intervene and disrupt the hegemonic 
discourse of FBVs through the pedagogy in early childhood. FBVs are 
performed in a specific way for the purpose of inspection and this reflects 
the power of surveillance through inspection. Farrell (2016) in an analy-
sis of FBVs in the context of schools concluded that teachers are required 
to ‘be surveilled in the truth game of Britishness,’ (p. 14) and this high-
lights the reach of FBVs as a practice of power deployed in early child-
hood and sustained through all sectors of education. While the 
practitioners provided a consistent rationale for an explicit public com-
mitment to FBVs, this performativity may have obscured reflection on 
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the ways in which values are communicated within ECE through the 
material environment (Johansson & Puroila, 2016). For some practitio-
ners, families and children the imagery associated with FBVs, explicitly 
the Union Flag and the monarchy, may be considered as symbols of 
nationalism, colonialism, oppression and power. The visual representa-
tion of FBVs by the ECE practitioners contrasted with the highly critical 
perspective they adopted towards the symbols of Britishness in commer-
cially available resources to support the implementation of FBVs in nurs-
eries. The complexity of ECE practitioners’ response to FBVs is now 
explored further by examining the ways in which they deployed pedago-
gies of values education.
 Values Education in Early Childhood 
and Fundamental British Values
Values education is a complex concept in early childhood; it can be 
understood as an education practice through which children are assumed 
to learn values as well as the norms and skills reflected in those values 
(Halstead & Taylor, 2000). Values are ‘guiding principles in life’ 
(Schwartz, 2012, p. 17) and they are ideals that enable the ‘evaluation of 
beliefs and actions’ (Halstead, 1996, p. 5). In this way, they form the 
basis of moral judgements in determining what is legitimate or unjustifi-
able and appropriate or inappropriate. Within research, policy and prac-
tice the focus on values in ECE pre-dates the introduction of the Prevent 
Duty and the requirement to promote FBVs.
Supra-national organisations advocating for the development of 
national policy and practice frameworks in ECE have emphasised the 
centrality of values. UNESCO (2000) claims that the ‘value orientations 
of children are largely determined by the time they reach the age of for-
mal schooling’ (p. 2) and therefore state governments need to create a 
‘value-based environment’ (p. 4) in early childhood provision together 
with a child-centred values education programme that is free from politi-
cal, social or religious abuse. Osler (2015) and UNESCO (2015) empha-
sise the centrality of values, for example fairness, empathy and respect, in 
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developing understandings of citizenship and a sense of belonging to a 
community. Elsewhere (Robson, 2019a) I have raised the question as to 
whether the policy of promoting FBVs in ECE can be separated from the 
political context of measures to address counter-terrorism or indeed 
whether the promotion of FBVs is considered by the UK government as 
a values education programme.
The ECE practitioners in this study were subject to the Statutory frame-
work for the early years foundation stage (DFE, 2017); however, this frame-
work for curriculum and pedagogy omits any mention of FBVs or 
clarification of how FBVs relates to both the ‘areas for learning and devel-
opment’ and the ‘early learning goals’ (p. 10). The framework states that 
registered providers of ECE are subject to the Prevent Duty. This layering 
of counter-terrorism policy over the statutory framework for ECE creates 
ambiguity, tension and complexity for ECE practitioners as they enact 
policy in practice (Robson & Martin, 2019) and more explicitly the ped-
agogical relationships that exist in ECE between practitioners and chil-
dren and between children (Robson, 2019b).
This problem can be situated in broader debates about the nature of 
values education, which often revolve around the central question as to 
whether values should be ‘instilled’ in children or whether children 
should be taught ‘to explore and develop their own values’ (Halstead, 
1996, p. 9). In practice, such values can be explicit, where it is directed 
by the state through the curriculum or other policy texts, or implicit 
within the practices of ECE (Thornberg, 2016). Einarsdottir et al. (2015), 
researching in a Nordic context, argue that practitioners are commis-
sioned by state governments to mediate values that are formulated in the 
political arena; however, values are also embedded within the pedagogy of 
ECE (Emilson & Johansson, 2009). Values education, as a pedagogical 
practice, mediates moral and political values to children (Thornberg, 
2016) and therefore moral pedagogies provide an understanding of how 
FBVs are navigated in ECE practice in England. Basourakos (1999) pro-
poses a theory for values or moral education that contrasts conventional 
moral pedagogy and a contextual moral pedagogy. In the former, values 
are absolute and the role of the ECE practitioner is to transmit a pre- 
determined set of values to children. FBVs as a set of values specified by 
the state in national policy assume a conventional moral pedagogy 
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(Robson 2019a, b). However, a contextual moral pedagogy leads to a 
paradigmatic shift where the ECE practitioners engage children in con-
structing their own understanding of moral values and practices. The 
ECE practitioners I interviewed stated:
FBV are not asking us to do anything differently but bringing it out more. 
So, do what you are doing but extending it more. They [values] are really 
important – what we are teaching the children will have an impact when 
they are older. (Sandra, Little House Nursery)
The values have always been here. The focus on Fundamental British Values 
has made us more serious about them. (Farah, Arcade Day Nursery)
Here Sandra reflected that values had always been implicit in the peda-
gogical practice and her understanding was that FBVs did not bring 
about a change in practice. However, Farah and Sandra emphasised that 
the requirement to promote FBVs led to an increased focus on values 
education; this was a consistent theme emerging from the interview data 
where the practitioners indicated there was a heightened awareness of the 
practice of values education.
ECE practitioners named pedagogical practices that enabled a focus 
on values education, for example, the forums enabling children’s partici-
pation in the weekly and daily planning of the curriculum and learning 
activities. Labelled by the practitioners as ‘children’s planning meetings’ 
such forums were led and documented by children. The visual records of 
the meeting were displayed as a way of validating and celebrating chil-
dren’s contributions to the planning. In naming the values observed in 
children’s planning meetings practitioners principally focused on those 
included within the four FBVs. However, my analysis revealed a rich 
diversity of values operating in children’s planning meetings including for 
example, care, kindness, empathy, solidarity, respect and joy. Practitioners 
stated that the planning meetings provided opportunities for children to 
learn about democracy as an FBV and specifically about democratic rela-
tionships between children and between children and adults. However, 
this practice moved beyond a rhetorical commitment to democracy by 
applying democracy as a principle to guide pedagogical relationships in 
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ECE. Einarsdottir et al. (2015) understand this practice as a ‘lived democ-
racy’ (p. 104) where children’s everyday experience is a democratic pro-
cess. The practitioners’ pedagogy of implicit values education, where 
values are explored within the everyday practice (Halstead, 1996), enabled 
children to experience values beyond the four FBVs. Although children’s 
engagement in values education is unconstrained by the narrow focus of 
FBVs, practitioners appeared constrained by the four FBVs when reflect-
ing on the values implicit in children’s planning meetings. In this way the 
practitioners perform the legitimised FBVs.
Values education was sustained within the everyday practice of the set-
ting. In Big House Day Nursery, relationships between children, families 
and communities were explored as part of the area of learning 
‘Understanding the World’ within the Statutory Framework for the Early 
Years Foundation Stage (DFE, 2017). The decision to focus on exploring 
relationships as ‘Kindness in the Community’ was made by the children 
and practitioners as it was significant to their relationships; this was evi-
dent from the documentation emerging from the children’s planning 
meetings. The ECE practitioners commented that kindness as a concept 
and value was accessible and meaningful to children. While kindness as a 
value is not one of the four FBVs it had high relevance to the relation-
ships between children, families and communities and my analysis sug-
gests that it led children to a deeper exploration of other values such as 
empathy, care, compassion and appreciation of diversity in the commu-
nity. Children made and subsequently shared tokens of kindness with a 
range of people in the vicinity of the ECE provision including the home-
less people they met every day, people who worked in local shops or in 
the public transport stations. They visited the Mosque after Friday Prayers 
to distribute tokens of kindness. Here, children’s learning about values is 
contextualised within the social and cultural environment of the ECE 
provision and its wider community (Johansson & Puroila, 2016). 
Children constructed their understanding of kindness through lived 
experience. My analysis revealed that ECE practitioners lifted to the fore-
ground the four FBVs in their dialogues about pedagogical practice. This 
resonates with Johansson’s (2011) suggestion that values may be com-
municated consciously in ECE provision. However, the reality of values 
education went beyond the compliance to and performance of FBVs; the 
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ECE practitioners engaged children in a contextual moral pedagogy 
where they are constructors of values and unconstrained by the narrow 
focus of the four FBVs. Viewed through this perspective, values educa-
tion in early childhood extends beyond the UK government’s explicit 
policy rationale for FBVs of counter-terrorism and national security.
 The Securitisation of Safeguarding?
The Statutory Framework for the Early Years Foundation Stage (DFE, 
2017) sets out the safeguarding and welfare requirements that providers 
of ECE must take to ‘keep children safe and promote their welfare’ (p. 5), 
including having due regard to the Prevent Duty. Similarly, within the 
guidance on inspection of safeguarding in early years settings ‘radicalisa-
tion and/or extremist behaviour’ is included as one of the areas of con-
cern where practitioners may need to take safeguarding action (Ofsted, 
2019b, pp. 5–6). By positioning counter-terrorism as part of safeguard-
ing policy, the practices associated with preventing people from being 
drawn into terrorism become aligned with safeguarding. I suggest this is 
an evolving process of securitisation of safeguarding practice in ECE, 
where securitisation is the process by which the law requires practitioners 
to enact the demands of national security (Gearon, 2015). In this way 
safeguarding policies, as practices of power, produce rules that organise 
and guide ECE practice (see Chap. 3).
The ECE practitioners revealed a story of their initial encounters with 
the Prevent Duty. Farah stated that she first became aware of the Prevent 
Duty when she participated in safeguarding training, which included 
information about the threat of terrorism and terrorist-related incidents 
in their locality.
I first heard of it [Prevent] on my safeguarding course and they explained 
that the characteristics of radicalisation are more common now and they 
emphasised the dangers. (Farah, Arcade Day Nursery)
This situated the training as dealing with the threat of terrorism rather 
than the risk to the individual child or families arising from 
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radicalisation. Nargis and Sacha understood and accepted that safeguard-
ing practice had been extended to include a focus on identifying families 
at risk of radicalisation:
The idea came along in 2015 and we had training. The children love telling 
you things and you might hear something that rings a bell. Talk to the 
safeguarding officer. If they are going on holiday – where are they staying? 
Yes, it is part of safeguarding. (Nargis, Angel Community Nursery)
We had a few trainings about safeguarding – some of the things [observa-
tion] we naturally do. (Sacha, Big House Day Nursery)
These practitioners indicated there had not been opportunities to reflect 
on the implications arising from this extension of safeguarding practice. 
Whilst I am not questioning the importance of keeping children safe 
from radicalisation and extremist behaviour, the implications arising 
from the fusion of these two policy agendas within ECE practice is, I sug-
gest, problematic in two ways and this is explored further below.
First, although ECE practitioners already engage in practices of obser-
vation of families as part of safeguarding the welfare of children, the 
Prevent Duty extends the focus of surveillance to include identification 
of families or their colleagues at risk of radicalisation. The ECE practitio-
ners, in this study, appear to have an unquestioning acceptance of this 
shift in practice.
…it is to prevent children from being dragged into terrorism or it can be 
adults. It is not just with children it is with staff and parents as well. We 
always have to look out for it. (Farah, Arcade Day Nursery)
We have a duty of care and we have to be aware when we observe children’s 
play or staff and how to raise concerns. We have to be mindful and  
keep an eye out. I think it comes with knowing the children and noting 
any changes in their behaviour. Also being confident. (Rosa, Little Castle 
Community Nursery)
I suggest that the absence of opportunities for reflection on this layering 
of policy and practice is problematic as there are potential implications 
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for practice, particularly as ECE practitioners enact the demands of 
national security policy, in pedagogical relationships with families (and 
this is explored further below). Mary and Sacha actively engaged in sur-
veillance of children, families and colleagues for potential signs of radi-
calisation and this was embedded in daily practice within the ECE 
provision.
It is our duty of care to report anything that we may be concerned about 
with regard to radicalisation or if the child or the family are at risk of radi-
calisation. If there have been any prolonged absences or any language that 
the children are using. Trips to certain parts of the world and if they do not 
return on the date in which they had said. It is our duty to report these 
concerns. (Mary, Grand House Day Nursery)
In the early years sector it is more about absences and monitoring those 
absences because with quite young children they are not necessarily going 
to be drawn into terrorism but their families, their siblings and their wider 
community. We record all absences and we will contact the parents and ask 
them where they were and ask them what was happening. If we were 
informed that they had taken the children away unexpectedly then we 
would inform the manager and the safeguarding lead for the organisation. 
If we are observing children as we do every day, we would notice any 
changes in their behaviour and anything they would be mentioning. 
(Sacha, Big House Day Nursery)
The ECE practitioners absorbed this new aspect of surveillance into their 
practice just as Vincent (2019) observed teachers in primary and second-
ary schools absorb FBVs into the curriculum and pedagogical practice. In 
these ECE settings the Prevent Duty had established a narrative that posi-
tioned all children, families and colleagues as being at risk of radicalisa-
tion or as potential terrorists; this narrative was legitimised through its 
inclusion within the powerful mandate of safeguarding policy and 
practice.
Second, the way in which the Prevent Duty positions ECE practitio-
ners in relation to children and their families is potentially in conflict 
with other guidance that governs their practice. One of the stated aims of 
the Early Years Foundation Stage (DfE, 2017) is to provide ‘partnership 
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working between practitioners and with parents/carers’ (p. 5) enabled by 
a statutory requirement for each child to have a key person whose respon-
sibilities include ‘to engage and support parents and/or carers in guiding 
their child’s development at home.’ (p. 10). Central to this pedagogical 
relationship between practitioners, children and families is the mutual 
concern for the learning and care of the child. However, the national 
priority for counter-terrorism intrudes into this space and further extends 
the process of securitisation of early childhood practice. The ECE practi-
tioners felt compelled to ‘look out for it [signs of radicalisation]’ (Farah) 
or ‘keep an eye out [for potential terrorists]’(Rosa) in their work with 
children and families. Central to this practice of surveillance was to view 
everyday occurrences, for example, absence from the nursery or children’s 
speech; through the lens of terrorism. In this way counter-terrorism 
became a focus in the pedagogical relationships between families and the 
ECE practitioners. My research brings into question the way the Prevent 
Duty affects the role of ECE provision in the community. Dahlberg, 
Moss, and Pence (2013) argue that early childhood institutions are 
forums ‘where children and adults may participate together in projects of 
social, cultural, political and economic significance’ (p. 80). They suggest 
that one such significant project arises ‘from its potential for the estab-
lishment and strengthening of social networks of relationships between 
children, between adults (both parents and other adults engaged in the 
institution) and between children and adults’ (pp. 84–85) where ECE 
providers can contribute to the cohesion of local communities. A focus 
for further research on the implementation of the Prevent Duty emerges 
from this perspective; this could explore how social networks operating 
within and around ECE provision are potentially affected by practices of 
surveillance whose aim is identify those at risk of radicalisation.
 Conclusion
The introduction of the Prevent Duty in ECE has potentially far reaching 
implications for practice in England. Through the intersection of policies 
concerned with counter-terrorism, early childhood education and care 
and safeguarding ECE practitioners are influenced by the powerful 
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discourse surrounding measures to counter-terrorism. The research 
reported in this chapter brings to the foreground two areas for further 
debate in the ECE sector: first, the role of values and second, the nature 
of risk being safeguarded against. FBVs are a pre-determined and explicit 
set of values and as such they assume values can be transmitted to chil-
dren (Robson, 2019a). As values formulated in the political arena and at 
some distance from ECE practice, FBVs may be in tension with the val-
ues implicit within the everyday pedagogical practice in ECE. Practitioners 
in the ECE sector are placed under pressure to comply with the policy of 
FBVs and this may compromise their beliefs about appropriate values 
education in early childhood. A consideration of the role of children as 
constructors or co-constructors of values may lead to a deeper under-
standing of the richness and diversity of values that are central to chil-
dren’s lives. Through this process alternative narratives about values 
education may emerge that are not constrained by the narrow focus of 
FBVs or the performativity associated with evidencing compliance.
Second, the requirement to identify those at risk of radicalisation 
through practices of surveillance has the potential to affect relationships 
in ECE. This study has revealed how the focus of practices associated 
with safeguarding has been extended from a focus on children’s welfare to 
include the identification of families and practitioners at risk of radicali-
sation. Everyday occurrences within the ECE setting and in relationships 
with families were viewed through the powerful narrative of counter- 
terrorism. Alternative strategies to prevent people being drawn into ter-
rorism may emerge if there is a focus on how ECE provision may initiate, 
develop and sustain social networks of relationships that could contribute 
to cohesion in the local community. Such a reflection may deflect the 
focus on the individual as an object of risk and refocus on structural 
issues of inequality and injustice that may be experienced by young chil-
dren and their families.
This chapter contributes to a growing field of scholarship examining 
the implications arising from the Prevent Duty for practitioners working 
with children and their family. Research reported in this chapter makes a 
small contribution to the field in three ways; first, it gives visibility to the 
process of securitisation where ECE practitioners are required to enact 
the requirements of national security policy in their everyday practice. 
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Second, the status and pedagogy of values education as an everyday prac-
tice in ECE is revealed as unconstrained by the hegemonic narrative of 
state specified values in the FBVs. The contextual moral pedagogy that 
underpinned values education positions children as capable constructors 
of values which they apply to evaluate actions and events. Applied in this 
way pedagogy becomes a powerful tool for producing alternative narra-
tives on values to those prescribed in policy. Third, this chapter reveals 
the complex way in which the ECE practitioners in this study imple-
mented the Prevent Duty; this was simultaneously performed, resisted 
and embodied in their pedagogy and engagement with colleagues, chil-
dren and their families.
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embedding of Prevent into fundamental British values (FBVs). Our find-
ings illustrate how this policy enactment responds to a context deter-
mined by the idiosyncrasies of the primary school setting, of the wider 
community, and of the political and strategic environment. We find that 
primary school educators display a positive acceptance of the Prevent 
Duty, largely motivated by its incorporation in a wider professional cul-
ture of safeguarding and that, with rare exceptions, they are supportive of 
embedding Prevent in the teaching of FBVs.
Keywords Prevent Duty • Safeguarding • Education • Primary schools 
• Fundamental British values
In this chapter, we examine how the Prevent Duty has been enacted in 
primary schools since its introduction in July 2015. We focus on its broad 
implementation, the raising of Prevent-related concerns, and the embed-
ding of Prevent into fundamental British values (FBVs).
Our findings illustrate how this policy enactment (Ball, McGuire, & 
Braun, 2013) is dynamic, responding to a context determined by the 
idiosyncrasies of the primary school setting, as well as by developments in 
the wider community and political environment. Specifically, we find 
that the primary school educators who participated in this research dis-
played a positive acceptance of the Prevent Duty, largely motivated by its 
incorporation in a wider professional culture of safeguarding, and within 
existing pedagogical practices around teaching values. We also show how 
the implementation of the Duty is evolving away from focusing on 
Islamist extremism, under the pressure of a changing socio-political con-
text. Furthermore, and in contrast with some of the other chapters in this 
volume, we encountered very few expressed criticisms either of the 
embedding of Prevent within the teaching of FBVs or indeed of the label-
ling of these values as ‘British’.
Whilst this chapter does not aim to provide an exhaustive account of 
how the Prevent Duty is enacted in primary schools throughout the UK, 
the breadth and variety of our data allow us to offer a valuable snapshot 
of the main approaches adopted in the West Midlands and how educa-
tors have assessed the implications of these approaches for their local 
community.
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 Methods
We draw on the findings of a larger project examining the operationalisa-
tion of the Prevent Duty in primary schools in the West Midlands, car-
ried out in 2018–2019. The West Midlands is a particularly interesting 
case study of the implementation of the Prevent Duty because, at the 
time of writing, three of its six local authorities are Prevent priority areas: 
Birmingham, Coventry, and Walsall. Priority areas are geographic regions 
considered to have a higher threat level (Mastroe, 2016; Home Office, 
2019). As such, they are provided with additional funding, a local Prevent 
coordinator, and in some cases one or more local Prevent Education 
Officers (PEOs) (see Chap. 2).
The project included an online survey, sent to all primary schools in 
the West Midlands. The survey was based on Charlotte Heath-Kelly and 
Erzsebet Strausz’s survey on the Prevent Duty in the National Health 
Service (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2019). Questions were added or 
rephrased to adapt the survey to the primary school context and to fur-
ther explore scenarios related to right-wing extremism. Free-text boxes 
were added to afford participants the opportunity to reflect, comment, 
and elaborate on their responses. Between February and July 2019, 345 
primary school educators answered the survey. This sample included edu-
cators at all stages of their career, teaching at all primary stages in state 
schools, academies, faith schools, and independent schools throughout 
the six local authorities in the West Midlands. The respondents included 
teaching assistants, teachers, and Designated Safeguarding Leads (DSLs) 
as well as school leaders.
The survey data was complemented by 32 semi-structured interviews 
with primary school educators in the West Midlands and five interviews 
with PEOs from the region. Questions focused on how primary school 
educators understood the Prevent Duty; how they enacted the Duty; and 
how they perceived the impact and implications of the Duty in their own 
sector of work. Throughout this chapter, we use both the free-text com-
ments by survey respondents and excerpts from interview transcripts.
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 Implementing the Prevent Duty in Primary 
Education in the West Midlands
The statutory guidance for keeping children safe in education (DfE, 
2019) presents the Prevent Duty as part and parcel of wider safeguarding 
practices. Thus, schools, like all sectors affected (e.g., health, social ser-
vices), are expected to integrate Prevent into existing safeguarding poli-
cies and procedures (Home Office, 2019). Primary and secondary schools 
specifically,
need to demonstrate that they are protecting children and young people 
from being drawn into terrorism by having robust safeguarding policies in 
place to identify children at risk, and intervening as appropriate. (Home 
Office, 2019)
Despite the controversy generated by the introduction of the Prevent 
Duty in sectors like education, and criticisms from some observers that 
the Duty leads to the ‘blurring of social and security policy’ (Ragazzi, 
2017, p. 168), 74.8% of survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
that ‘The Prevent Duty belongs within education’. Some explained this 
view with reference to the belief that they are ideally positioned to notice 
and to deal with any behavioural changes, including signs of 
radicalisation:
teachers often get to know children very well and be able to see the changes 
in them to prevent radicalisation before it becomes too late. (Anonymous 
survey respondent)
In line with the existing literature on Preventing Violent Extremism 
(PVE) and education (Davies, 2016; Bryan, 2017; Busher, Choudhury, 
& Thomas, 2019; Elwick & Jerome, 2019), we found that the Prevent 
Duty, in the primary school context, has been broadly accepted as part 
and parcel of safeguarding. Indeed, the majority of survey respondents 
(71%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘The Prevent Duty is 
just safeguarding. It is the same as safeguarding pupils from domestic 
abuse and sexual abuse’. However, their responses to the Duty were not 
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limited to a position of ‘pragmatic acceptance’ (Busher et  al., 2019). 
Rather, some of the respondents adopted more positive attitudes, fuelled 
partly by the way that the Duty resonated with existing perceptions of 
young children as victims, as individuals at risk of abuse. One PEO elab-
orated on this point in an interview:
Actually, saying just like any other issue FGM, honour based violence, 
domestic abuse, all these different issues that can affect people, you see 
Prevent the same. So, what I say to them [primary school educators] is: 
when you are dealing with a CSE [child sexual exploitation] case you see 
the young people as victims, when you’re dealing with a Prevent case you 
are doing the same thing, they’re victims of radicalisation or groom-
ing. (PEO1)
In the same line of thought, one survey respondent stated in the free-text 
comments:
As a school we must protect children from all forms of harm and radicalisa-
tion is a form of harm. (Anonymous survey respondent)
Some interviewees also underscored that aligning Prevent with safeguard-
ing has helped educators come to terms with the policy as an instrument 
to protect rather than to police children and their families. As a head-
teacher put it, when seen in this light the Prevent Duty becomes:
just part of normal safeguarding, I don’t want the big hysteria about it […] 
I think it is just another part of safeguarding, in the same way that if you 
saw a child with a bruise, or if a child disclosed something to you. (E18, 
headteacher, Birmingham)
Similarly, another headteacher noted:
[if ] there are still some headteachers that believe that Prevent is too inva-
sive, erm, I’m not one of those I’m afraid. (E23, headteacher, Birmingham)
Only one survey respondent contemplated the potentially detrimental 
consequences of the Prevent Duty, in general, and of a Channel referral 
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in particular, which he considered to be more than ‘just safeguarding’ as 
it ‘can label people as terrorists’ and ‘lead to dreadful consequences that 
affect many people in the community’.
This overall confidence in the Prevent Duty and in its implementation 
is, as already mentioned, fuelled by its conflation with existing safeguard-
ing policies and practices. According to our survey data, the quality of the 
Prevent-related training provided to educators has also played an impor-
tant role here. The Department for Education requires that all staff 
undertake this type of training. The Home Office offers WRAP 
(Workshop to Raise Awareness about Prevent) training and a variety of 
external organisations have also developed Prevent-related training tai-
lored to schools. This training should, according to the statutory guid-
ance, give teachers ‘the knowledge and confidence’ to identify at-risk 
pupils, as well as how to refer pupils for further support (Home Office, 
2019, paragraph 70). Among our survey respondents, 96% stated that 
the training they had received explained the signs of radicalisation well or 
very well. This contributed to the overwhelming majority of survey 
respondents stating that they were confident or very confident in refer-
ring a query about radicalisation (90.9%). As one of the respondents 
reported, they felt confident because they felt well equipped ‘with the 
information needed to identify signs of radicalisation’.
The data collected through interviews was however less positive regard-
ing the quality of the training received, particularly the WRAP training. 
In contrast to survey respondents, some interviewees emphasised that the 
Prevent training they attended was not suitable for the primary school 
context. Reflecting on the WRAP training, one interviewee stated:
I find it difficult to relate a lot of the training materials to this [primary 
school] environment because it is very much secondary based and teenager 
based and because of how the vulnerable groups are identified. In that 
respect you can’t just walk away with the training materials and apply what 
you have learned. (E2, Assistant Head, Walsall)
In this sense, most interviewees suggested that the training ought to be 
better tailored to the age group they deal with by clearly presenting the 
risks and signs of radicalisation for primary school children, as they did 
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not believe that they are the same as for secondary school pupils. Most of 
our primary school respondents saw children as potential victims rather 
than perpetrators when it came to Prevent-related issues. For example,
Generally [because of ] the age of our children they probably are less sus-
ceptible to Prevent issues so we're not… if we get a trigger about a worry 
there is usually something else behind it. (E2, Assistant Head, Walsall)
This was not, however, the opinion of one of the PEOs interviewed, who 
considered that years 5 and 6 are ‘crucial times when children could be 
radicalised’ (PEO5), which justifies raising awareness, in the training 
context, of case studies of older children who are at risk of 
radicalisation.
In sum, the data collected through both surveys and interviews dis-
played a rather positive acceptance of the Prevent Duty, rooted in the 
incorporation of Prevent in a wider culture of safeguarding. Whilst sur-
vey respondents considered Prevent-related training had boosted their 
confidence in implementing the Duty, interviewees pointed out that 
training materials need to be better tailored to the primary school context.
 Raising Prevent-Related 
Safeguarding Concerns
Despite their positive acceptance of the Prevent Duty, respondents were 
not passive in its implementation. In fact, we found that the enactment 
of the Duty was dynamic and responded to its wider environment. 
Respondent’s reflections on the scenarios that would lead them to raise a 
Prevent-related safeguarding concern, illustrated how they navigate such 
dynamic interaction between the Prevent Duty and the socio-political 
context in which it is implemented.
In keeping with the incorporation of the Prevent Duty in a broader 
professional culture of safeguarding, the vast majority of respondents 
reported that they would pass on to their DSL anything they were unsure 
or uncomfortable about. For example, 86.9% of survey respondents 
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stated they were likely or very likely to make a safeguarding query if a 
student draws or writes about weapons:
It depends on the child, but I would be concerned if they were obsessing 
over something like that [weapons]. I would raise it, even if it turned out 
to be nothing. (Anonymous survey respondent)
Although mentioning the need to observe children’s behaviours over time 
and to be sensitive to the context of specific actions and statements, sur-
vey respondents reported that, in practice, they most often side-lined 
concerns, doubts, and ambiguities, in favour of referring:
It could be something or nothing but it is better to report and it be nothing 
that to ignore and it cause harm to someone. (Anonymous survey 
respondent)
In this context, time and again, falling back on wider safeguarding prac-
tices and policies, respondents reported that they would flag up any 
potential problems to allow the DSL to make the decision. Indeed, most 
of our respondents expressed trust in their schools’ procedures, with 
93.1% of survey respondents trusting their school to make sensible and 
appropriate decisions about referring pupils and staff to the Local 
Authority through the Prevent Duty. As a survey respondent put it:
I know I am well supported in school and I would report to DSL confi-
dently, even if my concerns turned out to be wrong. (Anonymous survey 
respondent)
There was also broad agreement among survey respondents about the 
kinds of actions or behaviours that would prompt them to make a refer-
ral. Despite the fact that the majority had received training specific to this 
area, several survey respondents and interviewees mentioned ‘common 
sense’ as the main determinant for a referral. For example, when asked ‘If 
you saw a student or staff member watching video clips of beheadings, 
would you make a safeguarding query?’, the overwhelming majority of 
survey respondents (87.5%) answered yes. They explained their choice by 
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using emphatic exclamations such as: ‘Does this need an explanation??!!! 
Of course!!’, ‘It is immoral!’; ‘Definitely!’, and ‘Most definitely! That is 
completely unacceptable.’ Only a handful of respondents shared more 
in-depth reflections on this issue, such as:
This is certainly a cause for concern but again does not instantly mean a 
student has been radicalised or has any intention of causing harm. It is 
important to find out why they sort [sic] out those videos and by who they 
had been told about the videos. It could be something as innocent as they 
had heard about it on social media and were curious about what people 
were talking about rather than seeking it out because they agreed with the 
video. (Anonymous survey respondent)
Most survey respondents (88%) similarly described themselves as likely 
or very likely to make a safeguarding query if a student or staff member 
made hateful statements against an ethnic, sexual, or another minority 
group. In addition, 73.8% of survey respondents said that they were 
likely or very likely to make a safeguarding query if they heard a student 
or staff member express anger about immigration and non- British cul-
tures. As one survey respondent put it:
this is most likely a racism concern and would need to be spoken to with 
DSL as it is very serious. (Anonymous survey respondent)
However, many pointed out that hateful statements and anger about 
immigration are possibly not a safeguarding concern, nor are they directly 
linked to radicalisation towards extremism. In this context, several survey 
respondents referred to different protocols when faced with potential 
instances of far-right extremism as compared with the red flags of Islamist 
extremism. In this vein, anti-immigration and hateful statements, in their 
views, would not result in referrals under the Prevent Duty:
I would think the person was racist and ignorant, but this doesn’t necessar-
ily mean they would be radicalised by a far-right group. (Anonymous sur-
vey respondent)
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Rather, these actions would be addressed through the school’s equality 
and behaviour policy:
It would be dealt with following our behaviour policy. Parents would also 
be contacted and possibly invited in to discuss pupil monitored family 
early help. (Anonymous survey respondent)
The fact that the respondents were more likely to resort to Prevent in the 
case of actions commonly associated with Islamist extremism may be 
partly explained by the content of the training. Some interviewees 
reported that the training that they had attended had placed undue 
weight on Islamist extremism. As one respondent put it:
[the training] was way too orientated around so-called ‘Muslim extremists’ 
and it just had a little bit about white supremacy at the end, and it just was 
quite… perhaps biased? (E16, Assistant Headteacher, Birmingham)
In this context, one headteacher in Birmingham recounted a negative 
experience with training delivered by the police:
The initial training that we had was via the police… I invited a number of 
my parent governors, all the staff and I have quite a lot of staff that are from 
Muslim faith Muslim background and I asked everybody in school to 
attend really for this special training. I thought it was really important and 
we really [made] a big deal out of it and after the training it didn’t go down 
as well as I would have liked. It was very instructional there was no debate 
there was no questions… The presentation we had was very one sided 
about we need to be aware that this could be happening within our schools 
and we need to look out for these signs and things like that. Actually there 
were parts of it that made me feel really uncomfortable with the audience 
that were sitting there. So I went away from that session and I went away 
wanting to do the WRAP training myself because I thought I’ll get better 
informed and I’ll do it myself in school. (E13, headteacher, Birmingham)
The Deputy Head in this same school also mentioned this event, observ-
ing that it ‘made some members of the community feel uncomfortable’ 
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and ‘was potentially a little bit inflammatory for some members of our 
team and community’ (E15, Deputy Head, Birmingham).
However, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, the enactment 
of the Prevent Duty in primary schools is dynamic and influenced by the 
wider socio-political context. In this sense, survey respondents were 
largely aware of the increasing threat from right-wing extremism in the 
UK. 73.9% of them agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I worry 
that right-wing terrorist attacks will become more frequent’. In the free 
text comments, several respondents pointed at the rise of populist politics 
around Brexit, which were seen to have legitimised anti-immigration and 
hateful statements:
Islamophobia coupled with issues around immigration have to lead to a 
rise in right wing parties lashing out against communities that perceive to 
be less British /English than them. (Anonymous survey respondent)
One survey respondent also added that the changing political context 
may trigger right-wing extremism:
The popularity of parties such as Brexit and the emergence of right-wing 
groups in Europe give credence to right wing ideologies of a more extreme 
nature. (Anonymous survey respondent)
Thus, research participants pointed out that the changing political con-
text affected the content of Prevent training and the enactment of the 
Duty at large. As one interviewee reflected:
Initially with Prevent, because of some of the things in the media and 
because it was more to do with Daesh and all of that, that’s the only aspect 
schools focused on. What we didn’t do is the far right, we didn’t do any of 
those things. Now, I think sort of a year or two on we are broadening and 
looking at it in a wider view than perhaps initially. It was just because we 
had had significant things in the news and it was all around those sorts of 
things. (E3, Deputy DSL, Walsall)
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Another headteacher echoed this perspective in pointing out that the 
training ‘has changed over the years so the first time it did seem to fall 
more on Islamic terrorism, but we feel that it is far more balanced now’ 
(E6, Headteacher, Walsall).
When reflecting on raising a Prevent-related safeguarding query, 
research participants largely adopted a better-safe-than-sorry attitude, 
consistent with a wider professional culture of safeguarding. However, 
they also highlighted that the Prevent Duty was being enacted dynami-
cally, responding to the wider socio-political context in the UK.  As a 
consequence of this changing political landscape, for example, it was 
reported that Prevent training is placing more emphasis on right-wing 
extremism.
 Embedding the Prevent Duty into 
the Promotion of Fundamental British Values
As already mentioned, most of our respondents did not problematise the 
incorporation of Prevent into wider safeguarding practices and, in fact, 
appeared to welcome Prevent as an extension of their duty of care. In the 
evidence collected through surveys and interviews, participants also 
spontaneously expressed support for the teaching of values in primary 
schools and for the embedding of Prevent into FBVs.
DfE guidelines state that ‘schools and childcare providers can also 
build pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental 
British values’ (DfE, 2015, p.5). Primary school educators in our study 
appear to have accepted these guidelines and incorporated them into 
their practice. During the interviews, when asked if the Prevent Duty is 
embedded in the curriculum, most interviewees brought up their school’s 
commitment to FBVs:
In terms of the Prevent Duty as such, I mean, for us the document itself is 
only about three or four pages. So we looked at it and thought about what 
do we do already and what do we need to look at. You know, we knew that 
British values have to be taught, we were already doing some of it but, I 
mean, we just needed to make it much more clearer [sic]. I think there is a 
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lot more of a sharper focus on what’s being done now because of the Prevent 
Duty. I think people feel a responsibility. (E13, Headteacher, Birmingham)
Another interviewee provided a similar response:
So, the way that we kind of take it, is so much to the British values route. 
We at my school have this specific curriculum for our school called the 
Three Bs, erm, and it’s about our school, and then Birmingham and Britain, 
so it’s about being part of those three communities…when we looked at, 
erm, you know, different types of extremism and, erm, people, young peo-
ple being drawn to that, we thought a lot about the isolation and actually 
we want our children to feel that they are part of our community so that 
they are not vulnerable to that kind of, erm, coercion as it were. (E16, 
Assistant Headteacher, Birmingham)
However, to make the most of their educational potential, some respon-
dents believed that Prevent-related issues (as well as other issues such as 
FGM) should be tackled in a child-friendly way, being sensitive to the 
children’s needs, and using age-appropriate terminology:
In terms of the curriculum we tend to do it in terms of how to keep safe as 
oppose to Prevent itself because of the age of the children. (E6, 
Headteacher, Walsall)
As a consequence, they reported embedding Prevent in the curriculum in 
subjects like religious education (RE) and Personal Social Health 
Education (PSHE), through topics such as ‘relationship coercion’, ‘preju-
dice and discrimination’, ‘understanding different religions’, ‘be respect-
ful of one another’s beliefs’, which are also discussed in school assemblies. 
As a headteacher described:
We don’t stand in front of our children going ‘right, today we’re doing 
about Prevent and how you stop something that doesn’t look right’. (E23, 
Headteacher, Birmingham)
Embedding Prevent into other subjects also helped solve practical chal-
lenges related with time and resources for the primary school curriculum:
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there are so many things at the moment that I feel particularly with the 
tight curriculum and particularly with the pressures placed on schools, par-
ticularly within inner city areas where let’s be honest a lot of these problems 
do arise, you’ve got the same high expectations required, expected of these 
children and the teachers, so for example you know you’ve got to get a pass 
rate of 75% which is the same in my area of Birmingham as it is in leafy 
home counties you know it just seems a bit absurd. You’ve got this intensity 
of curriculum alongside a plethora of other problems, you know you’ve got 
social issues. So what I’d say is that whilst there’s definitely will I just don’t 
think there’s the support or the time, the curriculum is incredibly tight and 
I feel as if you would need such a long time to address certain issues class 
by class and we just don’t have that time and this is probably a well-trod 
point made by a lot of teachers but unfortunately this is the case. (E26, 
Teacher, Birmingham)
Throughout their interviews, participants displayed a positive acceptance 
of teaching values in primary education. Only one educator problema-
tized the notion of FBVs, and the fact that at present it encompasses 
Prevent:
even calling it British values annoys me a little because surely some values 
are values to everybody. […] You can almost alienate people by saying 
they're British but we talk about our values and what we hold dear here. 
(E13, Headteacher, Birmingham)
This positive acceptance of teaching values and normalisation of the label 
of FBVs contrasts with the findings of research in the early childhood 
context (Chap. 5), where educators are broadly supportive of teaching 
values, but critical of labelling them as ‘British’.
 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the enactment of the Prevent Duty in 
primary schools in the West Midlands, focusing on the implementation 
of the Duty, the raising of Prevent-related safeguarding concerns, and on 
 R. da Silva et al.
113
the embedding of Prevent into FBVs. We have reported three main 
findings.
First, we find that primary school educators display a positive accep-
tance of the Prevent Duty. One survey respondent summarised that 
Prevent is ‘doing a great job and helping to educate people’. Similarly to 
secondary school teachers (see Chap. 7), primary school teachers in our 
study reported that Prevent has been successfully incorporated into wider 
safeguarding practices. Thus, despite being conscious of the need to 
observe children’s behaviours over time and to be sensitive to the context 
of specific actions and statements, our respondents reported that they 
would rather be safe than sorry. This attitude is wholly consistent with 
wider safeguarding procedures and leads to educators raising safeguard-
ing concerns and trusting that the school leadership will deal with them 
appropriately. In this context, very few respondents reflected on the 
potentially detrimental consequences of a Prevent referral for the chil-
dren, their families, and the wider community.
Second, we found that the Prevent Duty is enacted dynamically, 
responding to the context of primary education but also to the changing 
wider socio-political context. For example, respondents reflected that, 
initially, the Prevent Duty was broadly perceived as focusing on instances 
of Islamist extremism. Our data shows that this emphasis has shifted and 
that educators and those responsible for training have started to pay more 
attention to right-wing extremism. This shift may reflect local circum-
stances: in 2018, the largest proportion of individuals ‘who received 
Channel support for concerns related to right-wing extremism […] was 
from the West Midlands’ (Home Office, 2018, p.15). It is also likely to 
be a response to national efforts by the Home Office to underscore that 
Prevent addresses all forms of violent extremism. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, a large part of our data collection was carried out in the immediate 
aftermath of the Christchurch mosque shootings of March 2019, which 
placed right-wing political violence high on the news agenda.
Third, similarly to other practitioners, primary school educators in our 
study were broadly supportive of conveying values in their classrooms. In 
keeping with official guidance, the Prevent Duty is embedded in the pri-
mary school curriculum primarily through the teaching of FBVs. 
Educators reported that talking about FBVs helps tackle Prevent-related 
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issues in a child-friendly way. Many interviewees expressed support for 
teaching values such as democracy and tolerance and viewed schools as 
best placed to do so. As a survey respondent summarised: ‘In education 
we can educate pupils about the correct values for everyone without prej-
udice’. In fact, only one interviewee reflected on the potentially detri-
mental and alienating impact of labelling values as ‘British’. The scarcity 
of such critical attitudes is in contrast to the findings reported in other 
chapters in this volume (see Chaps. 3, 5, and 8).
Finally, there is a clear need for more multi-method and multi-level 
research to test these findings in regions other than the West Midlands. 
However, one message emerged consistently from the survey and inter-
views: educators repeated time and again that if the Prevent Duty is to 
work in the interests of children and the wider community, the specific 
requirements and context of primary schools should be considered at all 
stages of its enactment—from training, to operationalisation, to referral.
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Prevent in ways likely to be effective, or that enable them to avoid any 
potentially harmful impacts.
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 Introduction
Whilst all educational institutions are now subject to the Prevent Duty, 
secondary schools have faced particular public scrutiny in the wake of 
what has become the exemplar of radicalisation for many (Lundie, 2019, 
p. 329): the case of three schoolgirls from a Bethnal Green secondary 
school who travelled to Syria in 2015. Extensive media coverage around 
this case served to frame secondary school students as particularly vulner-
able to radicalisation. And today, this age-group appears to face particular 
scrutiny given that the median age of all individuals referred to Channel 
from the education sector in 2018/2019 was 14 (Home Office, 
2019, p. 9).
Secondary schools face distinct challenges in enacting the Prevent 
Duty. Prevent is underpinned by the disputed assumption that radicalisa-
tion is a product of ‘vulnerability’ (see Chap. 2), yet this concept becomes 
increasingly problematic as secondary school students progress into ado-
lescence and increasingly come to be seen as actors in their own right. It 
is widely agreed that secondary schools should be fostering the political 
agency of their students, but signs of growing political agency, when 
viewed through a lens of vulnerability, can potentially come to be seen as 
indicators of risk (see Coppock & McGovern, 2014, p. 250).
Primary school pupils are undeniably children, whilst students in col-
leges have many of the legal rights of adults, and some are legally adults, 
having turned 18. However, many secondary school students exist some-
where between childhood and adulthood. In serving those who are nei-
ther ‘villains’ nor ‘victims’ (see Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks, & De Winter, 
2015) secondary schools must balance questions of vulnerability and 
agency in specific ways, whilst being subject to a public discourse framing 
their students as particularly ‘vulnerable’ adolescents.
This chapter argues that these discourses of vulnerability go some way 
towards shaping Prevent work across secondary schools. However, it also 
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contends that educators are able to exercise agency to shape Prevent work 
in their own institutional contexts. To illustrate these processes, the chap-
ter draws on the framework of ‘policy enactment’ to explore how four 
contextual dimensions shape Prevent work in secondary schools: Situated 
Contexts; Professional Cultures; Material Contexts; and External Contexts 
(Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012, p. 21). Building on previous research 
using the enactment framework (e.g. Busher, Choudhury, & Thomas, 
2019; Vincent, 2019a), it argues that context is an ‘active force’ (Ball 
et al., 2012, p. 24) that shapes the practice of counter-radicalisation in 
secondary schools.
In making this argument, I take a different position to those who view 
the Prevent Duty as evidence of a ‘securitisation’ of education (see Chap. 
2). For such authors, the risk of childhood radicalisation has been ‘secu-
ritised’ and thus removed ‘from the realm of “normal” politics’ (see Lister, 
2019, p. 419). Yet, whilst these analyses are extremely valuable, Durodie 
(2016, p. 22) suggests the Prevent Duty may be equally emblematic of 
the reverse process, whereby a ‘therapeutic culture’ in education that has 
long treated students as ‘vulnerable’ has shaped security policy. My 
research suggests that for many educators who have long viewed their 
students as vulnerable, the Duty is far less exceptional than some 
have argued.
As Lister (2019) writes, one consequence of treating any policy as 
exceptional is the neglect of ‘broader debates about the content and direc-
tion of public policy as a whole’ (p. 419). I contend that the Prevent Duty 
is a continuation of longer-term political trends, and like Lister (2019, 
p. 426) I draw links between counter-terrorism policy and neo- liberalism. 
Neo-liberalism is a practice of governance that ‘seeks to create self- 
regulating, autonomous and responsible citizens’ (Elshimi, 2017, p. 95). 
Education has long been seen as instrumental in creating such citizens, 
(Sukarieh & Tannock, 2016, p. 31). As a result, the history of neo- liberal 
education policy has been a series of ‘problematisations’ (Ball, 2013, 
p.  28), whereby schools have been tasked with tackling an increasing 
range of societal ‘problems’ seen as detrimental to this goal.
Most educators interviewed as part of my doctoral research under-
stood radicalisation to be the latest in a long line of problems that they 
had been asked to tackle under the logic of ‘safeguarding’. This meant 
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that many were unopposed to the Duty. Of course, depending on one’s 
position, this non-problematisation of Prevent could be seen as either a 
positive or negative finding. If we take educators at their word, it may be 
analytically useful to view radicalisation as the latest problem that has 
been designated to them by the neo-liberal state.
Whilst I disagree with the notion that radicalisation is no different to 
other harms, the role of the neo-liberal educator has expanded in recent 
years to what one interviewee termed a ‘lower-level social worker’. I 
therefore argue that non-opposition to the Duty may be emblematic of 
what has already changed in education, not of how Prevent itself has 
transformed education (see Sukarieh & Tannock, 2016, p. 31). Revell 
and Bryan (2016) argue that education is now marked by ‘imperma-
nence’, and have highlighted how schools that are now used to respond-
ing to new policies might pragmatically respond to growing workloads by 
‘[taking] the same approach to every policy’ (p. 351). Within this context 
we might expect educators to deliver the Prevent Duty with the same 
pragmatic acceptance that Busher et al. (2019) identify. In this chapter, I 
explore how such pragmatism specifically shapes the enactment of the 
Prevent Duty in secondary schools.
 Methods
This chapter draws on semi-structured qualitative interviews with 32 
educators from nine secondary schools, and 14 local Prevent practitio-
ners conducted between October 2017 and September 2019, as part of 
the author’s ESRC-funded doctoral research. It also draws on supplemen-
tary interviews with six academics. The schools were a mix of local 
authority-maintained and academy schools, including one alternative 
provision for those not in mainstream education. Most were non-faith, 
with one a Catholic faith school. Six were located across three Prevent 
priority areas (PPAs), those deemed to have higher levels of local radicali-
sation risk, with the others based across two non-priority areas.
Prevent practitioners included Prevent Co-ordinators and Education 
Officers or their equivalents, as well as those for whom Prevent was only 
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part of their function. All were based across eight PPAs, but a handful 
also supported institutions in non-priority areas in their role.
Interviews were analysed using ‘thematic analysis’ (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss four themes that cap-
ture ‘something important about the data in relation to the research ques-
tion, and represent some level of patterned response or meaning’ (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006, p. 82). Drawing directly on the words of educators and 
Prevent practitioners, I use each theme to outline how ‘context’ shaped 
Prevent work in secondary schools. To guide the reader, where a respon-
dent is quoted in the main text, a respondent number is shown in brack-
ets, ‘E’ delineating an educator, and ‘P’ a Prevent practitioner.
 Understanding Prevent in ‘Context’
In the analysis that follows I discuss how each of the four contextual 
dimensions identified by Ball, Maguire, and Braun (2012) shaped the 
enactment of Prevent. I first discuss each dimension in turn, before point-
ing to important intersections between them.
 Situated Context
The ‘situated context’ refers to the specific locational and historical con-
text of schools (Ball et al., 2012, p. 21). In this section I discuss three situ-
ational features that were important in shaping Prevent work: local ‘risk’; 
institutional histories; and student cohorts.
Educators operating in PPAs often noted how they worked in ‘high- 
risk’ areas, or contextualised non-opposition to the Duty by discussing 
local cases of radicalisation reported in the media or highlighted during 
Prevent training. Non-opposition to the Duty was thus often rooted in 
an internalised view of the local area constructed by external forces. This 
effect was also evident in one non-priority area where respondents from 
two schools discussed media reports of a local case of radicalisation. And 
as many respondents came to believe that radicalisation was a real and 
local risk, Prevent work came to be shaped to address risks that were 
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specific to the physical location of each school. For example, one educa-
tor had included the threat of far-right activity at a nearby local landmark 
in a Prevent risk assessment.
Whilst many ‘risks’ discussed in interviews were hypothetical, every 
school had a distinct institutional history of risk. Most schools had either 
made a Prevent referral or asked for external advice around Prevent con-
cerns. In a minority of schools, students had received support through 
Prevent. This institutional history often shaped perceptions of Prevent in 
one of two ways. Most respondents saw incorrect referrals as having had 
no ill-effects, whilst rare instances where students had gone on to receive 
support through Prevent had, as one respondent (E22) put it, ‘woke us 
up’ to the issue. In this way, having some kind of direct or indirect experi-
ence of referrals often seemed to shape respondents’ non-opposition to 
the Duty.
At the same time, most respondents had never personally raised a 
Prevent concern, nor had any concerns about a student being radicalised. 
Many therefore felt the Duty had little impact on their practice. For these 
respondents, Prevent had faded into the background. They may now do 
what the Duty asks of them, but they may not see this as ‘Prevent’ work. 
As one respondent (E21) noted then, ‘on a day-to-day basis’, the ‘name 
Prevent doesn’t really come into it’.
However, just as Robson (Chap. 5) finds in early years settings, some 
educators now interpreted certain behaviours differently as they came to 
view students through ‘the lens of terrorism’. For example, one respon-
dent (E27) spoke of an interest in Hitler having gone from being seen as 
‘weird’ to ‘weird and worrying’. This reflected a broader trend of respon-
dents becoming increasingly aware of the threat from far-right extrem-
ism, something that is important in the current climate. However, some 
respondents had come to view behaviours in more alarmist or problem-
atic ways.
For example, one respondent (E6) had been concerned about the 
potential radicalisation of ‘a semi-school refuser’ on the back of their 
training, even though they recognised that this interpretation of such 
behaviour was ‘putting two and two together and coming back with five’. 
And most problematically, a handful of respondents discussed referrals 
made by colleagues that appeared to reflect biases in broader discourses 
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around radicalisation (see Chap. 2). For example, one respondent spoke 
of a colleague raising a concern with safeguarding staff about a Muslim 
student praying in the common room given that this was uncharacteristic 
behaviour for that student. Such incidents were rare, and were predomi-
nantly confined to the early days of the Duty. Nevertheless, this case 
demonstrated how discourses on radicalisation might sometimes shape 
educators’ perceptions in problematic ways (see O’Donnell, 2017, 
p. 179).
Finally, respondents also spoke about shaping Prevent to school cohorts 
or to ‘the community you serve’ (E3). For example, one respondent con-
trasted their work with an overwhelmingly White British cohort to 
another local school whose students predominantly came from black and 
minority ethnic backgrounds, and which had a much larger Muslim cohort:
Their approach will be very different in terms of how they discuss it with 
their pupils, as to how we discuss it with our pupils, just in the sense of the 
type of people, so we will concentrate on people that they can relate to, so 
community leaders within their own communities … at the [other] school 
it will be Imams from the local Mosque. (Educator 21)
There was much agency in how educators shaped Prevent work to their 
cohorts. However, in some cases, this creativity was seemingly constrained 
by a tendency to view specific communities as vulnerable (see O’Donnell, 
2017, p. 184) or segments of local communities as in specific need of 
intervention (see Vincent, 2019b, p. 27). For example, one respondent 
clearly saw intolerance to be a specific feature of ‘our cohort’ which, they 
had noted earlier, was a predominantly White British cohort with ‘signifi-
cant’ levels of deprivation:
[W]e feel that with our cohort that come to our school, maybe beyond our 
gates, some of the attitudes are not quite what we want them to be, and if 
they weren’t managed properly they could ultimately not meet British val-
ues. (Educator 27)
This respondent had recently updated their PSHE (Personal, Social, 
Health and Economic education) curriculum to tackle an increase in 
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students using intolerant language. There was clear value in this work. 
However, this response demonstrated how even valuable work might be 
underpinned by what Vincent (2019b) terms ‘blunt categorizations, 
assumptions and generalizations’ of cohorts (p. 26) as concerns arising 
from a small number of students had shaped a perception that the entire 
student body needed to be taught in a different way. As Vincent (2019b, 
pp. 26–27) argues, assumptions can sometimes be indicative of underly-
ing biases. However, whilst my earlier discussion of referrals suggests that 
some educators were not immune to bias, this respondent was not only 
able to identify and  discuss a  range of biases that exist in society, 
they,  like many others in my sample, saw it as their role to tackle bias 
wherever they saw it—a point I return to below. This belief suggested that 
Prevent work was underpinned by a specific understanding that respon-
dents had of their role.
 Professional Cultures
The ‘professional culture’ refers to ‘less tangible’ features of the educa-
tional context, namely ‘ethos [and] teachers’ values and commitments 
within schools’ (Ball et al., 2012, p. 26). In this section I discuss how 
institutional, professional and departmental cultures all served to ‘inflect 
policy responses in particular ways’ (Ball et al., 2012, p. 27).
Distinct institutional cultures drove varying responses. For example, 
whilst many schools adopted the language of ‘British values’ unproblem-
atically, one school had repositioned them as school values on the back of 
concerns about the ‘British’ label (see Vincent, 2019b, p. 24). This school 
also took a distinct approach to teaching students about British values, 
with one respondent (E18) noting how they drew on an existing ethos of 
‘critical pedagogy’ to challenge students to think critically about notions 
of ‘British’ values, and of ‘Britishness’ more broadly.
Three respondents invoked school cultures to argue that the Duty itself 
was not needed, on the basis that existing safeguarding procedures were 
effective. In making this argument, two pointed to media reports of 
alarmist referrals made by other schools, but both clearly felt that their 
internal procedures would prevent similar referrals being made by their 
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school. Notably, one of these respondents (E8) did argue that being asked 
to refer students ‘compromises teachers’. This was not based on any per-
sonal or institutional experience, but on concerns raised, not only in the 
media, but also by trade union colleagues. The role of the trade union was 
interesting here as it highlighted how perceptions of policy might be 
shaped by external as well as internal institutional contexts (see Ball et al., 
2012, p. 62).
However, opposition to the Duty was extremely rare, with school val-
ues often seen as being aligned with Prevent. Educators often invoked a 
culture of safeguarding and a ‘duty of care’ when discussing referrals. In 
doing so, they pointed to a professional culture of safeguarding that had 
clearly shaped educators, as they came to see their role as more than sim-
ply teaching:
[T]eaching in the classroom is a small, small part of what teachers are 
expected [to do] these days, you know, you’re a social worker, you’re a 
Prevent Officer, there’s so many things that you have to put in place, but 
that’s the role of the teacher. (Educator 20)
This professional identity had been shaped by the recent history of 
national education policy. One respondent (E21) noted how the govern-
ment had regularly ‘add[ed] more of a burden to the job role’ by intro-
ducing ‘reactive’ policies asking schools to tackle a range of issues. Junior 
staff had never worked in a context where Prevent was not part of their 
role. However, more experienced staff often felt that, rather than schools 
being changed by the Duty, the ‘world’s changed’ around schools (E30). 
Several respondents viewed the threat of terrorism as unprecedented, and 
in turn the latest in a long line of issues they had been tasked with 
tackling.
Interestingly, one respondent (E6) who saw the current threat to be 
more pronounced reflected that perceived terrorist threats had previously 
been addressed in a different way. They noted that, in the case of the IRA, 
‘we never really thought of that as a Prevent issue’. This spoke to how 
radicalisation is framed differently to ‘older’ terrorism (Elshimi, 2017, 
pp. 30–31), but also to the changing function of schools, as one academic 
interviewed for this study explained:
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[T]he professional identity of teachers is a fundamentally different beast 
now than it was 20 years ago, or 30 years ago even. You couldn’t have had 
Prevent in 1988. And, remember in 1988, you had actually a real terrorist 
threat, through the IRA. (Academic 6)
Many respondents had come to see safeguarding as one of the defining 
features of their role, making their non-opposition to what many saw as 
an extension of safeguarding unsurprising. One teacher (E20) even 
argued that ‘anybody can teach’ and suggested that the real skill of an 
educator was in dealing with safeguarding concerns. This seemingly 
undermined the traditional view of teachers as holding specialist knowl-
edge (see Bryan, 2017, p. 224) which raised some interesting questions 
about the role that expertise played in the enactment of the Prevent Duty.
Respondents valued specialist expertise on radicalisation, with many 
schools using external ‘experts’ to deliver sessions to students. However, 
most did not problematise their own lack of expertise on the topic (see 
Bryan, 2017, p.  224). For example, one respondent (E21) argued the 
‘idea of having a Prevent specialist [on the staff] would be a bit much’. 
Some respondents identified colleagues with specific knowledges that 
might deliver Prevent work—a point I return to below. However, for 
most, the role was ‘to report, and it ends there’ (E9). As a result, many did 
not feel as though they needed any specialist knowledge on radicalisation 
as they had always passed safeguarding concerns of any kind to those that 
did have the relevant expertise.
Classroom staff would raise issues with safeguarding teams, who would 
ultimately decide on whether to pass concerns onto external bodies. This 
process was often underpinned by a risk-averse logic, with one safeguard-
ing lead (E17) arguing that ‘there’s no grey areas, there’s no opinions, if a 
child presents in that way we pass that information on’. Interestingly, 
whilst this respondent saw such an approach to be common sense, they 
recognised that those who don’t work in schools might argue that such a 
risk-averse approach to referrals is ‘not really helping anyone’. This com-
ment suggested that there might be something distinctive about the safe-




Two potentially distinctive features stood out in my interviews. First, 
whilst the notion of educators monitoring students for signs of radicalisa-
tion is contentious (see Chap. 1), schooling has increasingly been marked 
by a growing culture of surveillance (see Chap. 3). This surveillance has 
been enabled by a growth in technology—a point I return to shortly—
and by legislation that has increased educators’ powers to, among other 
things, search students’ belongings (Ball et  al., 2012, pp.  100–101). 
Interviews suggested that surveillance in the name of ‘safeguarding’ had 
largely been normalised, with one respondent unproblematically discuss-
ing having searched a student’s phone, for example. To a non-educator 
like myself, such surveillance was unexpected. However, it was perhaps 
unsurprising that educators working in an existing culture of surveillance 
would deliver Prevent in this way.
Second, one safeguarding lead (E7) argued that educators are generally 
less opposed to Prevent than the general public ‘because the nature of our 
bubble in which we operate is that young people are vulnerable’. This 
suggested that support for the Duty was underpinned by a pre-existing 
‘therapeutic culture’ that, as discussed earlier, fundamentally viewed 
young people as vulnerable. Respondents regularly used a language of 
vulnerability to express concerns about students being exploited, and of a 
need to build ‘resilience’ through the curriculum (see also Chap. 8). As 
one respondent remarked, aside from core skills, ‘the one thing I want 
[students] to have when they leave is awareness and resilience’ (E26). For 
them, this meant using PSHE to build students’ resilience to a range of 
potential vulnerabilities, again demonstrating how radicalisation came to 
be treated in much the same way as other issues.
In many schools, curriculum work of this kind would be tailored to 
different year groups. Younger students would often focus on British val-
ues, whilst older year groups might learn more explicitly about radicalisa-
tion or Prevent itself. Sixth-form students might also be asked to lead 
assemblies for younger year groups. This highlighted how adolescents 
came to be asked to play a role in enacting Prevent, with some schools 
even teaching students the indicators of radicalisation so that they could 
recognise if they, or their peers, were being radicalised. Notably, I heard 
of one Prevent referral where students had alerted staff to content a class-
mate had posted online. As students progressed into adolescence then, 
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building resilience seemed to increasingly rest on using the curriculum to 
foster students’ agency to keep themselves safe.
This work often took place in PSHE lessons, which meant non- 
specialists often delivered work around Prevent. However, subject spe-
cialists were tasked with leading this curriculum work in some schools, 
demonstrating how individual roles were often shaped by departmental 
contexts (see Ball et al., 2012, pp. 28–29). For example, several schools 
had come to deliver Prevent work through the Religious Education (RE) 
curriculum.
In many schools, extremism was already being discussed in RE class-
rooms before 2015. For example, one Head of RE (E29) spoke of histori-
cally being asked to ‘drop everything’ in the wake of terrorist attacks so 
that they could lead discussions on terrorism with students. Prior to the 
Duty, they had been the only teacher expected to do so. However, they 
noted that the Prevent Duty had forced other teachers to discuss a topic 
they had previously avoided. Where they saw colleagues as feeling pres-
surised by the Duty, they now personally felt more freedom. Where 
before they would have discussed incidents in a ‘reactive’ way, discussions 
of extremism were now more formally embedded in their curriculum and 
in other subjects on the back of the Duty. This meant they now felt as 
though they could refuse to ‘drop everything’ in the wake of a future 
incident, as the topic was now more routinely discussed across the school.
The fact that a Head of RE had been specifically asked to ‘drop every-
thing’ highlighted how specific subjects were often perceived to lend 
themselves to Prevent. This is not without controversy, with some authors 
opposed to any attempt to ‘politicise’ Religious Education (see Jackson, 
2015). However, many respondents felt that RE, and other subjects such 
as History or English, were appropriate for Prevent work. This might be 
because they saw an overlap between Prevent and topics such as Nazi 
Germany, or because they felt that discussion-based lessons were most 
appropriate for this work. In such classes, discussions related to Prevent 
would sometimes be planned, but they were more often ad hoc (see 
Vincent, 2019b, p. 25):
And some of our subjects lend themselves to it as well, like English, you 
discuss everything […] openly a pupil said, ‘Well, this kind of people, duh 
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de duh de duh’, and I would have done what I would usually do, I stopped, 
and I dealt, and I addressed that. (Educator 14)
Several respondents discussed challenging students who espouse biased 
views in this same way, with many seeing it as their role as an educator to 
tackle intolerant views. Interestingly, this role often extended beyond 
challenging biases that students might hold, as shown by one respondent 
working with local Prevent practitioners, to address what they and several 
colleagues had seen to be biases in original Prevent training materials.
Respondents were willing to tackle biased opinions regardless of the 
subject they taught. However, some subjects were not seen to lend them-
selves to formal Prevent curriculum work. Prevent Practitioners noted 
this might be down to a lack of confidence that some teachers have 
around this topic. However, the professional role of teachers might also 
vary across departments. For example, the aforementioned Head of RE 
recounted how a colleague had asked them to speak to a student holding 
concerning views long before the Duty existed:
[T]his was a Science teacher talking to me, and they saw their job was to 
get through their Science GCSE, whereas the job of the RE teacher was to 
be a little bit more [about] building relationships. (Educator 29)
This exchange suggested that departmental context might shape how 
educators perceived of their own, and their colleagues’, potential role in 
Prevent. Many educators were willing to perform the roles set forth for 
them. However, their ability to do so was shaped by the material realities 
of the setting, which at different times might enable or constrain 
Prevent work.
 Material Context
Material features such as ‘buildings and budgets … levels of staffing, 
information technologies and infrastructure’ (Ball et  al., 2012, p.  29) 
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shape the conditions in which policies are enacted. In this section I point 
to three such factors: infrastructure, finances, and time.
First, Prevent was able to draw on pre-existing technological infrastruc-
tures. For example, one respondent (E18) spoke of installing a Prevent 
‘add-on’ to existing Internet filtering and monitoring software, and 
another (E21) of a Prevent ‘tick-box’ being added to software used for 
reporting safeguarding concerns. The use of such pre-existing technology 
highlighted how enactment often rested on simply adapting existing 
tools (see Chap. 3) that enabled Prevent in different ways. The use of the 
former was further evidence that surveillance had already been nor-
malised before the Duty, whilst the latter literally eased the process of 
enacting the Prevent Duty as reporting concerns of any type had become 
‘literally a two-minute job’ (E23).
Second, schools had varying levels of resources. Prevent work was 
shaped by financial constraints, which are ‘the most “material” of all the 
contextual factors’ (Ball et al., 2012, p. 34). Budgets for Prevent work 
varied. One Prevent practitioner (P14) spoke of an institution that was 
‘fortunate’ to have the funds to pay a private contractor to deliver work-
shops every year, yet noted that most schools would not have the funds 
to do so. Some respondents sourced external providers in a similar way. 
However, respondents often relied on providers funded by local authori-
ties, noting how they would ‘jump at the chance’ (E30), or try to ‘seize 
the opportunity’ (E31) whenever such sessions were offered to them.
However, respondents were not always able to take up such offers as 
they lacked the time to do so. Prevent had to fit into existing time-spaces, 
which inevitably varied across schools:
[E]verybody’s got different restrictions on them in terms of time, and how 
things can be delivered, so it’s all about just, adapting things so we can get 
the best results … (Educator 31)
Subjects often cited as useful for Prevent are often given little curriculum 
time (see Vincent, 2019a, p. 57). In my sample, standalone Citizenship 
lessons were rare, RE was often taught for as little as one hour per week, 
whilst PSHE was mainly delivered in form time, and in wide-ranging drop-
down days. Several practitioners noted that the structure of the curriculum 
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and levels of contact time with students left more time for Prevent work 
than in colleges. However, this space remained limited as schools predomi-
nantly came to deliver Prevent through the PSHE curriculum which is, as 
Vincent (2019a) notes, a ‘baggy holdall of topics’ (p. 45).
This limitation was perhaps especially true in the early days of the 
Duty, with one Prevent practitioner (P13) noting that ‘most schools 
delivered [Prevent] as standalone modules’ as their PSHE curriculums 
had already been finalised when the Duty became law. Yet, even as Prevent 
had been formally embedded in the PSHE curriculum over time, it came 
to be treated as just one issue among many that had to compete for atten-
tion. In some schools, there were more spaces for Prevent. Some schools 
had Prevent-related drop-down days, whilst one respondent (E26) kept 
the PSHE curriculum ‘malleable’ to leave space to discuss emerging 
issues, or take advantage of any sessions offered by the local authority. 
However, even in this malleable curriculum, Prevent was but one of over 
a dozen topics to be discussed throughout the year.
Some schools had developed their approach over time by ‘taking own-
ership’ of Prevent and producing their own resources (P4). However, not 
all schools had time to do this. For example, one safeguarding lead (E7) 
hoped curriculum work would become more embedded, but wanted the 
government to drive this by producing a dedicated curriculum since 
‘schools don’t have the time or capacity’ to do so. In this way then, even 
respondents who may wish to do more Prevent work did not always have 
the resources to do so. These resources may be further reduced over time 
as secondary schools adapt to an ever-changing external context.
 External Context
The final set of factors was pressures from ‘wider local and national policy 
frameworks’ (Ball et  al., 2012, p. 36). Here, I draw attention to three 
particularly important external factors: local authority delivery struc-
tures; Ofsted; and wider policy requirements.
First, Prevent delivery structures varied across regions. Schools in PPAs 
had access to local authority Prevent practitioners and Prevent-funded 
projects that were less common in non-priority areas. These practitioners 
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performed the role of ‘mid-level policy enactor’ (Vincent, 2019a, p. 17), 
with local authorities interpreting the Duty and in turn shaping their 
support for schools in different ways (see Chap. 2). Enactment was 
marked by ‘interpretations of interpretations’ (Ball et al., 2012, p. 3), as 
the resources available to schools varied according to the approaches 
adopted at local authority level. For example, whilst the educator above 
wanted national government to produce a Prevent-related curriculum, 
local authority Prevent practitioners in other PPAs had already developed 
similar resources.
The landscape was different in non-priority areas, with the Police often 
taking a more central role in training (particularly in the early days of the 
Prevent Duty), and as the first port-of-call for concerns. It was interesting 
that one local authority Prevent practitioner (P6), who now led on train-
ing schools, described the previous approach of the Police training schools 
in their area as a ‘securitised model’ of delivery. This raises the possibility 
that concerns about ‘securitisation’ are more applicable to those non- 
priority areas in which the Police retain a role similar to that during the 
much-criticised ‘Prevent 1’ phase (see Chap. 2).
As touched on above, a range of private and third-sector providers also 
delivered Prevent work in schools, with the Duty providing a ‘market 
opportunity’ (Ball et al., 2012, p. 106) for ‘expert’ providers wishing to 
commercially create resources or offer guidance (see Vincent, 2019a, 
p.  54). In this way then, Prevent work relied on a network of differ-
ent actors.
However, the most significant external actor was the school inspector-
ate, Ofsted. A need to prove compliance to Ofsted was a core driver of 
Prevent work for many respondents. In turn, there were clear signs of 
‘performativity’ as described by Ball (2003) as some schools adopted a 
tick-box approach to enacting the Duty (see also Chap. 5). Some respon-
dents explicitly used a language of ‘box-ticking’ (see McGlynn & McDaid, 
2019, pp. 134–140) to describe Prevent training or mapping British val-
ues across the curriculum. Moreover, one educator’s (E29) discussion of 
potentially introducing a British values display despite noting ‘I don’t 




Performativity was even evident in how some educators discussed 
Prevent work that they clearly felt was useful. For example, one respon-
dent (E26) had adopted an approach of ‘repetition and re-enforcement’. 
This meant discussing individual topics, including Prevent, across mul-
tiple PSHE lessons throughout the year. They did so both because it was 
seen to be an effective approach for ensuring that key messages ‘sink in’, 
but also so they could demonstrate to Ofsted that students would learn 
about a topic, even if they missed one session.
External pressure was clearly important (see Vincent, 2019a, p. 137). 
In the immediate aftermath of the Duty’s introduction, Prevent had been 
a priority for many respondents as they arranged whole-school training, 
or mapped Prevent across the curriculum to prove compliance. However, 
respondents did not find it unusual to be asked to tackle new issues in 
this way:
I mean to be honest there’s so many different legislations and acts coming 
into place that you can’t remember what you’re doing, you just know you’re 
doing it, [laughs] you don’t know what it’s called. (Educator 22)
Prevent came to be seen as part of a broader policy ensemble. In some 
schools it was even introduced alongside other responsibilities, with one 
respondent (E6) noting how the Duty was presented as one of ‘two new 
balls up in the air’ alongside new training on LGBTQ equality. To bor-
row an analogy from earlier, the Duty entered a ‘baggy holdall’ of policies 
competing for attention. Prevent may have been a priority back in 2015, 
but as with many other policies, it had faded into the background, only 
to be thrust into the foreground again at certain times.
Priorities were often determined by events outside of the school. The 
attention schools gave to a specific issue would often be dictated by exter-
nal agencies, with one respondent (E17) noting how different topics 
would be ‘fashionable’ to local authorities at different times. More 
directly, respondents often noted how classroom Prevent work, and in 
some cases their own concerns about radicalisation, might increase in the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack. It was therefore unsurprising to hear one 
Prevent practitioner (P5) remark that in some months they receive no 
Channel referrals, but in others ‘there are spikes around major incidents’.
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In discussing this trend, this practitioner remarked that Prevent had 
‘an advantage’ given the disproportionate media coverage that terrorism 
receives. Educators were clearly aware of this media discourse, with one 
respondent framing the Duty as evidence that ‘the front pages have 
jumped into my classroom’ (E30). In turn, several respondents remarked 
that schools could not shy away from Prevent work given that many stu-
dents would be equally aware of media coverage of terrorism, and would 
want to discuss it in their lessons (see Chap. 4). In this way then, events 
outside of the school had the power to impact the day-to-day work of 
educators.
Prevent was therefore enacted within a specific and ever-changing 
external context (see Vincent, 2019a, p. 137). As this external context 
evolves, new priorities will emerge. Already, in the wake of growing pub-
lic concerns about rising knife crime, the government has announced 
plans for a new ‘Public Health Duty’ requiring schools to report young 
people at risk of such violence (Hymas, 2019). Just as radicalisation was 
not the first problematisation of education, it will not be the last. And 
perhaps as new responsibilities emerge, the widespread perception 
amongst educators that the Prevent Duty is unexceptional might con-
tinue to grow.
 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how a range of contextual factors shaped Prevent 
work in the secondary schools that participated in this research. First, 
educators tailored Prevent to risks they saw as specific to the historical 
and geographic locales in which they worked. Second, a professional cul-
ture of safeguarding contributed to a widespread acceptance of Prevent, 
whilst distinct institutional and departmental cultures shaped practical 
responses to the Duty. Thirdly, Prevent work was shaped by material con-
siderations such as time, money, and technology. And finally, local and 
national government policy shaped how schools engaged with Prevent.
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None of these dimensions operated in isolation. Many respondents 
internalised external discourses framing students as vulnerable to radi-
calisation. This meant there were fleeting signs of alarmism, and even 
bias. However, educators retained the scope to mediate these discourses 
as they were filtered through distinct professional and institutional con-
texts. As many came to understand radicalisation as but one of many 
local issues emerging in distinct situated contexts, respondents came to 
enact Prevent in much the same way as any number of earlier policies, 
tailoring it according to the institutions and departments in which they 
worked. And whilst many of the approaches schools adopted in 2015 had 
seemingly remained unchanged, Prevent work did not remain entirely 
static, as it constantly had to respond to emerging external events. Taken 
together then, the precise form that Prevent work took was shaped by 
how multiple contextual factors intersected in specific institutions at spe-
cific times.
Such a conclusion mirrors many of the findings from the other studies 
in this volume. However, the realities of secondary education afforded 
particular opportunities and constraints for Prevent. This suggests that 
the impact of the Prevent Duty can only truly be understood by explor-
ing how Prevent is enacted in specific contexts. Ultimately then, ‘taking 
context seriously’ (Ball et al., 2012, p. 19) seems essential if we are to 
truly advance our understanding of how counter-radicalisation is prac-
tised at the local and institutional levels.
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Enacting the Prevent Duty in Further 
Education
Natalie James
Abstract This chapter explores staff and student experiences of the class-
room implementation of the Prevent Duty within further education. It 
focuses on two key dimensions of the Duty: the teaching of Prevent and 
its role as a safeguarding mechanism. It highlights the malleable nature of 
the Duty, whereby educators have tailored their enactment of it in ways 
that they believe can help overcome some of the problems the Duty was 
perceived to have raised. It also highlights however that the ability of staff 
and students to enact the Duty in this way was constrained by the pro-
cesses of governance which surround the Duty and the dominant public 
narratives of prejudice which inform and are informed by it.
Keywords Prevent Duty • Further education • Malleability • British 
values • Safeguarding • Students • Staff agency
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Annual Prevent statistics have continuously placed the education sector 
as the leading area from which Prevent referrals emerge. Moreover, the 
age range most likely to be referred has consistently been the 15–20 cat-
egory since the Duty’s inception (see Chap. 1). This would suggest that 
the further education (FE) sector has been under an enormous pressure 
to comply with the Prevent Duty, yet there has been little research under-
taken regarding the only education sector dealing with predominantly 
16–18-year-olds (see Beighton & Revell, 2018; Moffat & Gerard, 2020). 
This chapter presents an insight into some of the key findings which 
emerged from a three-year study into experiences of the Prevent Duty 
within Greater Manchester’s (GM) FE sector.
Focusing on the practicalities of implementation within the classroom, 
this chapter explores how FE teaching staff sought to embed the Prevent 
Duty within their institutions. It does so by revealing two dominant 
spaces through which staff translated the legislation into practice: through 
their teaching practices and their institutional safeguarding processes. 
Moreover, it also highlights the role students played at these sites of 
implementation, exploring the extent of both their involvement in and 
their acceptance of such measures.
Like other chapters in this volume, this chapter also utilises Ball, 
Maguire, and Braun’s (2012; see also Braun, Ball, Maguire, & Hoskins, 
2011) concept of enactment and consideration of context to explore how 
the implementation of the Duty by staff and their students within the 
classrooms of FE institutions occurred and the limitations which sur-
rounded their approaches. In doing so, this chapter argues that such 
experiences highlighted a malleable nature to the Prevent Duty, whereby 
educators were able to tailor their enactments to the needs of their insti-
tution and those within it. Moreover, in viewing the Duty as malleable, 
this enabled educators to use their implementation to overcome some of 
the perceived problems which Chap. 2 of this volume explores. Yet, in 
revealing these sites where the Duty could be interpreted through the 
eyes of educators, this chapter also highlights the contextual factors which 
limited them, such as the processes of governance which surround the 
Duty and the dominant public narratives of prejudice which inform and 
are informed by it.
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 The FE Context
Critical to reading the following findings is an understanding of the con-
text in which these actions were taken. The year 2015 was momentous 
for the FE sector. Not only did it face the introduction of the Prevent 
Duty, but the school-leaving age was also increased from sixteen to eigh-
teen. Therefore, from 2015, anyone up to the age of eighteen was required 
to be in either education or training, and thus subject to the Prevent 
Duty—a key part of this then became the management of adult learners 
who were still subject to the same safeguarding procedures as children 
within secondary or primary schools. For the FE sector, this meant not 
only an increased demand for services but also an increased demand on 
staff to deliver a variety of curriculums to a diverse student body. It also 
created a new space within which staff simultaneously had the responsi-
bility to protect students from extremism and terrorism under their safe-
guarding responsibilities, whilst also transferring this responsibility of 
protection over to students in their passage from childhood to adulthood. 
This was further complicated by the inclusion of mature students within 
this realm, blurring the boundaries further of where responsibility lay for 
preventing oneself and those around them from becoming vulnerable to 
radicalisation (James, forthcoming). Moreover, it also brought training 
providers, often in the form of private companies, squarely into the mix 
for being subject to the same inspections and regulations that academic 
providers were, through their inclusion to the FE sector.
 Research Basis
This chapter draws on a three-year study engaged with both staff (13 
participants) and students (45) across five institutions within Greater 
Manchester (GM), which comprised two training and three academic 
providers. Representatives from local councils, the Department for 
Education, independent training providers, the North West Counter- 
Terrorism Unit and Ofsted also participated. The study was undertaken 
through focus groups (9), semi-structured interviews (21), participant 
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observation (9) and an online questionnaire (49). Respondents have been 
anonymised in the extracts that follow and participants in the student 
focus groups selected their own pseudonyms (see James [forthcoming] 
for further methodological detail). Although seven of the ten GM bor-
oughs were included in the research, such small-scale research cannot 
claim to produce generalisable results about the whole of the FE sector, 
or even FE provision in GM. Rather the research generates insights into 
processes of policy enactment in FE institutions, and in doing so helps to 
illustrate how the Prevent Duty comes to have impacts on staff and 
students.
The Manchester Arena bombing in 2017 also occurred as access for 
fieldwork was being negotiated (fieldwork was undertaken between 
October 2017 and November 2018). Whilst there is no available mea-
surement of the impact this had on the data, it is likely that this event had 
a bearing on some of the experiences obtained. Indeed, it was referenced 
by several participants—both staff and students—as bringing these issues 
to the forefront of their minds when implementing Prevent.
 Teaching Prevent
For the vast majority of teaching staff who took part in this research, their 
training on Prevent had been delivered to them by their designated safe-
guarding lead (DSL). The session was an adapted version of the govern-
ment’s Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training, which 
enabled a tailored approach from the generic public sector training into 
one suitable for their particular institution. Respondents involved in the 
delivery of such training indicated that this had been the general approach 
to training for some time and highlighted the malleability in the Duty to 
go through such adaptations. Though the nature and content of the 
training varied, this institutional level of training was designed to enable 
teaching staff to gain the knowledge and access to resources necessary to 
embed the Prevent Duty into their classroom. Teaching staff would then 
further adapt this training for their own pedagogical needs. Thus, prior to 
the Duty being enacted within the classroom, there already existed two 
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sites of transformation within the institutions through which the Prevent 
Duty became implemented: at DSL level and at teaching staff level.
It is the second process with which this chapter is concerned. For 
teaching staff, the Prevent Duty meant ensuring students were resilient to 
the ideologies of extremism and terrorism through two key means—via 
pedagogical practices around what extremism and terrorism might look 
like, and promoting fundamental British values within the classroom, the 
latter of which I deal with first. The experiences highlight the ways in 
which educators were able to tailor their enactments within the class-
room as a result of the Duty’s malleability, but also how the governance 
processes surrounding this, and in particular inspection regimes, placed 
constraints on this malleability.
 Teaching Fundamental British Values
British values are defined by the UK government as democracy, individ-
ual liberty, the rule of law, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with 
different faiths and beliefs (Department for Education, 2014). Though, 
as an agenda, they have been within political discourse since the premier-
ship of Gordon Brown, they became cemented in the education system 
through the Prevent Duty in their presentation as the antithesis to the 
values of extremist and terrorist ideologies (James, 2018). Here, embody-
ing British values was presented as a means of resilience against becoming 
radicalised (McGhee & Zhang, 2017). Thus, teaching staff were tasked 
with the responsibility of ensuring that British values were embedded 
within their classroom delivery: the education system acting as a site of 
citizenship development (see Jerome & Clemitshaw, 2012). For many of 
the teaching staff who participated, encouraging good citizenry was noth-
ing new, nor was the utilisation of a values agenda in the promotion of 
this. The provision of Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural (SMSC) 
development within pedagogic practices was, for them, a longstanding 
values agenda that was already central to their classroom delivery. Thus, 
it was not the idea of a values agenda, nor the values themselves, which 
were perceived as problematic, as both were seen as a continuation of the 
existing SMSC agenda. Rather, it was the labelling of these values as dis-
tinctly ‘British’ which created a number of potential issues.
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A number of the participants raised concerns around the extent to 
which ‘British values’ could encompass all students, particularly those 
who did not perceive themselves as being British or of a primarily British 
identity. Both teaching staff and students questioned the usefulness in 
labelling the values as ‘British’ when, for them, they were ‘human’ or 
‘universal’ values and thus applicable to people outside of Britain too. For 
many there was nothing distinctly British about the values; rather, they 
were values to which anyone could adhere; though some conceded this 
was anyone within the West, noting the Western-centric narratives at the 
heart of the values themselves (Winter & Mills, 2020; Miah, 2017; 
Revell & Bryan, 2018). Some respondents viewed the British label as 
problematic as it was perceived to place Britain, and those easily identifi-
able as ‘British’, as being superior to Others. These sentiments were par-
ticularly strong amongst some of the students, with this excerpt reflecting 
a number of the fieldwork conversations that took place:
Isla: They should be everybody’s values
Rachael: Yeah
Lois: Yeah it just segregates so many people, it’s like
Interviewer: In what way, do you think?
Lois: Because, if you’re a good person, [Isla: it doesn’t matter 
what country you’re from] it doesn’t matter where you’re 
from, what religion you’ve got, what race, you know it’s 
just like you don’t have to have an excuse to be a nice per-
son and it doesn’t matter if you’re living in Britain and you 
don’t consider yourself British, it’s like, you know, it feels 
like it could isolate some people being like ‘you have to, 
you know if you’re going to be a nice person you have to 
British!’ it’s like well you don’t! (Academic Institute 1, 
Female Focus group)
For these students, and for a number of their peers who participated in 
the research, the fundamental British values agenda was interpreted 
through this lens of hierarchical goodness (who could be a good citizen or 
not) and gave rise to concerns around the potential exclusion which could 
occur as a result of the Us versus Them narrative they perceived this 
British label to have (Smith, 2016).
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Many staff and student participants expressed fears that in defining the 
values as British, the agenda would further exclude or alienate those stu-
dents who did not identify as British, who were often more visible by 
their ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic identity anyway, further 
emphasising their difference. As one teacher noted:
They’re British values, but they’re everyday values, they’re all about respect 
and tolerance, treating people how you want to be treated, and a lot of our 
clientele, ninety percent are non-British, or don’t identify as being British, 
so we go through British values, and they’re like ‘well I’m not British, do 
they not apply to me?’ (Counselling, Psychology and Mental Health 
Educator, Training Institute 2)
This also raised concern about those who had such visible markers of dif-
ference whilst also considering themselves as British. For both staff and 
student participants, there was a grey area in how these students would 
manage their multiple identity structures. For a number of staff and stu-
dent participants, markers of difference became, or had the potential to 
become, hyper-visible. Many of the staff participants who raised concerns 
around this suggested that whilst students knew they were ‘British val-
ues’, staff instead referred to the values as ‘human’, ‘our’, ‘college’ or ‘uni-
versal’ values to both minimise these fears and the potential for those who 
did not identify as British from being excluded from the notion of good 
citizenship in an attempt to actively include them within discussions 
around this (see Busher, Choudhury, Thomas, & Harris, 2017).
It is important to note that there were, however, some respondents 
who did not express concerns around British values. For some, British 
values were viewed as unproblematic.
I think the British values stuff is just like the basics of what makes our 
society work erm and what creates sort of like cohesion within us all. 
(Politics Educator, Academic Institute 1)
Moreover, for some, ‘British values’ were not only something that were 
felt to be central to upholding the way of life in Britain, they should also 
be celebrated.
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I fully appreciate British values, I totally understand democracy, the rule of 
law, I can see the difference between what happens in the UK and what 
happens in my country, for example, I’m from South America. (Social Care 
Educator, Training Institute 2)
Thus, for some of the respondents, British values were a positive addition 
to the education sector which gave the opportunity for a ‘multiplicity of 
voices’ to be united (Politics Educator, Academic Institute 1) both inside 
and outside of the classroom.
Nonetheless, even amongst those who advocated for the language of 
Britishness, there remained an overwhelming sense that the labelling of 
the values as British had not been because they could only be seen through 
such a framework, but because this had become a directive from Ofsted 
through the common inspection framework. In this sense, the performa-
tivity of their enactments as noted in Chaps. 5 and 7 of this volume are 
also visible in the further education sector:
I think we do British values every lesson regardless of whether we were told 
to do British values or not you know what I mean? […] so you know it’s 
just about signposting it you know […] but we’ve got a poster on the wall 
about it […] cos obviously when British values came in, we had to evidence 
to Ofsted that you know it’s within our classrooms at all times […] it 
would be about the signposting around the college and if Ofsted popped 
into your lesson, to mention the word British values and that should tick 
the boxes. (Politics Educator, Academic Institute 1)
Though this Politics educator had not problematised the British framing 
of the values agenda, evident in an earlier excerpt, she simultaneously 
labelled its integration into the classroom as an exercise to ‘tick the boxes’ 
for Ofsted. Embedding British values then became about staff perform-
ing their duty (Ball, 2003). This performativity, however, was more prob-
lematic in the classroom for some. For example, another educator who 
did not reject the fundamental British values label altogether, nonethe-
less, suggested that Ofsted’s requirement for the British label to be visible 
within their enactments of the Duty had made teaching these values 
more onerous. She suggested that without extra time and effort taken to 
explore the relevance and necessity of the agenda, and its position within 
British society, the label of the values as British created a barrier for 
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students to meaningfully engage: ‘they’d be like “ugh, British values, ugh” 
and look at you’ (Business Access to HE Educator, Training Institute 2). 
For this educator, the agenda itself was not problematic, but its gover-
nance was. In Ofsted’s requirement for it to be explicitly referred to as a 
fundamental British values agenda, her ability to tailor her enactment of 
the Duty became limited. Where the agenda was labelled as just values, 
there were fewer issues which arose from students, she suggested, but 
where the framing of it as British became required for Ofsted inspections, 
the rejection or reluctance visible in students (see also above) resulted in 
her having to deconstruct its value and worth within her classroom. Thus, 
her ability to utilise the malleability of the Duty became limited once the 
perceived requirements of Ofsted governed her enactment of it within 
the classroom.
Whilst the extent to which staff accepted the values being labelled 
British varied, this performative nature of British values, as a result of 
Ofsted’s requirement, remained constant throughout their experiences. 
This limitation arose out of staff members concerns that a failure to make 
these visible would result in a potential sanction for them and their insti-
tution. The pressure to perform during inspections and the stakes for not 
doing so acted as a deterrent to completely omit the language from the 
classroom. Though Andrew Cooke, North West Head of Ofsted, stated 
there was no requirement to see British values referred to explicitly, the 
following admission suggested that its absence would be flagged as some-
thing which required investigation:
If it wasn’t called British values then, I don’t think you know, well we would 
ask perhaps why, I suppose sometimes the question is if people deliberately 
don’t use the word British, you then ask the question why, and what’s 
driving that?
The experiences highlight the nuances, or grey areas, which surrounded 
the implementation of the fundamental British values agenda. Moreover, 
these perceptions of the common inspection framework and its require-
ments of staff also reveal the ways in which the Duty intersected with 
wider systems of governance and the pressure which staff, in particular, 
felt as a result.
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 Teaching About Extremism and Terrorism
A second area in which Prevent shaped pedagogical practice was in staff 
provision of the knowledge around what extremism and terrorism might 
look like. Some participant staff suggested that this was embedded within 
their day-to-day curriculum, through the encouragement of critical 
thinking skills but almost all placed the primary focus in teaching Prevent 
on specific sessions which sought to educate students around the signs 
and risks of radicalisation. For most, this came in the form of tutorial 
sessions in which broader citizenship agendas were delivered, with one or 
two weeks per year dedicated specifically to Prevent. These were labelled 
‘raising awareness’ sessions which were about ‘building learner resilience’ 
(Teacher Trainer, Training Institute) through providing them with the 
knowledge and skills to identify and subsequently reject extremist or ter-
rorist narratives. Sessions provided examples, which I shortly discuss, of 
the processes of radicalisation and students being asked to explore what 
signs were shown, how these could have been stopped, and informed of 
what support might be put in place. These sessions were supplemented by 
posters which were visible in each room in each institution participating 
in the research that stated who to speak to should a student, or staff mem-
ber, be concerned that they or someone they know is or might be being 
radicalised. As with the perceived expectations around the regulation of 
British values, teaching staff also perceived their engagement with Prevent 
in the classroom to be inspected and thus requiring evidencing. Sessions 
solely devoted to this gave them a clear-cut means of doing so. For a 
number of staff members, external resources provided an avenue for them 
to obtain the evidence they perceived necessary to pass an inspection:
[The students] have to do a test at the end [of the workshop] and they get 
a certificate which they send to me (…) it’s one more thing that I can say if 
Ofsted come and go “how does X, Y, and Z know that” it’s just one more 
thing to back me up. (Business Administration and Customer Service 
Educator, Training Institute 2)
The emphasis this educator placed on being able to provide evidence for 
Ofsted was replicated by the majority of teaching staff who participated. 
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I suggest this was largely due to the context of compliance and regulation 
within which the Prevent Duty was placed and which was already shaped 
through these modes of governance (Ball et al., 2012). Yet, despite their 
familiarity with the requirements to evidence their compliance, this was 
still viewed by many of the staff members to be a limit upon their enact-
ments, because of the power that Ofsted was perceived to exert through 
their requirements to pass inspections. Whilst many of the DSLs voiced 
a preference for Prevent being brought in through ‘naturally’ occurring 
conversations, many of the teaching staff did not feel this to be enough to 
demonstrate their teaching of Prevent. As a result, whilst staff adopted 
their own approach to the pedagogy of Prevent, their scope for interpre-
tation was constrained by the perceived need to utilise approaches which 
would provide tangible evidence that they could have on ‘standby’ should 
they be asked for it by Ofsted.
The utilisation of external resources to conduct these sessions was com-
monplace across the institutions, whether in the form of videos, info-
graphics, online sessions or a combination. A number of these educators, 
and in some cases their DSLs, would seek out a variety of external 
resources to create packages of learning in order to direct and aid their 
delivery of content which was largely unfamiliar to them. The capacity to 
use external resources allowed staff to bridge knowledge and confidence 
gaps, enabling them to distance themselves from the content and instead 
provide pedagogic support around the skills that would require students 
to navigate the knowledge that had been supplied from elsewhere.
Moreover, most staff utilised these external sources in their attempts to 
avoid presenting simplistic or one-sided accounts of radicalisation by 
carefully selecting or developing their own resources. For these staff 
members, there remained an over-emphasis on Islamist-related concerns 
within the materials which were provided as learning resources. As a 
result, a number of staff who participated saw many of the generic 
resources associating radicalisation with Islam and thus Muslim students 
being seen as the target of the agenda (also see Dudenhoefer, 2018; 
Kyriacou, Szczepek Reed, Said, & Davies, 2017; Saeed, 2017). Though 
many of the DSLs had sought to provide resources that did not propagate 
such stereotypes, a number of teaching staff felt such adaptions had not 
gone far enough and therefore sought to further minimise the risk of 
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stigmatising Muslim students by supplementing these resources with 
their own. This commonly included the use of what staff referred to as 
examples of different forms of extremism, with focus predominantly 
placed on far-right inspired extremism as well as Islamist examples. Staff 
saw these efforts as their attempts to move Prevent away from being 
focused primarily on Muslims (see Chap. 2). Whilst several of the staff 
observed that it was problematic that these adaptions were necessary, 
their ability to enact the Duty through their own resources highlighted 
the malleability of the Duty and thus the capacity of those on the ground 
to shape it.
A significant proportion of the staff suggested, however, that the domi-
nance of wider public narratives of prejudice which placed Islam as a 
security threat limited the effectiveness of their efforts to shift perceptions 
about the focus of the Prevent Duty. These narratives were seen as con-
straining such efforts in two ways. Firstly, some staff recognised that 
ongoing exposure to prejudicial depictions of Islam within the media and 
government rhetoric was likely to give rise to bias within their own think-
ing and professional judgement. Secondly, some staff at least expressed 
the view that within a context of entrenched public discourses that posi-
tioned Islam as the primary terrorist threat, their attempts to challenge 
these depictions were likely to have limited effect.
Students recognised the attempts by staff to bring in non-Islamist 
forms of extremism and terrorism to their sessions, but also referenced 
the same problematic narratives of prejudice which conceptualised Islam, 
and therefore Muslims, as the terrorist threat. Almost all of the students 
who participated believed that it was the media who created this narrative 
of the terrorist as ‘the Asian guy with the beard’ (Rio, Student, Mixed 
Focus Group, Training Institute 2):
Like any brown person that you see on the street, they get labelled instantly 
don’t they. (Henry, Student, Mixed Focus Group, Academic Institute 2)
This sentiment was echoed by a number of students who suggested that 
white perpetrators of violence were often depicted, in contrast, as men-
tally unstable. Therefore, for many of the students, racial, cultural and 
religious signifiers had become central markers for understanding who 
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could be seen as threatening and thus the target of programmes like the 
Prevent Duty—namely Muslims, and those who looked Muslim. Efforts 
by their teachers to challenge this were welcomed but not perceived as 
enough to break such narratives down.
Many of the staff participants similarly recognised the barrage of media 
images and rhetoric that had been in place since 9/11 and had played an 
important role in shaping these young people’s perceptions of terror-
ism (See also Jerome & Elwick, 2019). For the majority of their students, 
Islamist-inspired terrorism had been all they had ever known. Moreover, 
for a number of staff and students, there was a feeling that by the point 
of further education, attempts to break down these perceptions were too 
little too late for individuals for whom these narratives had been accepted 
and normalised. For these staff members, their students pre-learned per-
ceptions meant their job to break down these narratives became even 
more challenging at an age where their views were already formed as they 
were entering into adulthood. As a result, for staff members, their efforts 
to minimise the problematic conceptions surrounding threat(s), and thus 
Prevent, rested not only on their capacities to shift away from a simplistic 
and one-sided presentation of radicalisation in their resources but also on 
their abilities to break down entrenched perceptions of who was likely to 
become radicalised. Thus whilst the Duty provided the space for other 
forms of extremism to be explored, and for previous claims around its 
targeting to be minimised, staff enactments to fulfil these adaptations 
through ground-level implementation were limited by such deeply 
engrained narratives of prejudice within the wider public discourse.
 The ‘Safeguarding’ Dimension of Prevent
Existing scholarship indicates broad acceptance within the education sec-
tor of the framing of Prevent as a safeguarding mechanism (Bryan, 2017; 
Busher, Choudhury, & Thomas, 2019; Jerome, Elwick, & Kazim, 2019). 
This was also found among the staff who participated in this research. 
Many did see the introduction of the Prevent Duty as an extension of 
their existing responsibilities around safeguarding their students from 
potential harms, with radicalisation seen in the same vein as child sexual 
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exploitation, abuse or substance misuse. Although some respondents 
made reference to the Counter-Terrorism Unit becoming involved in dis-
cussions around referrals for DSLs, once external support was felt to be 
required (James, forthcoming), internal referral processes relating to con-
cerns over potential radicalisation issues followed normal safeguarding 
procedures for teaching staff.
Where concerns were raised, teaching staff would disclose the matter 
to safeguarding teams, whether through a paperwork trail or an online 
system, and their DSL would then investigate the concern. In this sense, 
referrals under the Prevent Duty were no different than any other form of 
safeguarding. Whilst many online participants described this referral pro-
cess, face-to-face participants revealed a further layer of deliberation. This 
comprised informal conversations with colleagues prior to informing 
their safeguarding teams to gain further reassurance that their concerns 
were valid. Of note, respondents described these conversations as being 
more likely to take place in cases related to radicalisation than other forms 
of harm. Such discussions, often outside of the safeguarding team, were 
described as providing staff themselves with a safeguard against making 
the wrong call. This, in many cases, related to when staff had a gut feeling 
but wanted to affirm this with others. As one member of staff noted, this 
was partly a result of trying to manage their own possible unconscious 
bias. As she explained, when concerned about a Muslim student, she used 
these informal conversations with colleagues as a means of reducing the 
risk that she was over-interpreting the situation because of her religion:
I talked to other members of staff who said, ‘no, refer it’, so that was nice: 
that we could discuss it without kind of breaking data protection or any-
thing like that, I could discuss it with other people and that reassured me 
that I could report it. (Fine Art Educator, Academic Institute 1)
For this staff member, it was the fear of ‘interfering with that student’s 
right to be religious’ by viewing her increased religiosity as a central rea-
son for referral which led them to seek reassurance from colleagues that it 
was not their bias which was guiding their referral but a shift in behav-
iour. Student discussions also noted concerns around potential uncon-
scious bias from staff members in their referrals:
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I’m not saying I’m a terrorist (laughs) but I might show the same traits or 
warning signs or something but as like a small white girl I don’t think it’d 
be picked up as like ‘she might be a terrorist’ like I don’t think I’d have that 
problem whereas say, this college is very diverse, and I think if some other, 
like if a lad was like that and he was from a different ethnicity, from a dif-
ferent background, I think he would be more likely to be picked out as 
‘ooh what’s this about’ rather than, like me. (Ava, Student, Academic 
Institute 1)
This extract from Ava’s dialogue demonstrates the perception visible 
within a number of students’ experiences, that a perceived Muslimness 
was central to whether or not someone could be viewed as being poten-
tially radicalised. Cultural, ethnic and religious markers of difference 
were seen by students who shared Ava’s concerns as markers of ‘risk’ 
(Heath-Kelly, 2013) which became hyper-visible in their perceived asso-
ciation with terrorism. For a number of students, fellow students with 
these ‘traits’ were perceived to therefore be hyper-visible to those deciding 
who was ‘at risk’ of radicalisation. Yet, despite their reservations, almost 
all of the students thought that those deemed ‘at risk’ of radicalisation 
should be referred to the relevant authorities.
The notion of better to be safe than sorry was evident in many of the 
experiences—of both staff and students—where the potential fallout 
from a wrong call was seen to be a far lesser burden to carry than that of 
missing an opportunity to stop an attack(er). As in McGlynn and 
McDaid’s (2018) study of university students’ perceptions of Prevent 
then, the student participants in this study also appeared to accept and to 
have internalised the idea that Prevent comprised a legitimate form of 
safeguarding:
It’s safeguarding isn’t it? […] you’re [as a teacher] in place of the parents 
[…] so if you suspect somebody you’re not only protecting them like trying 
to get them out of that scenario, you’re protecting everybody else involved 
because if something was to happen, it’s not just them being affected, it’s 
the entire community. (Ashleigh, Student, Mixed Focus Group One, 
Training Institute 1)
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Though students understood they were being asked to be aware of the 
signs of radicalisation, the vast majority suggested that this was not some-
thing they felt was required of them, nor would it be something they 
would anticipate ever having to do. For most of the students in the 
research, though the threat of radicalisation was real, it was not some-
thing that was familiar or close to them or their peers. It was only after an 
attack had happened that students felt their awareness around terrorism 
and extremism became heightened; outside of these, this was something 
that felt distant. For students who suggested that the Manchester Arena 
attack did bring concerns around terrorism to their attention, their focus 
was placed on those impacted by the events, rather than the perpetrator. 
The likelihood that they or those they knew would be impacted by a ter-
rorist attack, even after the arena bombing, was low, but the likelihood 
that they or their friends might be the ones to perpetrate such an act was 
even lower. Instead, students’ concern over their friends would be put 
down to mental health, family problems, stress or other well-being issues; 
putting a concern down to potential radicalisation would be ‘a last resort’ 
(Rachel, Student, Mixed Focus Group, Academic Institute 1). For stu-
dents in the research, the visibility of attacks reified the presence of threat 
within wider society, but the perception that this was something they or 
their friends might be involved with was distanced.
These experiences highlighted an internalisation of the Prevent Duty 
as  a safeguarding mechanism. For both staff and students, the Duty’s 
enactment through those existing platforms of safeguarding was simply a 
continuation of the practices and principles of their institutions to pro-
tect students from harm. The concerns felt by some were largely seen as 
not being a result of the Duty itself, but as resulting from the problematic 
narratives of prejudice which surrounded perceptions of who the Duty 
was most likely to be preventing.
 Conclusion
Through this exploration of staff and student experiences, two narratives 
have emerged which, together, enable us to tell this story of the imple-
mentation of the Prevent Duty within these further education institutes.
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Firstly, the experiences highlighted the way in which the malleability 
of the Duty enabled staff to utilise existing practices and processes as a 
means of embedding the Duty into their current pedagogical practices. 
Whether through its embedding of a values agenda or its requirement to 
refer those vulnerable to radicalisation, the Prevent Duty became some-
thing which was accepted and integrated into existing mechanisms. In 
this sense, the Duty simply extended responsibilities and actions that had 
already been expected of staff.
Secondly, there is a story of the limitations surrounding these enact-
ments. The limitations emerged from two key places: the processes of 
governance which regulate the Duty, and the wider public narratives of 
prejudice which inform and are informed by it. The malleability of the 
Duty enabled staff to minimise the perceived stigmatisations and divi-
sions which were felt to inform Prevent as a counter-terrorism agenda. 
This occurred through a shift away from an isolated focus on Islamist- 
inspired terrorism, a distancing from values as distinctly British and a 
recognition of internal bias regarding potential referrers. For educators 
and their students, these actions enabled them to challenge and seek to 
minimise the potential negative effects of the Prevent Duty that they 
perceived. However, staff members often perceived that their attempts to 
shift the focus of the Duty away from Muslims, or those who looked 
Muslim, were ultimately rendered fairly ineffective by the power of the 
public discourse which continued to perpetuate the idea that Prevent 
work did and ought to focus on Muslims.
The second place in which these limitations became apparent was in 
the processes of governance which surrounded the Duty. Staff perceived 
the Duty’s malleability to be limited by the requirements of Ofsted. 
Whilst external resources helped teachers bridge knowledge and confi-
dence gaps, they were also used to obtain documented evidence of teach-
ing Prevent; whilst ‘Our’ values were advocated, ‘British’ values were on 
posters or dropped in during inspections to ensure compliance. For many 
of the staff then, the Duty’s malleability opened up possibilities for varied 
enactments, but only so long as they could provide evidence of meeting 
the expectations of Ofsted.
It seems then that in FE, as in other parts of the education sector 
(Chaps. 5, 6, and 7), staff made use of significant malleability within the 
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Prevent Duty to enact it in ways that they saw as fitting with their wider 
professional practice and commitment to the education and well-being 
of their students, and that arguably challenge some of the popular cri-
tiques of the Prevent agenda. Yet at the same time, the scope of educators 
and their students to interpret the Prevent Duty as they wanted was con-
strained by the environment in which they were operating, both in terms 
of the wider public discourses inscribed with significant and persistent 
anti-Muslim prejudice, and in terms of the processes of governance that 
often undermined the willingness or confidence of educators to exercise 
their professional judgement.
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Our decision to write this book was motivated by the belief that if we as 
a society are to have a meaningful conversation about the Prevent Duty 
and the wider Prevent strategy, then we need to be better informed about 
how the Duty has played out on the ground since it was introduced in 
2015. In order to develop such an understanding, it is important to get 
beyond, although not to discard or overlook, high-level policy and theo-
retical analysis, and to explore the experiences of the educators, students 
and other actors whose lives are being influenced directly by the Duty. In 
this final short chapter we draw out some of the main insights from across 
the preceding chapters. We organise this discussion around the three 
basic focal points for analysis that run throughout the book: the enact-
ment, impacts and implications of the Prevent Duty.
 The Enactment of the Prevent Duty
Perhaps the most striking theme here concerns the Duty’s rapid normali-
sation within education. Throughout the volume, the picture that 
emerges is, for the most part, one of the Duty quickly coming to be seen 
as just another of the many requirements placed on educators. While it 
initially caused considerable anxiety, in general the Duty appears to have 
become a ‘non-exceptional’ area of practice for many education profes-
sionals (see especially Chap. 7).
All of the chapters indicate that the UK government’s framing of the 
Duty as a straightforward extension of existing safeguarding responsibilities 
has largely been accepted by educators, despite criticisms by a number of 
academics that the extension of this concept potentially pathologises and 
closes down dissent, and is likely to focus disproportionately on Muslim 
students (see Chap. 2). Nevertheless, occasional disruptions to this policy 
frame in the course of educators’ own reflective practice indicate there are 
still some unresolved tensions in this ‘Prevent-as- safeguarding’ narrative 
(see Chaps. 3 and 8). Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 also illustrate how the 
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common framing of the Duty as ‘safeguarding’ obscures the very different 
implications for each age-related phase of education. In practice, safeguard-
ing in the early years context is rather different from the further education 
sector and so, therefore, the Prevent Duty leads to quite distinctive prac-
tices related to surveillance and reporting. For example, among early years 
practitioners, particular emphasis appears to have been placed on increased 
surveillance of the families of children in their care (Chap. 5).
What the chapters also reveal is how quickly staff moved from feelings 
of anxiety about the Duty to the type of policy problem solving typical of 
‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 2010). They examined the new require-
ments, ‘mapped’ how these requirements fitted with their existing prac-
tice, identified where their existing practices would require adaptation in 
order ensure compliance, and some explored opportunities the Duty 
might offer to pursue new projects or priorities. In other words, and at 
risk of over-simplification, while this rapid normalisation of the Prevent 
Duty has partly been a product of ‘top-down’ policy processes, it has also 
been a product of the way educators themselves have integrated it into 
existing professional practices and organisational cultures.
This rapid normalisation of the Duty has had important implications for 
how it has played out in practice. Most obviously, it has contributed to 
soften professional reticence about, or opposition to, the Duty. There has 
not been the widespread resistance to the Duty that one might have expected 
given the breadth and intensity of the criticism expressed prior to its intro-
duction. Indeed, the chapters in this volume report that there has even been 
some positive acceptance. However, there is evidence of some continued 
professional wariness about, and resistance to, the Duty. This is particularly 
concentrated around the requirements to promote fundamental British val-
ues. Here, despite significant continuity with an existing pedagogical and 
organisational focus on values, the emphasis placed on the supposed 
Britishness of these values was often, although not unanimously, seen as 
being problematic, and quite possibly counter- productive—whether in 
terms of fostering potentially toxic in-group and out-group categories, or 
producing a narrow and somewhat impoverished discourse and understand-
ing about positive values (see especially Chap. 5). There is also some evi-
dence that concerns about the Duty are more prevalent among black and 
minority ethnic educators who, perhaps, might be more attuned to the 
Duty’s potential to reinforce forms of structural racism (see Chap. 3).
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 The Impacts of the Prevent Duty
It is important to note how challenging it is to identify and demonstrate 
with confidence the impacts of the Prevent Duty per se, without reaching 
well beyond the data. In particular, it is often difficult to disentangle the 
effects of the Duty from those of wider developments both within the 
education sector and within society more broadly (see especially Chaps. 
7 and 8). Nonetheless, the kind of ‘low-hovering research’ (Anderson, 
2007) presented in this volume offers a number of insights that are likely 
to be of interest to researchers, policymakers, civil society groups and 
educators alike.
What these accounts of the Prevent Duty really have in common is that 
they all paint a picture of considerable ambivalence: seemingly defying 
easy summarisation. In terms of the impact of the Duty on professional 
practice, the evidence indicates that most educators perceive the Duty to 
have had relatively little impact, either because they perceived it to be 
broadly commensurate with existing practices, or due to subtle forms of 
resistance, such as continuing to talk about ‘our values’ or ‘school values’ 
rather than ‘fundamental British values’. Yet as discussed in Chap. 1, there 
was, at least initially, a marked increase in Prevent referrals after the Duty 
came into force; approximately a third of Prevent referrals have continued 
to come from the education sector, and despite the general narratives of 
continuity, across the chapters there is also evidence of considerable pro-
fessional adaptation and innovation.
In terms of whether the Duty has had a ‘chilling effect’ on the voices of 
children and young people, there is a fairly consistent finding that staff 
are broadly confident in their ability to mitigate its possible negative 
effects. Indeed, there is evidence that some educators have seen the Duty 
as an opportunity to encourage greater dialogue around issues previously 
considered too sensitive or contentious, and to reprioritise areas of work 
that, until recently, would broadly have fallen under citizenship educa-
tion. Some of the data raise questions about the extent to which such 
perceptions among staff resonate with the lived experience of children 
and young people, and particularly those of Muslim and other minority 
ethnic or religious backgrounds (see especially Chap. 8).
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What does seem to be clear from the evidence from secondary students 
(Chap. 4) is that young people want their teachers to create the space for 
open and critical investigation of issues related to terrorism and extrem-
ism. However, the resources endorsed by government for use in the class-
room (reviewed in Chap. 4) fall considerably short of the kind of 
education requested by the students, which underlines the challenge for 
teachers in selecting, supplementing and interpreting such material (see 
Chap. 8). This raises important questions about whether it might be pref-
erable for the UK government simply to re-emphasise such areas of work 
(e.g., learning about terrorism, extremism and the fundamental British 
values, but also about positive citizenship and democratic processes and 
values) within national curricula, rather than covering them separately 
under the rubric of Prevent. Bajaj (2012) has noted that curriculum con-
tent can be transformed by the context in which it is encountered, and so 
it may well be significant if concepts such as democracy, liberty and tol-
eration are largely learned through British values and Prevent, rather than 
a broader form of critical citizenship education (Vincent, 2019).
The evidence about the possible link between the Prevent Duty and 
the stigmatisation of Muslim children and young people is also difficult 
to decipher. There appear to be fairly widespread perceptions that this 
risk exists, and both adults and young people recognise that their rela-
tionships and experiences are influenced by a wider context of substantial 
and persistent anti-Muslim racism and prejudice. The data discussed in 
this book demonstrate the potential for staff risk-assessments and refer-
rals to be shaped by unconscious bias. They also indicate important varia-
tion in terms of the degree to which educators are confident that such 
risks can be effectively managed.
 The Wider Implications of the Prevent Duty 
and of Our Research
In turning to consider the implications of our research we have to move 
beyond the data and assert our own interpretations of what they might 
mean. We suggest this research raises two points of particular importance 
 L. Jerome et al.
165
for thinking about the Prevent Duty. First, the descriptions of the Duty 
set out in this volume lend considerable support to the idea that it should 
be understood within the context of ongoing processes of professional 
responsibilisation that are central to the expansion of neo-liberal forms of 
governance (Garland, 1996; Thomas, 2017). While policymakers might 
well argue that the Duty places legal responsibility on institutions rather 
than individuals, it would suggest a rather naïve understanding of sys-
tems of power and accountability within contemporary professions to 
argue that the Duty has not placed greater responsibility and pressure on 
individuals. While responsibility for the Duty is felt particularly keenly 
by members of staff with specific safeguarding responsibilities (Chap. 3), 
it seems clear that these responsibilities have been internalised by educa-
tors more broadly, and that this has had a significant bearing on their 
lived experience. There is also evidence that educators often locate respon-
sibility for the apparent failures of the Duty—whether in terms of miss-
ing ‘genuine cases’ or inappropriate referrals or other practices—with the 
individuals and institutions that have ‘done it badly’ (Chap. 3), rather 
than with higher-level processes of policy design and implementation. It 
seems reasonable to expect that this has had a major bearing on profes-
sional evaluations of the Duty.
The second point is about how the introduction of the Duty is shaping 
wider policy and public debates about Prevent and the UK’s Counter- 
Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST). If the broad accommodation of the 
Prevent Duty by a substantial majority of the educators in this volume 
reflects a general phenomenon across the half a million educators in 
Britain, this would appear to lend considerable weight to Heath-Kelly 
and Strausz’s (2019) argument that we might be witnessing a ‘banalisa-
tion’ of counter-terrorism (see also Awan, Spiller, & Whiting, 2018; 
McGlynn & McDaid, 2019).
It remains unclear however what the implications of this banalisation 
will be. As Heath-Kelly and Strausz argue, if those responsibilised under 
the Duty internalise its logic and become less inclined to critically engage 
with this and similar legislation it might be seen as a source of concern. 
On this view we might expect that they will become more likely to slip 
into practices that both exacerbate structural racism and expand surveil-
lance in ways that could seriously constrain free speech and undermine 
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human rights. Yet it seems that other effects of this banalisation are also 
possible. This is because, at the same time as the counter-terrorism logics 
inscribed in the Prevent Duty come to permeate other areas of practice, 
including those related to education and childcare, prior practices and 
logics operating in these other spaces might also begin to shape the prac-
tice of the Prevent Duty and Prevent policy more generally. As Prevent 
becomes something banal, direct opposition might diminish, but so too 
might the accompanying sense of intimidation, anxiety and insecurity 
among professionals that is likely to distort their professional judgement 
and foster discriminatory practices. The banalisation of Prevent might 
also result in education and childcare professionals feeling increasingly 
emboldened to develop their own take on the Duty and to mould it 
around their own existing professional and institutional cultures and 
ethos, in the context of their wider relationships with families and com-
munities. As this happens in early years provision, schools and colleges 
across the country, it is possible that grassroots policy enactment by edu-
cation and childcare professionals could not only significantly reconfig-
ure what the Prevent Duty looks like in educational settings, but might 
also give rise to important ‘bottom-up’ policy innovations that have wider 
implications for how societies seek to respond to issues such as polarisa-
tion, terrorism and political violence.
 Final Thoughts
The picture that we have traced of the Prevent Duty in early years, pri-
mary, secondary and further education is one characterised by significant 
ambivalence. These findings do not lend themselves easily to claims that, 
as some critics of Prevent would have it, the Duty is a major threat to a 
cohesive, democratic and fair society. Yet neither do they lend themselves 
to claims that the problems that the Prevent Duty throws up can simply 
be addressed through a little more training and support. Such findings do 
not translate easily into policy recommendations. What they do, how-
ever, is provide an important reminder, should one be needed, that policy 
plays out in complex and often surprising ways as it travels from initial 
intention into practice (Ball, Maguire & Braun, 2013). Policies 
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concerned with countering and preventing violent extremism are no dif-
ferent. If we are serious about wanting to understand the effects of such 
policies, we must get as close as possible to where they are being put into 
practice, and we must be willing to grapple with a messy reality that 
might not fit comfortably, if at all, with our expectations.
We would argue that the accounts of this messy reality set out in this 
book also indicate that the educational debate about Prevent might use-
fully be expanded beyond the issues of securitisation, responsibilisation 
and the erosion of professional boundaries that have tended to dominate 
discussion to date, important though these remain. The first distinctively 
educational issue to emerge concerns what children and young people 
need to learn about terrorism and extremism, in order to feel that they 
understand the issues (including the threats and the policies designed to 
counter those threats). Teachers and other professionals are well-placed as 
trusted adults to play a role in building this level of critical understanding 
and to engage children and young people in various forms of values edu-
cation, but it seems that policy could do more to empower them to 
undertake this fundamental educational role. Some of the educators in 
this research across all age-phases continue to question whether the fram-
ing of such knowledge as the ‘promotion’ of ‘fundamental British values’ 
is the most useful way to articulate what children and young people 
should learn. In practical terms, such framing seems to be alienating (at 
least some) professionals from the policy, even when they are generally 
well-disposed to the Prevent Duty as a whole.
The second educational issue relates to the nature of safeguarding. 
Here staff seem to have taken steps to integrate the Prevent Duty into 
existing safeguarding practices, and yet they also report concerns that the 
surveillance and monitoring of Muslim and minority ethnic students 
might reflect unconscious bias and prejudice. There is also evidence that 
some referrals are motivated by fears of being judged to have missed 
something, rather than being solely rooted in individual safeguarding 
concerns for children and young people. We note that the number and 
profile of referrals is shifting over time, and so this is an open question 
about whether the Duty encourages over-reporting, especially of some 
groups, or whether this is settling down as the policy becomes normalised. 
However, our research indicates that, even where the Prevent Duty has 
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been absorbed into existing safeguarding practices, there are on-going 
concerns that such practices continue to be disproportionately focused 
on children and young people from specific ethnic or religious minori-
ties, even where staff actively seek to mitigate against such effects. We 
believe therefore that some sort of equality impact review might be a use-
ful next step in the policy’s development.
As Chap. 2 indicated, the Prevent policy has evolved over time and 
responded to government priorities, external events, and public percep-
tions and fears about those events. As the policy continues to evolve, we 
hope that this book, and the kind of research it offers, will encourage 
policy-makers to take account of the way the policy is enacted and of the 
multiple effects it has on educators, children and young people and oth-
ers. The conclusions we have outlined in this chapter indicate some of the 
insights that can be gleaned from attending to the voices of those in the 
education sector affected by the Prevent Duty, and suggest aspects of the 
policy that can be improved. This does not ignore the debates about 
whether the Duty is the right kind of policy in the first place, but it does 
suggest that, if the Duty continues, there are some pragmatic steps that 
should be taken to avoid or minimise unintended harm. We hope such 
pragmatic suggestions will inform the next steps of those leading the 
development of policy at national level, as well as those enacting policy 
through their roles in the education system.
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